Technology's Disaster Clock

[bananas]

http://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2010/06/technologys-disaster-clock/58367/

Technology's Disaster Clock

Jun 18 2010, 12:45 PM ET

Remember the Ixtoc I well blowout of 1979, that released about 3.3 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico over more than ten months? Not many North Americans do -- because they were less environmentally conscious, because it occurred in Mexican rather than U.S. waters, because Iran's Islamic revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan filled the airwaves and the headlines, or even because many of today's adults were too young to notice, or even unborn.

And that's one of the big problems behind the BP oil spill. In 1977 the University College London civil engineers Paul Sibley and Alistair Walker published a paper suggesting that major bridge collapses occurred at approximately 30-year intervals as new designs succeeded old as a result of the failure's lessons, new generations of designers became increasingly confident in the safety record of their innovations, until they finally pushed them over a tipping point, beginning a new cycle. The civil engineering professor and historian of technology Henry Petroski has developed this idea, which last came to the fore in the Minneapolis bridge collapse of 2007, as discussed here and here. My graduate teacher William H. McNeill coined a mordant phrase for such recurrence of disasters partially as a result of confidence in reforms, the Law of the Conservation of Catastrophe.

Do cycles of disaster apply to oil rigs as well as to bridges? Sibly and Walker thought so. In the February 12, 1976 issue of New Scientist they had the North Sea in mind when they wrote "When Will an Oil Platform Fail?" but their conclusion was prophetic for the Gulf as well:

Our studies have shown that it is a mistake to rely on the success of previous structures as an assurance of safety and that whenever vigilance is relaxed the price must be paid. With the present scale of structures the price will undoubtedly be much higher than the cost of any testing or research that could be done now.

This applies to nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons.
It's been a long time since a nuclear energy disaster, so people think that nuclear energy is perfectly safe.
It's been a long time since a nuclear weapon disaster, so people think that nuclear weapons are perfectly safe.
They combine those and become complacent about the dangers of nuclear weapon proliferation associated with nuclear energy.

[kristopher]

1. Kick and recommend

[joshcryer]

2. Yes, relaxing vigilance is a bad policy for any energy source.

People will be hurt if we are not vigilant.

[Confusious]

3. That's why when they build new plants,

They don't use the old safety systems of 30 years ago. They have new safety system that have fewer parts and work on principles that won't fail. Like gravity and convection.

Unless you think gravity will fail, or water will no longer obey the laws of physics.

Bad analogy, considering that the oil companies are using the same safety systems of 30 years ago.

[bananas]

4. Thanks for providing an example of complacency

Serious design flaws have been discovered in both the EPR and AP-1000.
Even without those flaws, both reactors are quite capable of failing catastrophically.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/nov/27/nuclear-power-reactor-design

Designs for new UK nuclear reactors are unsafe, claims watchdog
Major setback for energy plans as report finds flaws in US and French models
* Terry Macalister
* The Guardian, Friday 27 November 2009

Britain's main safety regulator threw the government's energy plans into chaos tonight by damning the nuclear industry's leading designs for new plants. The Health and Safety Executive said it could not recommend plans for new reactors because of wide-ranging concerns about their safety.

<snip>

[Confusious]

5. Usual part of design process

They always have some complaint. They wouldn't feel right about collecting a cheque if they didn't. Like feet and inches rather the meters.

Even without those flaws, both reactors are quite capable of failing catastrophically.

That's why you have safety systems.

Japan, France. 50 years. Even with massive earthquakes in Japan.

Here's a more current article, Westinghouse changes design

http://www.powergenworldwide.com/index/display/articledisplay/0650284690/articles/powergenworldwide/nuclear/reactors/2010/02/uk-nuclear_safety.html

"The fact that we have issued a regulatory issue does not mean that the design is unsafe - ND is still assessing designs on paper, so any safety detriment is still in the design stage. Westinghouse is considering a number of possible solutions, such as further analysis, testing and possible changes to the design, and intend to provide detailed proposals and supporting evidence by the end of October 2010."

Highlighted so you don't miss it.

and another

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Questions_on_AP1000_structures_1702102.html