Who is Brig. Gen. CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR.?

[trof]

I think you should get to know this guy.
I also think he's on our side.
trof

TECHNOLOGY AND THE 21ST CENTURY BATTLEFIELD: RECOMPLICATING MORAL
LIFE FOR THE STATESMAN AND THE SOLDIER (1992)

In this monograph, Air Force Colonel Charles Dunlap starts
from the traditional American notion that technology might offer
a way to decrease the horror and suffering of warfare. He points
out that historically this assumption is flawed in that past
technological advances, from gunpowder weapons to bombers,
have only made warfare more—not less—bloody. With a
relentless logic, Colonel Dunlap takes to task those who say that
the Revolution in Military Affairs has the potential to make war
less bloody.

Exerpt:
Ultimately, a doctrine that relies on antiseptic methods of
warfare may prove dangerously seductive. Seemingly tailormade
for an era of post-modern politics, precision weapons also
have the potential to increase the propensity of political leaders
to resort to violent means. The ready availability of PGMs (Precision Guided Munitions) may
tempt them to conclude that force need no longer remain the
option of last resort, and induce them to employ their arsenal
without due reflection.
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/1999/techbatl/techbatl.pdf

The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012
CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR.
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1992/dunlap.htm

Biography here:
http://www.af.mil/bios/bio_print.asp?bioID=5293&page=1

[troublemaker]

1. Your post reminds me of this section from

an endless essay I wrote as theraputic self-help after the war:

Smart Weapons
Were our policy makers seduced by dreams of risk-free techno-war? Did anyone ever tell Bush that when he gave the go ahead he was personally authorizing the killing of at least 5000 innocent civilians? Did he ever ask? 

During the war we heard a lot about how JDAMs and other civilian friendly laser and GPS weaponry almost eliminate risk to civilians. That's both true and false. Substituting smart bombs for dumb bombs is extremely civilian friendly if you keep the dumb bomb missions unchanged. In practice we have expanded the range of acceptable missions to keep up with our newfound accuracy. A target next to a school can be hit with precision so we are now willing to bomb next to schools. Don't get me wrong. In Iraq we definitely did a lot to avoid collateral damage--a non-explosive concrete bomb taking out a single satellite dish is more humane than high explosives--but it wasn't quite as friendly as our PR claimed or as friendly as the available technology allowed. Speaking of PR, during the war I got the impression from the press briefings that we were using smart weapons almost exclusively. After the war we learned that the majority of bombs dropped on Iraq were regular-old unguided dumb bombs. (See the Air Force's first comprehensive after-action summary... should be on the web somewhere)

Emboldened by what Leonard Cohen called "the beauty of our weapons" we launched a decapitation strike against Saddam Hussein based on intelligence that he was in a bunker beneath a restaurant. A series of bombs hit atop each other like Robin Hood splitting the arrow leaving a crater the size of a blimp and deep enough to take out any bunker. But there was no bunker. All we had done was bomb a restaurant during the lunch hour, killing everyone inside. There's some ambiguity in public sources as to whether we hit the correct building but there was no bunker, or whether we hit the wrong building. Either way, it's a good bet we would have skipped that mission entirely if we only had dumb bombs.

[trof]

2. You and Dunlap think a lot alike.

He's JAG at Langley now.
Were you in Iraq?

[troublemaker]

4. Not me. I've never served (except lunch)

Just the kind of therapeutic self-help even many of us couch jockeys needed after watching such an depressing reality show... or was it a mini-series? Tough to say sometimes.

[bemildred]

3. Hope you are feeling better.

Your comments are right on. It's the same old explosion
at the end, "precision bomb" is an oxymoron, but we have
lot's of newspeak in the military these days.

[bobthedrummer]

5. He authored Revolution in Political and Military Affairs/RPMA in 1996

My view is that it is reflective of much of the neo-conservative dominated military think tanks (such as USAF/INSS) during the Clinton era and very RW, imo it certainly is reflective of the highly politicized officer corps that hated President Clinton, who is mentioned in the opening paragraph.

Revolution in Political and Military Affairs/RPMA by Charles Dunlap October 1996
http://www.guerrillacampaign.com/coup.htm

As an aside, anyone else remember the incident of Captain Craig Button???
http://www.rickross.com/reference/jw/jw1.html

[trof]

7. Aha! The quote I was looking for.

On the breakdown of discipline and the "politization" of the military.
Thanks.

"Worst of all was the handling of the 1993 case of an Air Force major general who publicly denounced President Clinton as a "gay loving, pot smoking, draft dodging womanizer." This egregious violation of Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice's proscription against the use of contemptuous language toward the commander in chief merely resulted in nonjudicial punishment, an administrative action reserved by law for "minor offenses." Once that precedent was set, it is little wonder that a malignancy I call "neopraetorianism" arose."

[bobthedrummer]

9. And I thank you for your service to OUR nation.

:hi:

[seemslikeadream]

16. seems you were thinking about Charles almost a year ago

http://www.democraticunderground.com/cgi-bin/duforum/duboard.cgi?az=show_thread&om=8124&forum=DCForumID71

came across it on google!

[bobthedrummer]

6. Kick

:dem:

[troublemaker]

12. kickback n/t

[troublemaker]

8. The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012

Whatever the man's politics it's interesting reading. Thanks for posting this. http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1992/dunlap.htm

(Maybe this should be re-posted with that subject line: The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012. Would probably draw more eyes)

[keithyboy]

10. Whoever he is, we should know more about him

He is definitely a 'thinking' person.

[trof]

11. I think this guy thinks more by his first cup of coffee

than I do in a week.
;-)

[seemslikeadream]

13. BRIGADIER GENERAL CHARLES J. DUNLAP JR.

Brig. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap Jr. is the Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va. General Dunlap is the principal legal adviser to the ACC Commander and staff on legal issues involving military justice, combat operations, civil litigation, environmental law, international law, administrative law, claims and other legal matters. The general provides professional guidance to more than 200 military and civilian attorneys, and to 400 enlisted paralegals and civilians. He establishes policy oversight for 21 base legal offices, including four general court-martial jurisdictions, which provide legal services to more than 214,000 active-duty personnel and dependents.

General Dunlap entered the Air Force in 1972 as a graduate of the Air Force ROTC program at St. Josephs University, Philadelphia, Pa. He was admitted to the bar of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1975. General Dunlap has deployed to support various operations in the Middle East and Africa, to include operations Provide Relief, Restore Hope, Vigilant Warrior, Desert Fox, Bright Star and Enduring Freedom. He has led military-to-military delegations to Uruguay, the Czech Republic, South Africa and Colombia. General Dunlap speaks widely on legal and national security issues, and is published in Aerospace Power Journal, Peacekeeping & International Relations, Parameters, Proceedings, the Fetcher Forum of World Affairs, the Air Force Times, the Wake Forest Law Review, the Air Force Law Review, the Tennessee Law Review and the Strategic Review, among others.

EDUCATION
1972 Bachelor of arts degree, St. Josephs University, Philadelphia, Pa.
1975 Juris doctorate, Villanova University School of Law, Villanova, Pa.
1979 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1984 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
1989 Air War College, by correspondence
1992 Distinguished graduate, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
1996 National Security Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, N.Y.

ASSIGNMENTS
1. January 1976 - April 1977, Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, 2nd Combat Group, Barksdale AFB, La.
2. April 1977 - May 1978, Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, 51st Combat Group, Osan Air Base, South Korea
3. May 1978 - December 1978, Chief, Civil Law Division, 20th Combat Group, Royal Air Force Upper Heyford, England
4. December 1978 - March 1980, Chief, Military Justice Division, 20th Tactical Fighter Wing, RAF Upper Heyford, England
5. March 1980 - July 1983, faculty member, Air Force Judge Advocate General School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
6. July 1983 - January 1984, Chief, Military Justice Division, Air Force Judge Advocate General School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
7. January 1984 - July 1984, student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
8. July 1984 - July 1987, Staff Judge Advocate, 97th Bombardment Wing, Blytheville AFB, Ark.
9. July 1987 - June 1989, Circuit Military Judge, Air Force Legal Services Agency, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.
10. June 1989 - August 1991, Chief, Personnel Action Law Branch, General Law Division, Air Force Legal Services Agency, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.
11. August 1991 - July 1992, student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
12. July 1992 - January 1995, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Central Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.
13. January 1995 - July 1998, Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb.
14. July 1998 - July 2000, Staff Judge Advocate, 9th Air Force, Shaw AFB, S.C.
15. July 2000 - February 2002, Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters Air Education and Training Command, Randolph AFB, Texas
16. February 2002 - present, Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Va.

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Southwest Asia Service Medal with two bronze stars
Humanitarian Service Medal
Air Force Overseas Ribbon - Short
Air Force Overseas Ribbon - Long
Small Arms Expert Marksmanship Ribbon

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS
1984 Outstanding Judge Advocate of the Year, Strategic Air Command
1992 U.S. Air Force Outstanding Career Armed Services Attorney
1996 Thomas P. Keenan Award for international and operations law

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant May 14, 1972
First Lieutenant June 9, 1975
Captain Jan. 20, 1976
Major Jan. 1, 1983
Lieutenant Colonel Sept. 1, 1988
Colonel Aug. 1, 1993
Brigadier General Sept. 1, 2002


(Current as of February 2003)
http://www.af.mil/bios/bio_print.asp?bioID=5293&page=1


Military Turns to Software to Cut Civilian Casualties

By Bradley Graham
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, February 21, 2003; Page A18


LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. -- In devising the targeting plan for a possible war against Iraq, U.S. military planners are hoping to reduce the potential for civilian casualties by using a new computer program whose name belies its serious purpose: "Bugsplat."



Approved just two months ago, the program represents a significant departure from the traditional method of drawing a simple circle around a target to show a bomb's estimated blast effect and determine what civilians might be at risk nearby, Air Force officials said.

Instead, Bugsplat generates blob-like images -- resembling squashed insects -- that military officials say more precisely models potential damage by a particular type and size of bomb dropped by a particular aircraft flying at a given altitude. This enables commanders to fine-tune attacks and, in some instances, can embolden them to order bigger bombs than they would have employed relying on less sophisticated modeling methods, the officials said.

"It's a significant advance," said Brig. Gen. Kelvin R. Coppock, director of intelligence for the Air Combat Command. "It will allow us to target those facilities that we want to target with confidence that we're not going to cause collateral damage."

more
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A37888-2003Feb20?
language=printer


In 1996, Air Force Staff Judge Advocate Brig. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., published a seminal article titled, “How we lost the High Tech War of 2007.”* In this “warning from the future” the United States, despite its overwhelming superiority in high-tech weaponry and conventional forces, loses a war to radical revolutionary Persia whose armies are adept at asymmetric warfare.

http://www.gcc.edu/news/faculty/editorials/tilford_multiculturalism_09_16_03.htm

The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012

CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR.

From Parameters, Winter 1992-93, pp. 2-20.

Still, that doesn't completely explain why in 2012 the military leadership would succumb to a coup. To answer that question fully requires examination of what was happening to the officer corps as the military drew down in the 1980s and 1990s. Ever since large peacetime military establishments became permanent features after World War II, the great leveler of the officer corps was the constant influx of officers from the Reserve Officers Training Corps program. The product of diverse colleges and universities throughout the United States, these officers were a vital source of liberalism in the military services.<65>

By the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, that was changing. Force reductions decreased the number of ROTC graduates the services accepted.<66> Although General Powell called ROTC "vital to democracy," 62 ROTC programs were closed in 1991 and another 350 were considered for closure.<67> The numbers of officers produced by the service academies also fell, but at a significantly slower pace. Consequently, the proportion of academy graduates in the officer corps climbed.<68> Academy graduates, along with graduates of such military schools as the Citadel, Virginia Military Institute, and Norwich University, tended to feel a greater homogeneity of outlook than, say, the pool of ROTC graduates at large, with the result that as the proportion of such graduates grew, diversity of outlook overall diminished to some degree.

Moreover, the ROTC officers that did remain increasingly came from a narrower range of schools. Focusing on the military's policy to exclude homosexuals from service, advocates of "political correctness" succeeded in driving ROTC from the campuses of some of our best universities.<69> In many instances they also prevailed in barring military recruiters from campus.<70> Little thought was given the long-term consequences of limiting the pool from which our military leadership was drawn. The result was a much more uniformly oriented military elite whose outlook was progressively conservative.

Furthermore, well-meaning attempts at improving service life led to the unintended insularity of military society, representing a return to the cloistered life of the pre-World War II armed forces. Military bases, complete with schools, churches, stores, child care centers, and recreational areas, became never-to-be-left islands of tranquillity removed from the chaotic, crime-ridden environment outside the gates.<71> As one reporter put it in 1991: "Increasingly isolated from mainstream America, today's troops tend to view the civilian world with suspicion and sometimes hostility."<72> Thus, a physically isolated and intellectually alienated officer corps was paired with an enlisted force likewise distanced from the society it was supposed to serve. In short, the military evolved into a force susceptible to manipulation by an authoritarian leader from its own select ranks.

more
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1992/dunlap.htm

The revolution in military legal affairs: Air Force legal professionals in 21st century conflicts.

Air Force Law Review; March 22, 2001; Dunlap, Charles J., Jr.

Dunlap, Charles J., Jr.
Air Force Law Review

March 22, 2001
air force, legal professionals, judge advocate, force legal, expeditionary law, operations law, see, jag, paralegal, aerospace law, rmla, military justice, international law, paralegals, jags
COLONEL CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR., USAF *

I. INTRODUCTION

For almost a decade now the American military has been in the
throes of what is known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). (1)
The progeny of the larger Information Revolution, the RMA describes the
impact of microchip-based technologies--not just on military equipment,
but also the doctrine, organization, and strategies of warfighting. The
synergistic effect of these impacts has led the U.S. armed forces--and
especially the Air Force--to achieve lopsided victories in Iraq, Serbia,
and elsewhere.

Paralleling the RMA there is what might be called a Revolution in
Military Legal Affairs (RMLA). In a sense, the RMLA is also much the
product of the same technological changes as t...

http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:dHlObh1qaR8J:static.highbeam.com/a/airforcelawreview/march222001/therevolutioninmilitarylegalaffairsairforcelegalpr/++%22CHARLES+J.+DUNLAP,+JR%22&hl=en

[TacticalPeek]

14. Kick. n/t

[bobthedrummer]

15. Kick

:dem:

[Karenina]

19. KICK!

:kick:

[seemslikeadream]

17. MELANCHOLY REUNION: A REPORT FROM THE FUTURE ON THE COLLAPSE OF CIVIL-MILI

MELANCHOLY REUNION: A REPORT FROM THE FUTURE ON THE COLLAPSE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

INSS Occasional Paper 11

October 1996

USAF Institute for National Security Studies

US Air Force Academy, Colorado

FOREWORD

Civil-military relations, especially civilian control of the military, have always been a significant aspect of U.S. national security policy. The issue assumed even greater prominence, however, with the election of Bill Clinton as the forty-second president of the United States. President Clinton's election signaled a number of firsts. Besides being the first Democrat to assume the presidency since Jimmy Carter, the first chief executive elected after the end of the Cold War, and the first president to "come of age" following World War II, Clinton was the first commander in chief since Franklin Roosevelt not to have served in the U.S. military. More importantly for civil-military relations, President Clinton avoided service during the Vietnam War, wrote of his sympathy for those who found themselves "loving their country but loathing the military," and took part in demonstrations against the war in Southeast Asia.

Together with his plans to cut the defense budget, unsuccessful effort to lift the ban on gays in the military, and controversial decisions regarding the use of force in places like Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, the military, to say the least, was skeptical about its new commander in chief. Some military members went beyond skepticism, however. President Clinton was heckled when he visited the USS Theodore Roosevelt, for instance, and one Air Force general even went so far as to ridicule the president as a "gay-loving, pot-smoking, draft-dodging womanizer" in front of 250 people at an awards banquet.

When combined with an increasing number of nontraditional (and often domestic) missions for the armed forces and the enhanced power for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (courtesy of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act), events like those cited above led to a flurry of articles about the health of civil-military relations in the United States. Central to this literature is Colonel Charles Dunlap's "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012." In that paper, written as a letter from the future, Dunlap examined how the American people increasingly turned to the military to address the problems their elected officials seemed unable to solve. "The cumulative effect of these new responsibilities," Dunlap wrote, "was to incorporate the military into the political process to an unprecedented degree." The end result was a military coup, "the beginnings of which were evident in 1992," the year Dunlap's paper was published.

"Melancholy Reunion" picks up where "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012" left off. The year is now 2017, and two years have elapsed since the countercoup that returned the U.S. government to civilian control. The speaker, addressing the twentieth reunion of the Air University classes of 1997, reflects on the civil-military environment in the late 1990s and the lessons learned from the Coup of 2012. "Melancholy Reunion," like Dunlap's earlier paper, is sure to stimulate vigorous debate. It also makes an important contribution to the literature on civil-military relations and civilian control of the military. We are pleased, therefore, to publish this eleventh volume in the Occasional Paper series of the USAF Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).

About the Institute

INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Negotiations Division, Plans and Operations Directorate, Headquarters U.S. Air Force and the Dean of the Faculty, U.S. Air Force Academy. Its other sponsors are the Assistant Chief of Staff for Air Force Intelligence, OSD Net Assessment, the Defense Special Weapons Agency (formerly the Defense Nuclear Agency), the Army Environmental Policy Institute, Army Space Command, and the

more
http://216.239.39.104/search?q=cache:tKUSi8QR3pwJ:www.internetpirate.com/coup.htm+Melancholy+Reunion:+A+Report+from+the+Future+on+the+Collapse+of+Civil-+Military&hl=en

[seemslikeadream]

18. SOMETIMES THE DRAGON WINS: A Perspective on Information-Age Warfare

Proposition #1 Our most likely future adversaries will be unlike ourselves.

For most of the nineteenth and twentieth century, however, these warrior societies and streetfighter nations infrequently succeeded - in a purely military sense - against the technologically superior forces of the West, especially when the Western power put its full resources into the effort. Indeed, a common critique of my article is that no adversary like the one I invented could possibly conduct the global military and paramilitary operations necessary to achieve the victory I describe. However, I assert that new developments in cyberscience have the potential to prove my detractors wrong.

Proposition #2: Information technology will facilitate and hasten the consolidation of potential opponents, including warrior societies.

Along this line I should note that a phenomena of warrior societies and extremist streetfighter nations is that they tend to produce charismatic leaders. Modern communications systems will enable telegenic leaders to leverage their personal "aura" to reach huge numbers of peoples. Even wholly illiterate people will be able to see and hear their leader via "telepresence." What's more is that coming holographic imagery will project the leader's charisma in an enormously convincing way and do so for audiences at multiple locations. Perhaps more importantly, a variety of emerging information and communication technologies will also leverage the streetfighter nation's military capabilities.

Proposition #3: Most analysts dangerously underestimate how significantly emerging technologies will empower warrior peoples.

Yet another reason that the battlefield will become more technologically "level" lies in the growing dependence of the U.S. and other armed forces on commercial-off-the-shelf or "COTS" technology. Plainly, this means that we have to expect that sooner or later our enemies can make similar purchases in the retail market. Like the decline in communication costs, the astonishing reduction in the price of computer power brings extraordinarily versatile systems within the range of even the poorest potential foes. Because of the ready availability of cyber-technologies and the continuing decline in costs, I contend that the era when the First World would produce and control the latest weapons is over - at least to the extent that information technology is the linchpin to the most sought after arms

Proposition # 4: The age of mass warfare may not be over!

Proposition #5: The impact of information-age technology on the global media will be the most immediate and most powerful influence on information-age warfare.

I might add that it is not only the media that is responsible for this evolution. The proliferating numbers of personal cell phones, e-mail capable laptop computers, fax machines, and so forth that troops themselves carry with them will also contribute to the avalanche of information that will be available about military operations. I think that commanders will find these devices near impossible to monitor and censor. While our adversaries will have a similar problem, I think it will be more pronounced for the militaries of Western-style democracies because of the open nature of our societies.

http://216.239.41.104/search?q=cache:bG1ihpv7yXoJ:www.afcea.org.ar/publicaciones/dunlap.htm+%22Charles+J.+Dunlap,+Jr%22&hl=en