On the whole, the commission was very tame in questioning Rice. They did not ask about Sibel Edmond’s claims (“Edmonds said she read intelligence reports from the summer of 2001 that al Qaeda operatives planned to fly hijacked airplanes into U.S. skyscrapers.”,
Washington Post), neither did they ask how Rice could publicly claim that nobody could have thought about hijackers using planes as bombs, contrary to many warnings that exactly that could happen; nor did they ask why the Bin Laden clan was flown out of the country very shortly after the attacks without being questioned.
Nevertheless, there were some inconsistencies in her testimony:
Rice claims there were no specific warnings, no “silver bullets”. On the contrary, she tries to suggest that there was only very general information available. She says the August 6 PDB was only an “historical document”, “there was nothing actionable in this”.
But then Bob Kerrey confronted her with a possible silver bullet:
Kerrey: But here's what Agent Kenneth Williams said five days later. He said that the FBI should investigate whether Al Qaida operatives are training at U.S. flight schools. He posited that Osama bin Laden followers might be trying to infiltrate the civil aviation system as pilots, security guards and other personnel. He recommended a national program to track suspicious flight schools. …
And the problem we've got with this and the Moussaoui facts, which were revealed on the 15th of August, all it had to do was to be put on Intelink. All it had to do is go out on Intelink, and the game's over. It ends. This conspiracy would have been rolled up.
RICE: Commissioner, with all due respect, I don't agree that we know that we had somehow a silver bullet here that was going to work.
What we do know is that we did have a systemic problem, a structural problem between the FBI and the CIA…The incident described by Kerrey contradicts what she tries to imply that there was no information available that was specific enough to act upon it. But what does she do? She switches to a general level – an approach she often chooses when she wants to avoid a direct answer --, babbling about structural problems. That’s a model case for evading. She just ignores this specific example given, which could have been a silver bullet.
Regarding the question how specific the August 6 PDB was,
there is a direct contradiction between her and Ben-Veniste: Ben-Veniste: Let me ask you a general matter, beyond the fact that this memorandum provided information, not speculative, but based on intelligence information, that bin Laden had threatened to attack the United States and specifically Washington, D.C.
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RICE: Well, August 6th is most certainly an historical document that says, Here's how you might think about Al Qaida. A warning is when you have something that suggests that an attack is impending.
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RICE (to ROEMER): And we did not have, on the United States, threat information that was, in any way, specific enough to suggest that something was coming in the United States.
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RICE (to BEN-VENISTE): But I can also tell you that there was nothing in this memo that suggested that an attack was coming on New York or Washington, D.C. There was nothing in this memo as to time, place, how or where. This was not a threat report to the president or a threat report to me.
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RICE (to BEN-VENISTE):: I believe the title was, Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States.
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RICE (to BEN-VENISTE):: You said, did it not warn of attacks. It did not warn of attacks inside the United States. It was historical information based on old reporting. Did you notice other inconsistencies in her testimony?