Dash to Baghdad Left Top U.S. Generals Divided

[gristy]

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/13/international/middleeast/13command.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

By MICHAEL R. GORDON and BERNARD E. TRAINOR
Published: March 13, 2006

The war was barely a week old when Gen. Tommy R. Franks threatened to fire the Army's field commander.

From the first days of the invasion in March 2003, American forces had tangled with fanatical Saddam Fedayeen paramilitary fighters. Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, who was leading the Army's V Corps toward Baghdad, had told two reporters that his soldiers needed to delay their advance on the Iraqi capital to suppress the Fedayeen threat in the rear.

Soon after, General Franks phoned Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan, the commander of allied land forces, to warn that he might relieve General Wallace.

The firing was averted after General McKiernan flew to meet General Franks. But the episode revealed the deep disagreements within the United States high command about the Iraqi military threat and what would be required to defeat it.

more...

[wtmusic]

1. "fanatical Saddam Fedayeen paramilitary fighters"

They must have been fanatics--who wouldn't welcome an American invasion? :shrug:

[rodeodance]

2. I saw TRAINOR on some talk show today. He was good.

.......¶Instead of sending additional troops to impose order after the fall of Baghdad, Mr. Rumsfeld and General Franks canceled the deployment of the First Cavalry Division;

General McKiernan was unhappy with the decision, which was made at a time when ground forces were needed to deal with the chaos in Iraq.

This account of decision-making inside the American command is based on interviews with dozens of military officers and government officials over the last two years. Some asked to remain unidentified because they were speaking about delicate internal deliberations that they were not authorized to discuss publicly.

Early Resistance Wasn't Foreseen

As American-led forces prepared to invade Iraq in March 2003, American intelligence was not projecting a major fight in southern Iraq. C.I.A. officials told United States commanders that anti-Hussein tribes might secure a vital Euphrates River bridge and provide other support. Tough resistance was not expected until Army and Marine troops began to close in on Baghdad.

[tabasco]

3. Sure wouldn't want to take time to secure ammo depots.

Tommy Franks was in such a hurry to seize the airport, declare victory, and get his victory parade that he left hundreds of tons of ordnance lying around for anybody to pick up. Our troops continue to be killed with the weapons that Franks handed to the guerrillas. It is that type of incompetence that gets you a freedom medal these days.

[0007]

5. Don't forget that the top officers were busy securing the museums

and all of the gold plated palaces and gaudily ornate buildings used for their own personal gain.

Whoopee I got Saddam's pistols!

Franks is a war criminal the same as junior.

[Lasher]

4. Rummy said repeatedly he was backing commanders on the ground

Remember that? This was always Rummy's reply when he was asked if we needed to have more soldiers there. Our commanders on the ground say they don't need more soldiers, he would claim.

What a liar!

[OKNancy]

6. Good article - recommended

Also, this was moved because it is a feature/analysis article, not breaking news.

[rodeodance]

7. yes, it is good--points out once again how arrogant Rummy is.

[bemildred]

8. The political script was more important than the military facts.

Makes me think of Operation Barbarossa somehow. Adolf telling Paulus to hold Stalingard to the last man and no withdrawal and blah, blah, blah while the German Army was slowly ground to dust.

Edit: if they did not expect resistance, it's because they were not listening, because God and everybody else was saying it well before they fired up the engines and headed for Baghdad.

[Igel]

9. One wonders if the Fedayeen were stationary after the

war, you know, if they stayed put where they were assigned.

Maybe a few got to Samarra. You know, trained in commando techniques and interested in instability--esp. by means of violence against Shi'ites, since they were mostly Sunni. And weren't they dressed in black? (Hey--isn't that the Mahdi Army's signature trait? Must be confusing, rather like both vanilla Coke and lime Pepsi coming in identically marked cans.) And, of course, the use of RPGs and explosives, as well as small arms ...

Why do it? Jahiliya is disliked, in all of its meanings, both basic and exegetical, archaic and recent. Iraq is in jahiliya; Saddam may not have been great, but he certainly avoided some forms of it. However, some fedayeen may have converted after the fact.