Reply #37: fuel pool notes

[divvy]

1) The spent fuel pools for Mark I containments are above the core, because the cores are top loaded and it makes fuel transport under water easier. Our control rods come in from the bottom. PWRs are the other way around, I know. Most of the heavy design work went into making sure that the pools couldn't be accdentally drained. There are no drains... the pool has leak detection equipment... all kinds of level, radiation, anti-syphon configurations, and temperature alarms... piping connections are all high in the pool. The easy way to get water up there was a fire hydrant right next to the pool (our fire pumps were redundant diesels) and if the fire system was down, a fire hose could be run up the stairwell. All you need is a tanker fire truck. Why, in 4 days, it never occurred to the utility to do it until dose was so high they can't do it, I don't know. 2) The last news I received is that they pulled everybody from the site.. those out of control fuel pools must have near lethal doses now. There is stuff they could have done in preparation of abandoning the reactor cores, but they don't seem to have done it (eg, flooding containment and draining he vessel). I can imagine a meltdown... I can't even imagine what those fuel pools will end up doing. We are way beyond TMI. I said from the very beginning that there were 6, not 3, plants in big trouble. The only thing that would have terminated this event was restoring AC power to site equipment. I never heard a single report on the status of doing that. The worst case has happened. There can be no good outcome now. I would be asking somebody if they can "shoot" a fire nozzle into the pool. There may not be that much they can do about the reactor cores, but they had better think about what they are going to do about those spent fuel pools unless they don't mind evacuating Japan. This is the worst possible outcome that I can imagine.