Reply #57: You are persistent, I'll give you that

[Mixopterus]

But still incorrect. I already stated that Kant provides some limited provisions for mutually consenting parties so long as there is no gross violation of the Categorical Imperative. For instance, it would be unethical for someone to consent to being murdered. Furthermore, those jobs are not exploitation in of themselves by future of their nature, as in prostitution, and can only be made into an exploitative relationship if the person is coerced or otherwise deprived of some basic right of fair compensation for their time. The issue, is sticky, I'll admit, but the question of consent in prostitution is almost always questionable, even in legal environments. The problem is further compounded by the nature of sexuality outside of prostitution as something of intrinsic value between partners due to elements of trust and mutual respect (hopefully) which is fundamentally violated by the exchange. As such, there is a core mechanistic difference between the act, say, waiting tables and being a prostitute. To extend the criteria for typical labor to questionable pursuits such as prostitution is to render the definition of labor so broad as to be rendered useless.

As for Kant, you are sadly mistaken and willful in your ignorance in equal measure. Lying is not the same as not telling the truth, categorically they are entirely different things. My response in regards to such is not new, it has been the classical response to the question of the murderer (or lying for philanthropic concerns) for a rather long time. At any rate, the question is rendered entirely moot by the treatment of Ross in modern (non-classical) Kantian ethics. I'm sure you find a consequentialist or even a utilitarian outlook most attractive, but that position is not without its drawbacks. How do you measure good beyond the charting of simple pleasure principle? Even John Stuart Mill has severe problems in his reasoning, up to and including criteria for categories so wide as to render everything under the sun a utilitarian action. If you cannot deal with Kant or his modern treatment, then so be it, but I would kindly ask to you provide a counter ethical approach and use that to validate your claim that prostitution is ethical. Only then can we get to the nuts and bolts of the ethical issue and come to a conclusion.

Fundamentally, yes, the person using the prostitute is doing just that: -Using- the prostitute. That is the core of their relationship: One using another for physical pleasure. We don't say we use the waitress or that we use the actor, which in of itself highlights the core mechanistic difference in relationship. If you were to use the word "use" to describe any relationship but a prostitute in common speech, they would undoubtedly and immediately understand the negative meaning of "use" in terms of relationships. You are, of course, confounding the classes of relationship in an unintentional or deliberate manner, I cannot tell, but the nature of the relationship is still different for the reasons I highlighted above. You are essentially widening the use of several terms, such as "use", as well as consensual exchange to the point of absurdity.

And I'll state for the (hopefully) final time that I won't suffer you as the role of mindreader. I don't hold any particular disgust for prostitution in a manner that is motivating my argument just the same as I am not automatically assuming you want to have sex with prostitutes by arguing the opposite position. That is not a fair or charitable treatment of me or my argument, and if you paid attention my qualm is not with you, so much as your abuse of a valid ethical system. I'll also ignore your needless extrapolations regarding how I view women and associating me with people who irrationally hate homosexuals (there is nothing unethical about homosexuality). You should know better.