Reply #69: To Answer Your Question First, Ma'am: No

[The Magistrate]

There is no instance of anything being defeated solely by air power, at least not after people who were its object got used to seeing the fact of flight. The success enjoyed shortly after the First World War by England's "Air Control" policy in Iraq against tribesman unfamiliar with modernity entirely cannot really be said to apply to anything beyond itself. But the devotees of air power are pretty stubborn people, and have long flaunted the battle cry that "This time, it's going to be different!" Unfortunately, as any casino operator can attest, there is no shortage of people who can be impressed by that cry, and so the thing is continually attempted.

Air power can be of great use in operation against guerrilla forces, but only in a close-support role assisting soldiers directy at grips with the guerrillas, and to a lesser extent, depending on the character of the landscape, in an observation role. As Mr. Selatius observed, guerrilla forces have little or nothing by way of a strategic rear that air power can effectively assail. But the whole doctrine of air power is rooted in the idea that such "strategic" targets are its proper object, and close support action an improper subordination of the new to the old, and so the tempation to find something to regard as a "strategic rear" will be very strong among air force planners.

The Israeli air attacks beyond the border regions seem to be aimed at several things that could be viewed, correctly or no, as approximating a "rear" of Hezbollah. One element relates to the Israeli assumption, probably correct in some degree, that Hezbollah was anticipating some fresh supply of weaponry as the confronation commenced and continued, and to the end of hobbling this, the standard communication facilities were attacked. One element relates to the Israeli assumption, again probably correct to some degree, that Hezbollah maintained a goodly portion of its stock-pile of weaponry north of the border area beyond ready reach of a ground assault, and to the end of destroying this places where such stores might be securely held were attacked, and to the end of preventing the movement of the stores into range for use, internal lines of communication were attacked. In this portion, it is quite likely that, whatever the Israelis thought they knew regarding location of stores, they were firing blind in fact, and also that they were nowhere near as good as they thought they were at discerning what was a Hezbollah transport effort rather than ordinary people on the move in fear, or even about their routine business. Another element relates to the standard military doctrine of disabling command and control and incapacitating central leadership, and to this end certain civil facilities were bombed in hopes of disrupting communication, and official Hezbollah sites bombed in hopes of catching officials and generally putting the organization to difficulties. This element of the campaign, standard as it is, probably brought no measureable benefit, as only particularly dim fellows would be near official sites, and the organization will have had numerous alternative and clandestine means of internal communication. It is quite certain the Israelis have not the slightest idea where the Hezbollah leadership is actually located: it would be dead if they did.