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This stance begs the question systematically about whether scientific method is the only available way of knowing or having rational beliefs about something, and then claims that it's 'open-minded' about the ways in which we might come to know something or have rational beliefs about it---and does not see the logical incoherence of what it's doing (begging the question systematically) with what it's claiming about itself (that it's open-minded).
---"Fine show me the evidence that there's another way of knowing or having rational beliefs about something"
"Here's some...."
---"Oh, I'm not going to count that as evidence"
"Why not?"
---"Well, it's not, um, scientific."
"But isn't that begging the question at issue?"
---"No, I'm open to other forms of evidence---as long as they conform to my a priori, not scientifically derived, commitment to scientific method as the only respectable yielder of evidence."
"But what about consciousness, and all the phenomena associated with reason and value"
----"No, that doesn't count, because I believe that science might one day be able to explain those things in materialist terms."
"And if it doesn't?"
----"We'll never know if it will or not. But in the meantime, I'm determined to believe that it will, regardless of all rational philosophical arguments to the contrary. Not that this is faith on my part. It's scientific open-mindedness."
"But I get the impression that regardless of how unsuccessful a scientific research program is into the nature of consciousness, reason and value, you will always say, ah, but it might be successful in future. Surely that's just a statement of faith on your part?"
----"No, I'm just being open-minded. And to show that I'm open-minded, I reject on a priori grounds the a priori arguments of philosophers who argue that science will never succeed in solving these problems."
"Hmmmmm. Well, what about all these indications from cosmology and physics and biology that the universe and life is extremely unlikely to have come about from chance, and exhibits to a marvellous degree mathematical intelligibility and order? You're saying that provides no evidential support for the theistic hypothesis?"
----"No, that's not scientific evidence either. You see, it's simpler to presume that there's an infinity of unobservable universes, than to posit the theistic hypothesis."
"An infinity of unobservables is a simpler---and scientific---hypothesis?"
----"Yes, because that's more conformable to naturalism."
"But isn't that begging the question again? Aren't we trying to decide if naturalism is true or not, or more rational believe?"
----"Yes, we are, and I'm completely open-minded about that. Just show me the evidence."
"But you won't count anything as evidence if it's not naturalistic evidence, so you're begging the question!"
----"No, I'm prepared to consider the possibility of there being other forms of evidence. Just as long as it has all the features of naturalistic evidence. If it doesn't have all those features, then that shows it's not good evidence at all."
"But you're begging the question again! The question is whether the concept of evidence is logically broader than the concept of evidence as defined by the naturalistic research program."
----"But we have good evidence in favor of the superiority of the naturalistic research program."
"What evidence is that?
----"It's the evidence we get when we do natural science---that kind of evidence is good evidence for the validity of natural science."
"But how does that show that that's the only kind of good evidence there is?"
---"Oh, there might be other kinds of good evidence. And I'd be prepared to accept that. Provided this can be shown by the methods of natural science, of course." :boring:
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