Reply #10: it's a matter of checking the electronic machines

[OnTheOtherHand]

No matter what voting method is used, ultimately the precinct-level results need to be tabulated. And that "central tabulation" is very likely to use an electronic machine. Counties aggregate precinct-level results, and states may aggregate precinct- and/or county-level results.

If the central tabulator just aggregates, then nothing too horrific should happen. It is perfectly possible for the central tabulator to aggregate incorrectly if it is misprogrammed. (This can sometimes happen for innocent reasons, because the US has very complicated elections.) But if people have access to the unaggregated data, it is not very hard to check the results.

If the central tabulator could actually alter results, then there needs to be an unaltered baseline (audit trail) to check against, and it needs to be checked. The nightmare scenario is a central tab that sends out instructions to every voting machine, "Take 10% of the Dem votes and change them into Rep votes" -- or overwrites memory cards to the same effect. (Probably more likely is that a state central tabulator would alter county-level aggregates.)

A subtler nightmare scenario is that a clear audit trail exists, but is never consulted. A precinct duly hand-counts its ballots (or whatever), phones in "72 Kerry, 16 Bush," and someone swaps the numbers. That could happen with or without computers. How would it be detected?

I haven't seen any evidence of central tab fraud, but there is no doubt that results can be misaggregated for various reasons, innocent or malign.