Reply #151: Yes, I do see that; however, my concerns are:

[Carolab]

What is the NATURE of the ballot? Is it one the voter marks or is it a receipt from the machine? I could see that the machine could be programmed to later spit out ballots with "different results" than what the voter verified and that substituted ballot could get counted instead. How do you prevent "ballot switching" unless it is in fact marked by the voter? And shouldn't those ballots be printed with a number so that they are sequential and cannot be later substituted with a falsified ballot? Or so that ballots cannot be added in later, after the polls are closed (or stuffed into the box beforehand)? And then, once you have such a voter-verified ballot, how do you ensure that the results as printed out by the machine actually match the true vote count? Unless you were to actually count up the votes on the ballots and match them to the machine printouts, you won't know that they match. And is the audit provision designed to that it occurs RANDOMLY, and at the precinct locations immediately after the election, or is it something done after the fact, that is, at the state/central tabulating location, and after someone could have a chance to manipulate the results so the audit matches the machine count?