Reply #12: Printed holographic serial numbrs for tamper-evident paper trails

[Ian David]

I think I might have something that hasn't been suggested, and just might work.

Each PAPER ballot is scanned by a machine, and the results shown on a user's computer monitor. If the results on the machine match the voter's intent, then the ballot is COPIED (using plain-old optics like a photocopier, NO digital equipment) onto a PAPER record, along with a SEQUENTIAL SERIAL NUMBER printed on A HOLOGRAPH which would also contain a machine-readable barcode on the holograph.

If any serial numbers(printed on tamper-evident holographs) are missing, then it would indicate a problem.

I have thought of ONE way to tamper with that, but maybe someone could find a fix for this flaw.

Let's say you know that a district is heavily Democratic. You just lose all the votes in half of the machines. Then you have no numbers out of sequence.

But then, you would probably want each polling place to account for each serial number they receive.

But if the people DELIVERING the ballots are the same as the ones PICKING THEM BACK UP, then you could have a problem.

Feedback?