Request for comment on this defective argument re: DREs

[Kelvin Mace]

I will be locking horns with this fellow and want to have all my ammunition ready to load. Rather than rely exclusively on my own brain power, I wanted to invite DU members help pick apart this guys arguments and perhaps catch things I've missed.


AAAS WORKSHOP ON DEVELOPING A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR ELECTRONIC VOTING TECHNOLOGIES
George Gilbert


Synopsis of Issues

The unreliability of hand counted paper ballots was evident well before the end of the nineteenth century. Each subsequent technological "advance" has engendered its own unique set of management problems. Direct record electronic (DRE) voting is no exception.

Never-the-less, properly managed, DRE voting is the most versatile, the most reliable and the most secure method of voting yet devised. This assertion is particularly applicable to American elections which tend to involve lengthy, complex ballots.

Uh, no, not even close according to the MIT/CalTech study DRE voting is not the most reliable. As for secure, three separate studies (Rubin, SAIC and RABA Technologies) have shown Diebold's machines, at least, to be anything BUT secure.

Obtaining repeatable, accurate tabulations, historically, has been among the most challenging tasks facing election officials. During 16+ years of DRE voting in Guilford County, NC, our voters have cast nearly 2 million ballots on this equipment. Recounts of at least one contest, have been conducted in a majority of the 51 elections conducted during this period. As expected, the recounted results from our DRE voting equipment has never varied from the original count.

Which means absolutely nothing since it is simply recounting data stored with no assurance that the data stored was properly recorded in the first place.

Insuring the security of voted ballots is another major imperative. Of the near 2 million DRE ballots cast in Guilford County, only 36 ballots were not properly recorded and only 4 ballots were so defective so as prevent tabulation. Of the 36 ballots which were not properly recorded, all were identified and the voters casting those ballots were invited to cast another ballot; 32 did so and all of their ballots were counted. This is a total error rate of .002%, or one out of every 50,000 votes. From the perspective of elections officials, the chief importance of this finding is not that the margin of error is statistically infinitesimal (though this is certainly important), but that such errors were detected and corrected (to the extent possible).

Again, these claims are baseless. You have NO idea how many votes were properly recorded since only the voter could determine that.

Results such as these are accomplished not because the technology is perfect, but by thoroughly and rigorously verifying and documenting the accuracy or our voting machines and tabulation system before the election, and by an even more thorough and rigorous auditing of the results after the election; with both procedures being open to public scrutiny.

In teh absence of a thorough examination of the source code, pre-election testing is not rigorous in any scientific meaning of the word

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It is significant that there is no presumption of perfection in election law. Every state has its procedures for handling election protests. In North Carolina, the fundamental issue addressed by election protest rules is, "is there substantial evidence to believe that a violation of the election law or other irregularity or misconduct did occur and that it was sufficiently serious to cast doubt on the apparent results of the election."

"Irregularities" occur in every election. Most are minor or would not affect the outcome. The closer the contest and the nearer the top of the ballot, however, the more brightly the lights shine on these incidents. Unlike every other office on the ballot, the time frame for resolving presidential election protests is limited. Similarly, the option of a new election does not exist as a remedy in the presidential contest. If the uncertainty involves the tabulation of votes, it is imperative that the voting system be capable of rapidly and accurately recounting the ballots. That imperative cannot be met by hand counting paper ballots.
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While this workshop has been identified as an "AAAS workshop on E-Voting Technologies," of necessity the discussion must encompass all voting systems. The strengths and weaknesses of one type of voting system can only be meaningfully evaluated in relation to other types of systems. In the current climate, the effectiveness, cost and reliability of electronic records must be compared to the effectiveness, cost and reliability of alternative voting mechanisms.

The evidence regarding "effectiveness" is overwhelmingly in favor of DRE voting. While no system is, or can be made perfect, DRE voting machines offer the possibilities of far greater accessibility, ease of use and accuracy than do any type of paper based voting systems. These possibilities are acknowledged even by most of the harshest critics of DRE systems.

What evidence? Evidence supplied by the vendor? There has been no rigorous analysis of these machines, as that would mean a completely examination of the software and the hardware, plus testing of the system in a controlled environment, something that the vendors DO NOT permit.

Cost must be assessed in several contexts. The direct or upfront costs of most voting systems is not particularly significant from a national perspective. It is often very significant, however, at the local level where most of the cost is typically incurred. One time federal grants will do little to alter the local, long term perspective.

DREs flunk the cost analysis since they are more expensive to buy and maintain than other, MORE ACCURATE systems. To add insult to injury, we are paying top dollar for antiquated technology in some instances.

Among the most significant cost factors that is generally disregarded until too late, is the cost of a recount. The cost of a DRE recount (by which I mean retabulation of the ballot images) is negligible.

And the significance of such a recount is equally negligible

The cost of recounting ballots using an optical scan system, while somewhat greater, is not a significant budgetary issue. The cost of recounting ballots by hand is potentially several times the cost of conducting a whole new election. The variable costs of conducting the presidential election of 2000 in Guilford County, NC, was roughly $200,000 to $250,000. The estimated cost of a full ballot hand recount of paper ballots is $1.2 million. More importantly, such a count would never be reliable.

But is is more reliable than DREs. Also, with a hand recount of PAPER ballots we have TANGIBLE proof of the vote, something DREs do not provide. Laws can be placed on the books to defray the cost of recounts. If the results are in fact wrong, then the state should absorb the cost as a few million dollars is a small price to pay for the faith and confidence in our democracy. If a party to an election is willing to pay for a recount, then the cost is irrelevant.

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The decentralized character of election administration in this country remains the strongest protection against fraud or manipulation impacting the outcome of an election. The trend toward centralization, both in voter registration and voting system selection, while intended to enhance uniformity and quality in election management, also enhances vulnerabilities as well as the scope of impact of either fraud or error.

I fail to see how chaos reduces the chance of fraud or error.

Error being the greatest threat to the integrity of elections, DRE voting systems, in general, lack one crucial feature….that is a mechanism for storing and securing the electronic ballot images (the ballots) from being destroyed by administrative error or electro-mechanical failure. Electronic ballots can be made even more secure that paper ones. The technology is available or, at least, a very short step away. It is time for it to be applied.

Electronic ballot images are meaningless. A picture of a counterfeit $100 bill is just as worthless as the actual counterfeit bill itself.