Reply #67: Don't dismiss the memo just because

[JDPriestly]

it is the opinion of a British intelligence officer about what Bush was thinking. The British intelligence officer knew what he was talking about. He was expressing an opinion in an area in which he had great expertise. His opinion should be given great weight.

The memo is important because:

It corroborates the general view in Europe with regard to the American action in Iraq -- that grounds for the invasion were contrived. The UK was the only major European nation to back Bush on Iraq, and, as we see, even they knew/believed that he had contrived the evidence to go in and that the WMDs and terrorism in other nations was a more serious problem that needed to be addressed before Iraq. How many sophisticated, well informed European leaders have to be against an idea before we question its wisdom? Remember how Bush dismissed the French and Congress threatened to rename French fries and people were boycotting French imports?

It proves that Bush had already definitively decided to go into Iraq in July 2002, a fact that the Bush administration has repeatedly denied. As I recall, Condoleeza Rice vehemently, publicly and UNDER OATH denied that Bush had already decided to go into Iraq before he announced it in (I believe) March 2003 at the committee hearing on her confirmation as Secretary of State. Correct me if I am wrong on this, but I think Boxer asked her about this.

It supports the claim that the evidence of WMDs and terrorism was "fixed," cooked up and exaggerated by the Bush administration. If the British intelligence officer had access to the real intelligence and knew that the Bush administration did not have sufficient intelligence to justify the Iraq invasion, why didn't Bush have that intelligence? Why didn't the American people and Congress know about that intelligence? This memo explains why -- because Bush had already definitively decided to invade by July 2002 -- regardless of the intelligence. Bush was fixing the intelligence. Bush was not seeking an objective assessment of the intelligence. The British intelligence officer's opinion on this is important because he had that intelligence. He was in the US speaking to members of the US government on this issue and could have given his assessment of it to the Bush administration at any time even if our intelligence was flawed. The British intelligence head implies that, after discussing this with people in the Bush administration, he had determined that Bush wasn't interested in accurate intelligence that wasn't fixed around his policy. This is an expert opinion. It is based on first hand knowledge. The memo was prepared and maintained in the course of the normal business of the UK government. It probably would be accepted as evidence of the British intelligence head's state of mind at the the time, and if he tried to contradict it now, he could be questioned about the memo he wrote at the time. It is evidence.

Several forms of fraud are recognized in US civil courts. In terms of evidence, this memo would support claims of at least three kinds. (Note, I say "support," they would not serve as conclusive evidence.)

The first is fraud in the form of misrepresentation by Condoleeze Rice
at the Senate committee hearing with regard to when Bush definitively decided to go into Iraq. Additional evidence would be needed because Rice would argue about the meaning of "definitively decided" and would probably say that Bush had not definitively decided to go in until the point that he had committed to such an extent that he could not pull out. So, in a court of law, the memo alone might not lead to a verdict against Rice for misrepresentation. In the political arena, however, it could really harm her. Remember how Clinton got into trouble when he said he didn't have sexual relations with that woman --- and the argument then focused on what sexual relations meant. That might work in a court -- maybe, maybe, but he sure looked like a sleazy lawyer. He was made to squirm. At the very least Condoleeza Rice could be made to look sleazy and to squirm by this memo. Ordinary people have very little patience with lawyerly stunts like quibbling over the exact definitions of words -- to cover up an obvious lie.

A second type of fraud is concealment -- telling less than the whole truth. Bush owed a duty to Congress (and the American people) to tell them the whole truth so that they could make an informed decision about authorizing military action in Iraq. He concealed material evidence from Congress and from the American people -- evidence that was available to the British and was generally known by European leaders and even by his own intelligence officers at the time, such as the doubts about the yellow cake memo, the doubts of the UN inspectors about Bush's having WMDs, doubts about whether Saddam had no relationship with Al Qaeda, etc. In other words, this memo shows that Bush, in an expert's opinion, was not presenting a full picture of the evidence he was relying on to support the invasion. He was leaving out the doubts. He was presenting information he knew to be doubtful as the whole truth. As for Bush saying he did not know, if the British head of intelligence had a hold on all the intelligence in July 2002, there is no excuse for the Bush administration not having a grasp of it. The Bush administration simply chose to ignore or conceal information that was unfavorable to their view. In so doing, they intended to induce Congress and the American people to make a decision that was not fully informed and authorize and support the war. All the while, they knew that the American people and Congress would trust them to tell the whole truth and rely on their version of things. It's complicated. Concealment always is, but that's a case for concealment and the memo and the British intelligence officer's opinion is some evidence supporting that case.

Actually, there is a third kind of misrepresentation -- negligent misrepresentation. It is complicated, but if you tell someone you are selling them ten pounds of coffee at a certain price, and you know they are going to decide to buy the coffee from you because you have assured them you will be delivering ten pounds of coffee, you have a duty to make a reasonable effort to check the scales and make sure that, in fact, you are selling them ten pounds. You can't sell them eight and say you thought it was ten if you didn't check your scale, let's say at least within the past couple of years, to be sure it was accurate. This is particularly true if you have received a number of complaints about the accuracy of the scale and still never checked it. Honest mistakes are not negligent misrepresentation -- but the line is thin -- and makes lots of interesting work for lawyers. When Bush sold Congress and the American people on the idea of invading Iraq, he knew or should have known that the evidence on which he was relying was inaccurate and incomplete -- his scale was not accurate. This memo shows that the British head of intelligence knew what accurate evidence showed. If Bush didn't know what the British intelligence head knew, it is because he did not check his scale. He did not measure his intelligence against the world standard -- the intelligence known to intelligence offices in other western countries. At the very least, he was negligent in his representations to Congress and the American people. This is an actionable offense in a court of law -- at least in California.

I've way oversimplified all this, but I think you can see why you shouldn't dismiss the importance of the memo even if it is opinion.