Reply #3: "We're going to have to use development", and here's why we need troops for that

[Turborama]

As much as I totally agree with your sentiment, what's been badly needed in Afghanistan since the invasion is reconstruction of a totally fucked up country (excuse my French but I can't think of a better way of putting it right now). Unfortunately, this cannot be done without troops providing the security that's required whilst the reconstruction is stepped up. Hearing President Obama speak like this gives hope that at last the real problems with Afghanistan can finally be addressed.

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From a very insightful article written recently titled "Graveyard of analogies" as reviewed by the http://ideas.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/the-misguided-soviet-afghan-analogy/">NYT:

Afghanistan | Americans aren’t destined to meet the same fate in Afghanistan as the Russians, Ahmed Rashid writes. The Soviets sent woefully inadequate forces to impose a Communist model “that had nothing to do with the nature and traditions of the Afghan people.” By contrast, if the Americans commit resources sufficient to win hearts and minds and defeat Taliban forces — many of whom hold simply “local grievances” and can be won over — Afghanistan is “indeed winnable.”

Are the Americans destined to meet the same fate in Afghanistan as the Russians? Ahmed Rashid argues that it is not too late for Washington to make good on its promises.

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Barack Obama has pledged to withdraw US troops from Iraq while stepping up the American commitment in Afghanistan. He has yet to fully flesh out the policy he will pursue, but seems to understand that what is required is a “comprehensive surge” that goes beyond new troops and new tactics to increase and coordinate development and reconstruction, provide security to the Afghan people and embark on a diplomatic initiative to bring Afghanistan’s multiple meddling neighbours together to stabilise the country and end the sanctuary the Taliban still enjoy in Pakistan. Obama has appointed a special envoy to the region, the seasoned senior diplomat Richard Holbrooke, and has begun to get tough with the Karzai government over corruption and the drugs trade.

The Bush administration lacked an overarching strategy for Afghanistan and its neighbours, and Obama does not want to repeat that mistake. He has already announced orders to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay and he will soon make a historic speech in a Muslim capital, where he is likely to repudiate Bush’s “global war on terror” and announce a policy of talking to militant groups, including the Taliban, while continuing the pursuit of global jihadists. Bush left regional diplomacy largely in the hands of the Pentagon, while Obama will restore the role of the State Department. Several senior administration officials have acknowledged that they cannot “shoot their way to victory” in Afghanistan.

In the interim, however, the situation in Pakistan has worsened substantially, with the rise of the Pakistani Taliban, heightened post-Mumbai tensions with India, an insurgency in Balochistan and grave rifts between the elected government and the powerful army. Ironically it may be the case that Afghanistan poses less of a challenge: the Taliban, although feared, are still intensely disliked, and the country can be stabilised with a massive infusion of money and troops alongside proper strategies for reconstruction and the rebuilding of state institutions.

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Full article: http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090130/REVIEW/458735663/1008

From May, 2003:

Afghanistan and broken promises

By Hooman Peimani

Last week, Afghan President Hamid Karzai threatened to resign if Afghan warlords refused to transfer to his barely-functioning government over US$500 million in collected taxes. His "threat" only brought smiles to the faces of the warlords, the practical rulers of Afghanistan apart from the capital Kabul, who reportedly promised cooperation with the Karzai government only to add another item to their long list of unfulfilled promises. However, the event reminded the international community one more time how forgotten Afghanistan has been left on its own to deal with its numerous economic problems as most international donors have failed to honor their pledges of sustainable adequate financial aid.

In the absence of the required funds to address immediate problems and to begin the badly needed reconstruction program, the worsening economic situation has created grounds for the continuation of all the ills of the pre-Karzai era. Taliban/al-Qaeda have regrouped and expanded their military operations against American forces and those of its Afghan and non-Afghan allies. Beside inflicting daily causalities on those forces, they now even capture small cities for a short while to show their power. The Karzai administration is practically non-existent outside Kabul, while it can only survive in that city thanks to 5,000 foreign troops; its president can only trust his American bodyguards with his life.

A major, if not the major, internal reason for the worsening political, economic and security situation is the inability of the Afghan central government in tackling its country's impoverishment. Not only has Afghanistan's reconstruction not begun in a meaningful way, the amount of available foreign aid has been less than the financial assistance promised in the January 2002 Tokyo conference. The donors participating in that conference pledged over $4.5 billion towards Afghanistan's reconstruction to be provided to the Afghan government over five years. However, most of the pledged assistance will most likely not be honored. This became evident in 2002 as only about 50 percent of the promised amount ($1.8 billion) for that year actually reached Afghanistan.

Although this amount was less than anticipated, it could still have made a significant positive impact had it been given to the Afghan government. The latter could have spent it on necessary projects to address immediate pressing needs, while providing for the required infrastructure to embark on a reconstruction program. However, the largest chunk of the internationally-provided funds was spent not on the badly needed projects, but on the expenses related to the settlement and operation of various United Nations agencies and non-government organizations operating in Afghanistan. Such expenses included those of their various work and residential facilities, the hefty salaries for their mainly Western employees and their spotless new air-conditioned cars.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/EE27Ag01.html">More

From April 2008:

Afghanistan Reconstruction: The Missing Link


The long-term success of counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan means denying the country to Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other extremist groups as a safe haven – which means helping the Afghan government become sufficiently stable, representative and effective that its citizens prefer it to the promises and threats of extremists.

As the fifth lowest ranking state on the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Index, Afghanistan faces extraordinary challenges. Yet, considering the importance of the outcome, the U.S. contribution to reconstruction has been shockingly small. In constant dollars per capita, we have spent far less in Afghanistan than in Iraq – or in the Balkans in the 1990s. We have allowed the aid efforts to be poorly coordinated and riddled with waste – and funneled large amounts of the money back to American contractors rather than to Afghan agencies.

This failure is undermining the Karzai government and demoralizing Afghan civilians, making it easier for the Taliban insurgency to reestablish itself. A stronger Taliban endangers our troops and poses a significant threat to all that we have achieved in Afghanistan. Washington must take care of our long-term security interests – and keep our promises to the Afghan people – by refocusing on Afghanistan, redoubling our assistance efforts, and addressing the problems of management and coordination on the ground.


The Situation in Afghanistan is Grave

According to the Brookings Institution, Afghanistan is the world’s second weakest state. Not only did Afghanistan receive a worse rating than Iraq, but it is also the "most insecure" state, according to the Brookings Weak State Index. "It has suffered from a long history of violent conflict as well as a lack of government control over significant portions of its territory and an inability to curtail grave human rights abuses. In the area of social welfare, Afghanistan also receives the world’s lowest score due to high child mortality, inadequate access to improved water and sanitation, and low primary school completion rates." http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx">Brookings, 2/26/08

Afghanistan received the 5th lowest rating on the 2007/2008 Human Development Index sponsored by UNDP. It was ahead of only Burkina Faso, Mali, Sierra Leone and Niger. Its Human Poverty Index ratings are equally abysmal, and the United Nations Human Development report for Afghanistan cites that in those terms, the country ranks as one of the "worst in the world." In addition, most Afghans live on less than a dollar a day and infant mortality rates are among the world's highest, while life expectancy is extremely low. http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/nhdr07_complete.pdf">Human Development Report for Afghanistan, 2007/2008

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Ineffective Reconstruction Efforts Are Undermining the Afghan Government and Empowering the Taliban

Reconstruction failures have badly tarnished the Karzai government and created opportunities for the Taliban. “They are also increasingly frustrated with the failure of President Karzai’s government to extend its authority and services throughout the country and by the lack of improvement in their daily lives six years after the international reconstruction process was launched. The Taliban have been able to exploit the Karzai government’s shortcomings to their advantage.” http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/Afghan_Study_Group_final.pdf">Jones-Pickering Report, 1/30/08

With few tangible benefits from reconstruction efforts, public support for the government is decreasing. In 2005, 77 percent of Afghans felt that their country was headed in the right direction, but today that number has dwindled to 54 percent. The Jones-Pickering report suggests that a failure to address longstanding challenges stemming from “insecurity, weak governance, widespread corruption, a poor economy and unemployment” is at the core of declining Afghan support. http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/Story?id=3931809&page=2">ABC News, 12/03/07
, http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/Afghan_Study_Group_final.pdf">Jones-Pickering Report, 1/30/08



Continue reading the rest of this extremely insightful report, http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/828">here

(edit to fix typo)