NYT Video:
Turning the Tribes in Iraq By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Published: September 2, 2007
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I tracked down Specialist Collazo, the Husky driver, who was an outpatient in Texas and sounded as if he was recovering well. As for Odom, he had returned to his home base at Fort Richardson, Alaska. His left arm and his nose were broken, and he had suffered a concussion. Despite the Hawr Rajab setback, he said that the cooperation with the sheiks had the potential to reduce the attacks on his soldiers and stabilize the town.
But he was philosophical about the way ahead. The political gridlock at the national level had made the recruiting and organizing of Sunni groups around Iraq all the more important. But what would happen once bands of concerned citizens were organized, trained and equipped? If the Iraqi government embraced the strategy, the effort to work with tribal leaders and local insurgents could lead to a broader political reconciliation. “At the local and national level, it could provide impetus to force some reconciliation,” Odom observed. “In other words, the Sunnis could come to have some sort of legitimacy through us.”
But if the effort to forge a link between the central government and the new security groups falters, the United States might simply be laying the groundwork for a heightened round of civil strife. The Iraqi government and the security forces it controls might become alarmed if Sunni security organizations were to sprout around the country and begin to network, and Shiite militias might also respond by stepping up their attacks.
“We have not made political progress at the national level,” Odom said. “We have taken on a decentralized effort with the concerned citizens at the local level and somehow hope that we can tie it back into the local and national government at the end of the day.”
What happened to the insurgents? They've been replaced by al-Qeada and concerned citizens by Bush's propaganda machine.
PREEMPTED: Bush admin Iraq spin and Petraeus/WH reportTroop Fatalies in Iraq 2006-2007