http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2006/12/18/112647/99From Larry Johnson, who is scaring the crap out of me lately:
Regardless of your feelings or beliefs about sending more U.S troops to Iraq, you must accept the painful truth that anything we do to salvage or strengthen the existing Shia-dominated government in Iraq redounds to the benefit of Iran. If we weigh in on the side of the Sunni insurgents we run a serious risk that the Shias will attack us in strength and, at least for the short time, cut our supply lines that run through the heart of Shia territory. Moreover, anything we do to militarily challenge Iran will weaken our influence in Iraq and jeopardize the mission of our forces in Iraq.
George Bush has made his choice and it is calamitous. He rejected out of hand the proposal to "Go Home". And dismissed the "Go Long" course of action, which would have emphasized counterinsurgency, public works vice combat, and diplomatic overtures to Iran and Syria. Instead, he has thrown his weight behind "Go Strong".
The key elements of the "go strong" plan are outlined in the accompanying analysis by Pat Lang (see Stalingrad on the Tigris?). What is not yet announced, but implicit in the plan, is a direct attack on Moqtada al Sadr and his militia, the Jayshi al Mahdi (JAM). During their meeting in Jordan last month, George Bush reportedly told Maliki in no uncertain terms that he would have to separate himself from al Sadr or become a casualty in the upcoming offensive against the bearded cleric. Ironically, Moqtada al Sadr has discouraged sectartian strife rather than egged it on and, among the various Shia clerics, is more receptive to working with Sunni counterparts to rebuild Iraq.
It is no surprise that Maliki returned to Iraq and is making a desperate bid to align himself now with Hakim and the "moderates" in the current government and is signaling he will abandon al Sadr. Bush, in his zeal for a deal in Iraq, is either ignorant or oblivious to the fact the al Hakim (a recent visitor to the White House) is closely aligned with Iran; in contrast to al Sadr who is more independent. Notwithstanding these facts the "'Decider'-in-Chief" has rolled the dice and will try to rub out Sadr's JAM. He also is betting he can do so without provoking a full-scale revolt among the Shia.