Not Quite a Blog
Complications with Sequoia's VVPATs, tapes in CA counties
05/31/06
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Riverside has asked for an exception to the provision in the California Election Code (§19370 and possibly §10260) which mandates the posting of results tapes at each precint (from "County in good (and bad) company"):
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In addition to arguing above that results posting could implicate voter privacy, Barbara Dunmore, Registrar of Riverside Co., argues that people can "walk off" with these reports, eliminating their usefulness. First, there should definitely be concerns about precincts so small that all ballots cast might be identical. Researchers here at Berkeley, Christopher Crutchfield, David Molnar and David Turner, point this out in a forthcoming paper entitled "Approximate Measurement of Voter Privacy Loss in an Election With Precinct Reports", forthcoming at the NIST/NSF Voting Systems Rating Workshop next week in Washington, D.C. One idea for solving that problem is to consolidate precincts where one of the precincts would have cast uniform ballots otherwise.
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It's clear to me that these counties have chosen to de-emphasize the importance of this provision of California Law, not because of concerns with voter privacy or the utility of posting results records but because the design of their voting machinery. The counties mentioned in this story all use the Sequoia AVC Edge DRE with VeriVote printer (for paper-trail compatibility according to CA law). Instead of designing a printer where poll workers change paper rolls or cartridges, Sequoia has designed the system such that entire printers are meant to be swapped out. These printers are difficult to open. The state's consultant who reviewed the system for the California Secretary of State, Paul Craft, had the following to say in February (from "California Secretary of State Consultant’s Report Sequoia's Voting Systems"):
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I have a hard time believing that the Registrars in Riverside, Napa and San Bernardino counties are being as forthcoming as they should be in their moves to waive or disobey this aspect of California election law. I would really like to hear what their real concerns are. Are the procedures for opening the printer too complicated? too complicated for the aging poll worker population? Does opening the printer subsystem at the end of the day unreasonably compromise the chain of custody for the paper trail inside? Basically: On what basis are these decisions really being made?
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http://josephhall.org/nqb2/index.php/2006/05/31/casequoiavvpat