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...but an independently auditable paper trail. The machine prints out a your voting choices in human and computer readable form (e.g. barcodes w/human readable text). You review the printed copy for accuracy, and stuff it in a box. Preliminary results are derived from the electronic tally from the voting machine.
However, prior to certification of the election results, some random selection of voting precincts count the printed copies manually, and compare to the computer tally. If they differ (perhaps by more than a small tolerance level, say 0.5%), count even more by hand. Also, if any candidate questions "suspicious" results for any precinct, they can be recounted manually, as well.
It's not so much the machines themselves, I can live with technological advances, and the desire for modern technology in our voting systems. What is necessary to ensure the integrity of an election is an *independent* means of recounting the ballots for accuracy, and the ability to audit the electronic results for the purposes of recounting.
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