Welcome to DU!
The truly grassroots left-of-center political community where regular people, not algorithms, drive the discussions and set the standards.
Join the community:
Create a free account
Support DU (and get rid of ads!):
Become a Star Member
Latest Breaking News
General Discussion
The DU Lounge
All Forums
Issue Forums
Culture Forums
Alliance Forums
Region Forums
Support Forums
Help & Search
Economy
In reply to the discussion: STOCK MARKET WATCH - Wednesday, 1 February 2012 [View all]Demeter
(85,373 posts)1. Pushing Non-Official Holders of Local-Issued European Debt into Subordination
http://www.zerohedge.com/contributed/pushing-non-official-holders-local-issued-european-debt-subordination
Courtesy of Russ Winter of Winter Watch at Wall Street Examiner
I spotted some interesting commentary on the maturing March 2012 Greek bonds. After buying at 40-45 cents, it seems the hedge funds are trying to unload in a bidless 35-cent market. The ECB has the largest stake, bought at 70 cents. This official holders dominance of this market, and refusal so far to participate in haircuts, is making the whole exercise futile and severely subordinates any potential non-official holder or future buyer of European sovereign debt. Reuters reports that the ECB is split and confused on this issue. The IMFs LaGarde says, If the level of Greeces privately held debt is not sufficiently renegotiated, then public creditors will also have to participate. Apparently, the IMF was also confused as this was retracted or denied. As I wrote in Stick it to the Local Issued Bond Holders, this is one of two serious subordination fiascos, the second being a slew of UK-law non-local issues that restrict collective restructuring actions (see chart at the Stick it link).
The always-alert analyst Simon Johnson writes about this issue in Europe:
The CDS cost on Portugal has blown out to 1350 points, and the 10 year is over 15%, suggesting that its exposed in its next financing rounds in May and June. Of course, in a world of gaming the credit insurance rules to avert default so as not have to pay claims and constantly subordinating nonofficial bondholders, one wonders if the hedge funds let alone banks using LTRO will be sucked in. About 25 billion in UK-law Portuguese bonds trade out of 104 billion and the ECB hold 20 billon, leaving 59 billion in the hands of local-issue holders, namely Tia Miriam (Aunt Millie) pensions and Portuguese and Spanish banks.
Perhaps anticipating problems ahead, Spain wants the Europe rescue fund to be bigger, thus allowing for even more subordination of non-official holdings. As one can see in my local bond issue article, Spain is a big issuer of UK-law bonds with 318 billion issued out of 505 billion. Against this condition, the ECB will make available a three-year loan (LTRO) at 1% for insolvent banks with tiny slivers of capital to go speculate on financing European debt.
Barclays estimates the European monetary authority purchased a total of 46 billion in Spanish debt since August, 22% of the total investment of its Securities Market Programme (SMP). Barclays also estimates that Italian debt purchases made up 43% (90 billion) of the SMP, while Greek debt made up 17% (36B), Portuguese debt made up 10% (20B), and Irish debt made up 9% (19B). In the year prior, the ECB plopped down an estimated 77.5 billion on Greek, Irish and Portuguese debt....
IN OTHER WORDS, THIS IS WHERE THEY EAT EVERYONE'S PENSIONS...
Courtesy of Russ Winter of Winter Watch at Wall Street Examiner
I spotted some interesting commentary on the maturing March 2012 Greek bonds. After buying at 40-45 cents, it seems the hedge funds are trying to unload in a bidless 35-cent market. The ECB has the largest stake, bought at 70 cents. This official holders dominance of this market, and refusal so far to participate in haircuts, is making the whole exercise futile and severely subordinates any potential non-official holder or future buyer of European sovereign debt. Reuters reports that the ECB is split and confused on this issue. The IMFs LaGarde says, If the level of Greeces privately held debt is not sufficiently renegotiated, then public creditors will also have to participate. Apparently, the IMF was also confused as this was retracted or denied. As I wrote in Stick it to the Local Issued Bond Holders, this is one of two serious subordination fiascos, the second being a slew of UK-law non-local issues that restrict collective restructuring actions (see chart at the Stick it link).
The always-alert analyst Simon Johnson writes about this issue in Europe:
In the event of default (i) any non-official bond holder is junior to all official creditors and (ii) the issuer reserves the right to change law as needed to negate any rights of the nonofficial bond holder.
We should not underestimate the damage these steps have inflicted on Europes 8.4 trillion sovereign bond markets. For example, the Italian government has issued bonds with a face value of over 1.6 trillion. The groups holding these bonds are banks, pension funds, insurance companies, and Italian households. These investors bought them as safe, low-return instruments that could be used to hedge liabilities and provide for future income needs. It was once hard to imagine these could ever be restructured or default.
Now, however, it is clear they are not safe. They have default risk, and their ultimate value is subject to the political constraint and subjective decisions by a collective of individuals in the Italian government and society, the ECB, the European Union, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). An investor buying an Italian bond today needs to forecast an immediate, complex process that has been evolving in unpredictable ways. Investors naturally want a high return in order to bear these risks.
Investors must also weigh carefully the costs and benefits to them of official intervention. Each time official creditors provide loans or buy bonds, the nonofficial holders become more subordinated, because official creditors including the IMF, ECB, and now the European Union continue to claim preferential status.
We should not underestimate the damage these steps have inflicted on Europes 8.4 trillion sovereign bond markets. For example, the Italian government has issued bonds with a face value of over 1.6 trillion. The groups holding these bonds are banks, pension funds, insurance companies, and Italian households. These investors bought them as safe, low-return instruments that could be used to hedge liabilities and provide for future income needs. It was once hard to imagine these could ever be restructured or default.
Now, however, it is clear they are not safe. They have default risk, and their ultimate value is subject to the political constraint and subjective decisions by a collective of individuals in the Italian government and society, the ECB, the European Union, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). An investor buying an Italian bond today needs to forecast an immediate, complex process that has been evolving in unpredictable ways. Investors naturally want a high return in order to bear these risks.
Investors must also weigh carefully the costs and benefits to them of official intervention. Each time official creditors provide loans or buy bonds, the nonofficial holders become more subordinated, because official creditors including the IMF, ECB, and now the European Union continue to claim preferential status.
The CDS cost on Portugal has blown out to 1350 points, and the 10 year is over 15%, suggesting that its exposed in its next financing rounds in May and June. Of course, in a world of gaming the credit insurance rules to avert default so as not have to pay claims and constantly subordinating nonofficial bondholders, one wonders if the hedge funds let alone banks using LTRO will be sucked in. About 25 billion in UK-law Portuguese bonds trade out of 104 billion and the ECB hold 20 billon, leaving 59 billion in the hands of local-issue holders, namely Tia Miriam (Aunt Millie) pensions and Portuguese and Spanish banks.
Perhaps anticipating problems ahead, Spain wants the Europe rescue fund to be bigger, thus allowing for even more subordination of non-official holdings. As one can see in my local bond issue article, Spain is a big issuer of UK-law bonds with 318 billion issued out of 505 billion. Against this condition, the ECB will make available a three-year loan (LTRO) at 1% for insolvent banks with tiny slivers of capital to go speculate on financing European debt.
Barclays estimates the European monetary authority purchased a total of 46 billion in Spanish debt since August, 22% of the total investment of its Securities Market Programme (SMP). Barclays also estimates that Italian debt purchases made up 43% (90 billion) of the SMP, while Greek debt made up 17% (36B), Portuguese debt made up 10% (20B), and Irish debt made up 9% (19B). In the year prior, the ECB plopped down an estimated 77.5 billion on Greek, Irish and Portuguese debt....
IN OTHER WORDS, THIS IS WHERE THEY EAT EVERYONE'S PENSIONS...
Edit history
Please sign in to view edit histories.
103 replies
= new reply since forum marked as read
Highlight:
NoneDon't highlight anything
5 newestHighlight 5 most recent replies
RecommendedHighlight replies with 5 or more recommendations
Too Failed to Be Big? Public Citizen Petitions Federal Regulators to Break Up B of A
Demeter
Jan 2012
#2
Europe’s refiners fall on hard times: IT'S A PERFECT TIME FOR AN IRANIAN OIL EMBARGO!
Demeter
Jan 2012
#11
Portuguese storm gathers as EU leaders fight over Greece By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Demeter
Jan 2012
#17
United States of Europe? What it Will Take to Save the Continent from Economic Collapse
Demeter
Feb 2012
#37
"The probability of the euro zone debt problems turning into a global financial crisis has receded
Demeter
Feb 2012
#31
There's so much very short-term thinking expressed in the financial MSM newsfeeds...
Ghost Dog
Feb 2012
#33
January private-sector jobs rise 170K: ADP (expected 185k. Dec revised down by 33k to 292k)
Roland99
Feb 2012
#48
Apple Tries Damage Control after Horrific Working Conditions at its Factories Exposed
Demeter
Feb 2012
#34
Inside the Bacchanalian Wall Street Fraternity Party of Billionaire Bankers and Hedge Fund Predators
Demeter
Feb 2012
#50
Santander's profits fall 35 percent as bank takes hit on property assets {spain}
xchrom
Feb 2012
#74