We now discuss whether the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad or an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of expression. The overbreadth doctrine applies when legislation criminalizes constitutionally protected activities along with unprotected activities, by sweeping too broadly and infringing upon fundamental rights ... Here, the State argues that Catalano and Schermerhorn do not have a constitutionally recognized right to play loud music, thus the statute is not subject to an overbreadth analysis. However, the right to play music, including amplified music, in public fora is protected under the First Amendment ... In short, the statute proscribes excessive sound emanating from vehicles on public thoroughfares. Subsection (3), however, excepts motor vehicles used for business or political purposes, which in the normal course of conducting such business use <sound-making> devices from this broad proscription ... Regardless of the intent of the Legislature, section 316.3045 is a sweeping ban on amplified sound that can be heard beyond twenty-five feet of a motor vehicle, unless that sound comes from a business or political vehicle, which presumably uses sound-making devices for the purpose of expressing commercial and political viewpoints. For instance, business and political vehicles may amplify commercial or political speech at any volume, whereas an individual traversing the highways for pleasure would be issued a citation for listening to any type of sound, whether it is religious advocacy or music, too loudly. Thus, this statute is content based because it does not apply equally to music, political speech, and advertising ... Accordingly, we find that the statute is an unreasonable restriction on First Amendment rights. Likewise, the restriction of the constitutionally protected right to amplify sound, despite the States acknowledgement that this level of noise is tolerable and safe if the source is a commercial or political vehicle, is not narrowly tailored to achieve the governments interests in improving traffic safety and protecting the citizenry from excessive noise. Thus, we also find that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad because it restricts the freedom of expression in a manner more intrusive than necessary ...'
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