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jberryhill

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Gender: Male
Hometown: Delaware
Member since: Fri Jan 20, 2006, 08:14 PM
Number of posts: 51,363

Journal Archives

Obama Caves!



Obamas explore 'spectacular' Carlsbad Caverns

Full video: Stormy Daniels Receives Key To West Hollywood


WEST HOLLYWOOD, Calif. (KABC) --
West Hollywood officials presented Stormy Daniels with the key to the city, saying they were honoring her for her legal battle against President Donald Trump.

The city proclaimed "Stormy Daniels Day" as the porn star made an appearance at adult-products store Chi Chi La Rue's.



This includes the full speeches by Avenatti and Daniels, along with the poster advertising her 7 and 9 PM appearances, and TeamStormy apparel.

Meanwhile, in Italy...

SDNY Cohen Case Filing Friday Roundup

An interesting little catfight broke out this week in the Cohen search warrant proceeding, and while I'm reluctant to guess what might yet be in store this early on a #FelonyFriday, there are some bits and pieces that I didn't see covered in the news in any great detail.

First up, some background on what this proceeding is about might be helpful. Michael Cohen is not, as yet, charged with a crime in New York. The basic outline is that he had been under investigation for several months on suspicion of a crime or crimes not yet identified, and that there was probable cause to search the locations which were searched to find evidence of it. The process of connecting that evidence with the crime(s) in mind is taking some time, in order to sort through the material seized and filter out any that might be privileged. Contrary to popular belief, what the USAO-SDNY has made clear is that the investigation pre-dates the Stormy Daniels civil matter in California.

What we learned today was that the search immediately followed a visit to NY by Qataris generously seeking to help out Jared with his rent. The search warrant immediately followed, probably as fast as it could, given the hoops through which one has to jump to get such a sweeping warrant for three locations involving an attorney. It's clear the USAO-SDNY wanted to get whatever may have been left behind while the Qatari trail was still warm.

After this matter concerning the search warrants began, Mr. Avenatti filed for intervenor status of Ms. Daniels. Procedurally, there are two parts of that - (1) Avenatti seeks admission to the court, since he is not licensed in NY, and (2) the intervenor petition itself.

On the matter of the actual intervenor status, Mr. Avenatti has agreed with the USAO-SDNY's motion NOT to allow that for the time being. That filing is here:

https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.491943/gov.uscourts.nysd.491943.35.0.pdf

The Government respectfully submits this letter to advise the Court that the Government
and counsel for proposed Intervenor Stephanie Clifford have met and conferred regarding her
Motion to Intervene (the “Motion”), as the Court directed. At this time, with the consent of
counsel for Ms. Clifford, the Government requests that the Motion be held in abeyance pending
these ongoing discussions.


What that says is that the prosecutors told Avenatti they don't want him in the proceeding, and he agreed pending further developments. Thus Avenatti has said he is "cooperating with the the USAO-SDNY", by agreeing to let the petition for intervenor status chill.

Into these waters waded the odd character of Peter Gleason. Gleason sent a letter to the court to the effect of his having held discussions with Cohen some years back on the matter of two women who were beaten up by Schneiderman, his advice that they not go to law enforcement, and his seemingly unconnected conversations that looped back to Cohen. While that sequence is something of a head scratcher, the picture becomes much clearer when one understands that Gleason had, in the relevant time frame, put up his own residence to secure the bond of a then-celebrated New York madam, and that Trump was in the "modeling agency" business. Hence, "you can't go to police" and what appears to be making other arrangements for compensation seem to line up with those facts a little more clearly.

In any event, Gleason wanted to ensure that the identities of the two women in question, and any records Cohen had about them, would also remain confidential. The judge requested that Cohen file a brief, advancing some legal reasoning as to why that is appropriate.

Gleason has filed his brief, which is a real thing of wonder. That brief is here:

https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.491943/gov.uscourts.nysd.491943.51.0_2.pdf

In summary, the brief says "Attorney work product is confidential, and New York is really, really corrupt." Why this means his dealings with Cohen in the matter of these two women should be protected is anyone's guess. There's one good point in there relating to protecting the identities of victims of sexual abuse, but not tied to what he's seeking here in any meaningful way.

The brief continues with several examples of drive-by accusations to the effect of, "Oh, did I mention that New York is really, really corrupt?"

Along the way, Gleason takes a potshot at Avenatti to the effect of saying that letting Avenatti into the case would pretty much blow any confidentiality relating to the potential documents in question, should there actually be any in existence, given the way that Avenatti has acted in relation to what appear to be unlawfully obtained bank documents.

Avenatti, still not actually admitted to the proceeding, doesn't let that get in the way of firing a gratuitous salvo at Gleason for reasons which are unclear. Although, really, it's unclear why he is seeking intervenor status on behalf of Daniels in the first place, since, in the contract suit in California, nobody disputes that the $130k was paid to Daniels and for the purpose of that contract dispute it doesn't matter one way or the other where Cohen got the money.

Be that as it may, Avenatti has an interesting footnote in his rimshot back at Gleason and as has become routine in his filings, spends quite a bit of time talking about himself, instead of any issue relevant to the case:

https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.491943/gov.uscourts.nysd.491943.52.0.pdf

"As a preliminary matter, even though counsel for Ms. Clifford, Mr. Michael Avenatti, is
addressed by name in the Motion and Mr. Gleason contends that Mr. Avenatti’s conduct
“necessitated the instant motion[,]” the stated request for relief in the Motion does not have
anything to do with Ms. Clifford or Mr. Avenatti. Rather, Mr. Gleason seeks a protective order to
ensure that his “discussions, regarding Eric Schneiderman, with (Plaintiff Michael Cohen), . . .
which Plaintiff may have memorialized, should be privileged communications and not subject to
disclosure to any third party.” [Dkt No. 51 at 10.] To be clear, Mr. Avenatti is not in possession
of these communications. Further, neither Mr. Avenatti nor his client have requested that these
communications be shared with them. Nor do they want access to them. Nor are they aware of
any plans on the part of the government to share these communications with them."


He italizices that last part, just to be "clear".

A sentence later, Avenatti continues with:

"Moreover, Mr. Gleason’s gratuitous ad hominem attacks on Mr. Avenatti are completely unwarranted."

...at which point we are referred to this footnote:

Mr. Avenatti is at a loss as to why Mr. Gleason would have filed pleadings with the Court
attacking him. Mr. Avenatti has absolutely no prior experience with Mr. Gleason. Indeed, Mr.
Avenatti first called Mr. Gleason days ago to discuss his prior letter to the Court and was
promised a call back by Mr. Gleason.
He has yet to receive any such return call.


So, as Mr. Avenatti would say, "to be clear" he never wanted any access, information, sharing, etc., in relation to anything having to do with the two women that Gleason says Schneiderman beat up; but when Gleason filed his original letter, Avenatti wanted to talk to him about something. Gosh, one wonders why someone with such a profound lack of interest in the women discussed in the Gleason letter would have wanted to talk to Gleason about.

Oh, hey, by the way, somewhere in here I should probably mention that the USAO-SDNY is interested in pursuing a criminal investigation and likely some charges against Cohen. That's why this proceeding exists.

But, oh well, back to the pressing matters at hand.

Avenatti's brief concludes by hanging out to dry the poor schmuck who gave him the SARS. In defending himself, for no reason since he's not on trial, against the claim that he has done something untoward by leaking the SARS information, and the minor erroneous information about other people's bank transactions (but, well, who are they anyway, fuck 'em), Avenatti makes this brilliant point:

As shown in Ms. Clifford’s recent filing, the facts detailed in the report drafted and
released by Mr. Avenatti were largely proven accurate.


...because attorneys have an obligation to be (largely) accurate.


Moreover, Mr. Cohen in his letter
objecting to Mr. Avenatti being admitted pro hac vice failed to specify what laws Mr. Avenatti
supposedly violated, or what wrongs he committed. Mr. Gleason similarly failed to cite any legal
authority to support his position. This is not surprising, seeing that no Bank Secrecy Act law was
violated by his disclosures.
See, e.g., In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 36, 41-42 (1st
Cir. 2015) (explaining that Bank Secrecy Act “expressly forbids disclosure only by reporting
financial institutions and their officers and agents, and by government entities, officials, and
agents on the receiving end of SARs”
and concluding that “neither the Act nor the regulations
restrict third parties—that is, parties on neither the financial-institution side nor the government
side of a SAR exchange—from disclosing the existence or non-existence of a particular SAR.”
)


First, understand that by "his disclosures", Avenatti means "my disclosures", as the upcoming royal wedding has no doubt led him to refer to himself in the third person.

But I love the takeaway from his argument: "I didn't break any law. The schmuck who got them for me did!" The Ecuadorian embassy was unavailable for comment on whether they have any open rooms in New York.

To finish off the week, Cohen's lawyers filed their brief opposing Avenatti's admission to the case, as the judge had previously requested.

Again, as things still stand, the USAO-SDNY hasn't modified their position that they don't want Avenatti in the case either but, whatever, they are pretty much in the back seat and along for the ride until the special master is finished sorting the evidence seized from Cohen.

Oh, did I mention that this case is about the USAO-SDNY looking to bring criminal charges against Cohen? Just in case you forgot. It's one of those irrelevant details that's easy to forget in all the exciting rock 'em sock 'em action.

So, in comes Cohen to take his turn with potshots against Avenatti. His brief is here:

https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.491943/gov.uscourts.nysd.491943.53.0.pdf

When you apply for PHV admission in a jurisdiction to which you are not directly admitted, you agree to play by the rules of that jurisdiction. Amazingly, New York actually has the same rule that California does on the subject of extrajudicial statements about a case:

Rule 3.6 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, provides the following:

A lawyer who is participating in or has participated in a criminal or civil matter
shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding
in the matter.


This will likely shock you to know that while the Empire State has no attorney regulation specifically addressing, "Going ape shit over people speaking Spanish in a sandwich shop", they actually DO have a rule against "Shooting your mouth off on television about a case you are involved in." I know, right?

The brief goes on to make the outrageous claim that Mr. Avenatti has made numerous media appearances about the case, and that since he's not following the rules already, the court shouldn't let him in. The flaw in that argument is, of course, that Avenatti is not yet admitted. All Avenatti has to do is to point out that, of course he'd stop appearing on TV to talk about the case just as soon as the court admits him. Boom. Done. Tell him that and send him my paypal address.

It's worth backing up a moment to talk about "Waddya gotta do to get pro hac vice admission anyway?" Ordinarily it is bone-dead simple. You get your state attorney licensing authority to give you a certificate of good standing, you get a local attorney to vouch for you, you fill out the form, pay the fee, and you are in. Avenatti's PHV petition is itself something of a thing of wonder, and is kind of worth backing up to look at and marvel:

https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.491943/gov.uscourts.nysd.491943.49.0_1.pdf

I mean, hey, he got the 2009 Orange County Trial Lawyer of the Year, and was voted best dressed in his high school yearbook, etc., but one little statement slipped by:

"5. There are no pending disciplinary proceedings against me in any State or Federal court."

Well, here we might end up talking about what the meaning of "are" is. I am not directly familiar with the disciplinary mechanism of the California bar. Orly Taitz, multiply sanctioned in federal courts, is an attorney in good standing, and by all accounts healthy gums. So, what constitutes a "pending disciplinary proceeding" or whether Calbar holds theirs in courts, I don't know. The only thing I know about Calbar is that if they invite you to speak at a CLE event, they get you a nice hotel room.

As Cohen's newly-filed motion notes:

The California Bar Association, of which Mr. Avenatti is a member, acknowledged in an
April 18, 2018 letter that it is currently investigating a complaint regarding Mr. Avenatti’s
alleged lack of fitness to practice law in the state. See Brooke Singman, Michael Avenatti being
investigated by California State Bar, Fox News (May 17, 2018), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2018/05/16/michael-avenatti-being-investigated-by-californiastate-bar.html.

This Court’s Local Rules provide that an applicant for pro hac vice admission to
the Court certify “whether there are any disciplinary proceedings presently against the applicant
and (d) the facts and circumstances surrounding any affirmative responses[.]” S.D.N.Y. Local
Case 1:18-mj-03161-KMW Civ. R. 1.3(c) (emphasis added). In Mr. Avenatti’s affidavit filed with this Court dated May 13,
2018, he stated “[t]here are currently no pending disciplinary proceedings against me in any
State or Federal Court.” ECF 46-1, at 3. Mr. Avenatti has not explained why he failed to
disclose the California Bar’s pending investigation into his conduct. Accordingly, his
submission does not comply with the requirements in the Court’s Local Rules.


Again, whether Calbar is "conducting an investigation" as Calbar has stated, rises to the level of a "pending disciplinary proceeding" may be something of an issue of semantics, which the court might want to look into (as well as whatever Avenatti might fill in on that topic in his next filing in reply to this opposition). Totally IMHO, it might have been better for Avenatti to mention that some jackass filed a bar complaint which is still in an investigational stage up front, and a little less Orange Queen of the 2009 Lawyer Festival.

The two remaining points are fairly nicely done by Cohen's counsel at McDermott Will and Emery, and really point out why it is a good idea to hire a lawyer when the focus of some part of a proceeding is about oneself. They jump on Avenatti's previous filing that he has a "right" to be admitted, by pointing out that there is no right to PHV admission (which is correct), and also have some fun with Avenatti's claim that absent his admission in this proceeding, then Daniels wouldn't have any legal representation. I mean, hey, other than by speaking Spanish at a sandwich shop, it's really hard to find a lawyer in New York City.

At the end, they set up an interesting proposition. Avenatti doesn't have a "right" to admission, and they've kicked up some dust over the claim that he spends a lot of time on television in apparent prospective violation of the relevant rule of practice in New York. But, since his admission is a disputed issue, the court may decide to examine Avenatti on any contested points before proceeding. If that happens, Cohen's motion proposes this:

We believe that it is vital that the Court inquire as to where Mr. Avenatti obtained the
SARs report(s) and related nonpublic bank records of Mr. Cohen. Those bank records and
reports are not attorney work product. They were purloined from protected federal agency files
and made public by Mr. Avenatti. If he fails to answer, he should not be admitted pro hac vice
in this proceeding before the Court.


It's an interesting proposition. As much as we want to see Cohen get nailed to the wall, courts don't work by conducting Twitter polls. This is a criminal proceeding. Among the top priorities in a criminal proceeding is safeguarding the rights of the defendant. The basic argument is "we can't trust Avenatti to act responsibility in connection with any confidential material he might come across by admission to this case". Hence, it is sort of relevant to ask, "what was the deal with the SARS" and if it comes down to him saying, I don't have to tell you (for which it's hard to think of a theory as to why), then the court can just as easily say that it doesn't have to let him into the case either.

So, this case, which is about the USAO-SDNY conducting a criminal investigation into Cohen (in case you forgot) and how to process the materials seized in the raid on Cohen's office is, for the time being, squarely all about Michael Avennati. Pending the special master wrapping up, the bulk of the court's attention is being sought by three parties to weigh the facts and law relating to Mr. Avennati's behavior.

On edit:

It figures - some late-breaking hip-shooting from Avenatti came in, which I posted downthread here:
https://www.democraticunderground.com/100210630928#post6

Talent Agency Pitching Avenatti/Scaramucci Reboot of Crossfire


http://variety.com/2018/tv/news/uta-avenatti-scaramucci-cnn-msnbc-1202813942/



The idea sounds like an update of “Crossfire,” the venerable CNN program that pit one liberal pundit (“on the left”) against a conservative commentator (“on the right”), and relied on everyone from Pat Buchanan and Robert Novak to Michael Kinsley, Tucker Carlson and James Carville. The program ran initially on CNN between 1982 and 2005, and enjoyed a short, second run in 2013 and 2014 when its panelists included Newt Gingrich, S.E. Cupp, Stephanie Cutter, and Van Jones.

Jay Sures, the co-president of UTA, is said to have been the executive sussing out interest in the potential project. The trio was spotted together at the recent White House Correspondents Dinner (above, pictured).

US Treasury FINCEN Issues Statement About SAR Availability


https://twitter.com/aviswanatha/status/997192039048646656

Can we calm the fuck down now?

Tweeter is WSJ reporter.

The "whistleblower" is interfering with a criminal investigation.

An IMHO important passage in the recent DC Manafort court opinion

As you may recall, there are two criminal proceedings going on against Paul Manafort - one in the US District Court for the District of Columbia (The DCDC), and one in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (The EDVA).

Both prosecutions were brought by Mueller, but involve different sets of transactions and consequent alleged crimes arising from Manafort's profitable relationships with the former Russian-backed government of Ukraine.

In both cases, Manafort's defense has filed motions seeking to dismiss the indictments on the grounds that they were out of scope of the special counsel's mandate, that relevant DoJ guidelines were not followed, and various other theories.

There was something of a mass freakout at DU over the recent hearing on these similar motions in the EDVA. While the EDVA still has that motion under advisement, the DCDC issued its decision on the motion.

The DCDC found the indictment in that case to be within the mandate, that DoJ internal rules do not create third party rights, and that, in any event, the relevant DoJ guidelines were followed.

The full decision is here:

https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.190597/gov.uscourts.dcd.190597.301.0_2.pdf

...and it is organized by topic:

I. The investigation of Manafort was an appropriate exploration of a “link” between a
person associated with the campaign and the Russian government.

II. The regulations do not create judicially enforceable rights.

III. The Appointment Order comports with the regulations.

IV. The Special Counsel received a specific factual statement of the matters assigned to
him, and the Acting Attorney General was the one who decided, as the regulations
require, that the Special Counsel’s jurisdiction includes the matters in the indictment.


Section II, starting at page 20, is interesting in part because it is not necessary. Because in Section III, the court finds that the appointment order was compliant with the regulations, then whether the DoJ internal rules create rights that outside parties may rely upon doesn't matter.

There are two reasons that a court will do something like that. One reason would be that if, on appeal, the appellate court were to find that part III was not valid, then part II provides the cure to that. In other words, even if on review it was determined that the appointment order did NOT comport with the DoJ internal rules, part II is a backstop which says "but it doesn't matter anyway".

The other reason a court may do that, is what makes Section II potentially interesting.

It starts with the conclusion:

Furthermore, Manafort cannot move to dismiss his complaint under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure based upon a claimed violation of the Department of Justice Special Counsel
Regulations because those regulations are not substantive rules that create individual rights; they
are merely statements of internal departmental policy. This is an independent basis to deny his
motion.


...and then proceeds to take a look at the rule in question to see whether they are "substantive" rules, or rules of DoJ policy, organization, etc....

A close review of the regulations reinforces the conclusion that they are internal rules
intended solely to guide the Attorney General and other Department personnel. The regulations
describe the circumstances that may warrant the appointment of a Special Counsel, the alternatives
the Attorney General may consider when those circumstances arise, and the qualifications an
individual appointed to serve must bring to the task. 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1–03. The regulation
singled out in Manafort’s motion statesthat the Attorney General will establish a Special Counsel’s
jurisdiction, and it provides that it will be the Attorney General who will determine whether to
grant additional jurisdiction or assign new matters that arise to the Special Counsel or elsewhere
within the Department


Before delving into applicable specific cases, the court makes a fairly broad and important statement:

The case law also makes it clear that internal agency regulations that were not required by
the Constitution or a statute are not enforceable by the defendant in a criminal prosecution.
See
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 749–54 (1979) (holding that IRS’s violation of internal
IRS electronic surveillance regulations did not require the court to suppress a tape recording of a
call between the taxpayer and the agency during the taxpayer’s trial for bribery); United States v.
Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 435 n.137 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (rejecting defendant’s suggestion that failure to
comply with FBI regulations can require reversal of a conviction).


In other words, any internal DoJ regulations that aren't there in order to safeguard a particular Constitutional or statutory right of a criminal defendant, simply do not matter.

The court then proceeds to note that Manafort's defense took a line out of context from the dispute over whether Nixon could broadly assert executive privilege against the subpoena of a special prosecutor, and takes some time to flesh out why the defense's citation was out of context. Manafort had quoted a line from US v. Nixon to the effect that DoJ regulations "have the force of law"...


In support of this argument, Manafort lifts one sentence from United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the case in which the Supreme Court decided that a President’s
claim of executive privilege could be overcome by a prosecutor’s showing of need.
Def.’s Mot.
at 22. In that opinion, the Court stated that the regulation appointing the Watergate Special
Prosecutor had “the force of law.”
Def.’s Mot. at 22–23, citing Nixon, 418 U.S. at 695. But Nixon
concerned a different regulation promulgated for a different purpose, and the case does not stand
for the proposition that the regulations at issue should be read to confer any enforceable rights on
the defendant.

In Nixon, the Attorney General had issued a regulation delegating authority to a Special
Prosecutor to investigate “all offenses arising out of the 1972 Presidential Election.” 418 U.S. at
694 n.8. As part of his investigation, the Special Prosecutor issued a subpoena to the President for
the tape recordings of conversations in the Oval Office, and the President resisted compliance on
the basis of executive privilege. Id. at 686–89. When the Special Prosecutor filed an action to
enforce the subpoena in court, the President argued that the court had no jurisdiction to hear the
case because the assertion of privilege was an intra-branch dispute between the President and a
subordinate involving a political question. Id. at 692–93. President Nixon also argued that because
the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to
prosecute a case, the President, as head of the branch, has the final word in determining what
evidence is to be used in any particular criminal case. Id.


The Supreme Court rejected the President’s arguments. In reaching its decision that the
judiciary had the responsibility under the Constitution to decide the question of the availability of
the privilege, it began by eschewing the parties’ formulations and characterizing the nature of the
dispute for itself. The starting point of the analysis was that the evidence was being sought in
connection with a pending criminal prosecution being brought in the name of the United States.
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 694. The Attorney General of the United States had, pursuant to the federal
statutes that authorized him to appoint subordinate officials, delegated the authority to represent
the United States in that case to the Special Prosecutor. Id. And given “these specially delegated
duties,” the regulation gave the Special Prosecutor “explicit power” to address issues unique to
“these particular matters,” such as “to contest the invocation of executive privilege.”
Id. at 694–
95.

The Court then said, “[s]o long as this regulation is extant, it has the force of law,” and the
Executive Branch was bound by it. Id. at 695.


In other words, the relevant regulation having "the force of law" was the regulation allowing appointment of the special prosecutor itself, but that, once the special prosecutor was appointed, the special prosecutor had the power to:

address issues unique to "these particular matters," such as "to contest the invocation of executive privilege."

Okay, so why am I fascinated by this passage of the decision?

Who can name some OTHER statement of DoJ policy which has received a lot of attention lately as to whether it does, or does not, establish a right on which a prospective defendant might attempt to rely?

"The case law also makes it clear that internal agency regulations that were not required by
the Constitution or a statute are not enforceable by the defendant in a criminal prosecution."


Let that sink in for a bit.

Remember ABSCAM? Seven members of Congress bagged in one FBI operation

There was a comment a while back asking if the speech and debate clause of the Constitution prohibited the criminal investigation of members of Congress for activities involving their official activities.

The speech and debate clause provides that members of Congress:

...shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in going to and from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

For those that missed it, ABSCAM was a pretty ballsy sting operation originally set up by the FBI to investigate official corruption connected with the Atlantic City casino business, but expanded into some amazing fictional scenarios set up to offer bribes to members of Congress. They had people pose as front men for a fake company that was claimed to be owned by wealthy Saudi Arabians.

If you don't remember it, or weren't around at the time, take a look at how they brought these guys down:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abscam#Convictions

Richard Kelly's appeal was something of an amusement:

In 1982 the conviction of Richard Kelly was overturned on the grounds of entrapment. Kelly, the sole Republican, said that he was only pretending to be involved with the bribery from Abdul Enterprises. He claimed that he was conducting his own operation dealing with corruption and that the FBI was ruining his own investigation. However, an appeals court upheld the conviction and Kelly served 13 months in prison.

What was hilarious about the "entrapment" claim was that it boiled down to saying, "Well of course if you offer a bribe to a Congressman, he'll take it!"

Watch how NBC broke the story:



The videos of the meetings were great stuff too.

This guy thinks he's going to outwit the FBI:







A little background on Peter Gleason - the lawyer seeking to seal Cohen records on Schneiderman

Ahem... from 2012 - the relevant time frame:


https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/22/peter-gleason-new-york-apartment

Looking relaxed in an open-neck shirt in his Elvis-inspired living room, Peter Gleason shows little concern over betting his $2.5m apartment on the word of an alleged New York madam.

But then again, nothing about the lawyer's involvement in the case of Scottish-born Anna Gristina – the alleged mastermind of a high-end Manhattan prostitution ring – has been conventional.

Even before opting to put up his well-heeled apartment for her bail, the 48-year-old played an intriguing role in Gristina's tale – part lawyer, part crusader and, he has said, part saviour.

...

But intrigue continues to swirl over possible names in Gristina's little black book, if such a thing ever existed. If Gleason is aware of such a directory – much sought after by New York's district attorney, it has been reported – he is keeping it to himself. "I never asked her if there was a black book, and as far as I'm concerned there is no black book," he said. If that is the case, it will come as a bitter disappointment to prosecutors and a hungry New York media pack – and cause many to wonder what the point of the five-year investigation was.



Gleason was attorney for the madam.

Schneiderman beat up two of the women (which is why they couldn't go to police).

They were referred to Gleason to arrange compensation.

Trump and Cohen come in via Trump's "modeling agency".

No agency would send escorts to Schneiderman anymore, so he started freelancing.

The real reason AT&T was paying Cohen....

No shit. This was predicted years ago.


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