Affirmative Action and the 'Critical Mass' of Diversity in Religious Studies Departments

[rug]

Posted: 11/01/2012 3:58 pm
Deepak Sarma
Professor of South Asian Religions and Philosophy, Case Western Reserve University

The United States Supreme Court is currently deliberating Fisher v. University of Texas. This case revisits decisions made in Grutter v. Bollinger, allowing university admissions officers to consider race and ethnicity when admitting students. The goal of these affirmative action practices was to achieve a "critical mass of diversity," which, the University of Michigan Law School believed, "has the potential to enrich everyone's education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts." According to the opinion of the court, delivered by Justice O'Conner, "The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer." Surely awareness and interaction with such diversity has desirable consequences for students and, eventually, for the nation as a whole.

One of the many questions that emerge from these deliberations Supreme Court concerns determining the metrics for achieving "critical mass." How many, for example, designated minority students is enough for critical mass to be achieved? Is a token minority student sufficient? Or should the critical mass be reflective of demographics of the immediate region? The state? The nation? The world?

Though the issue pertains to admission practices at academic institutions it could easily be extended to a wide variety of contexts, such as sports teams, corporations and even to more abstract scenarios such as topics of study in academic departments, like a department of religious studies. Should a department of religious studies, whose mission is to teach students about religions (and not to teach students to be religious), have a critical mass of faculty who teach and research "minority" religions that will "enrich everyone's education" and that will be beneficial for the nation as it maneuvers in a globalized world?

Of course, in the "western" academe, most departments of religious studies weigh more heavily on Christianity than on Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, Zoroastrianism or any other religion. Is this merely Christian privileging? Is it anachronistic? Is it a bad idea?

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deepak-sarma/affirmative-action-diversity-in-religious-studies-departments_b_2012027.html

[Jim__]

1. This seems like obfuscation of the real issue.

The issue in Grutter v. Bollinger was student admissions. I believe that is also the issue in Fisher v. University of Texas.

If that's correct, then:

Though the issue pertains to admission practices at academic institutions it could easily be extended to a wide variety of contexts, such as sports teams, corporations and even to more abstract scenarios such as topics of study in academic departments, like a department of religious studies. Should a department of religious studies, whose mission is to teach students about religions (and not to teach students to be religious), have a critical mass of faculty who teach and research "minority" religions that will "enrich everyone's education" and that will be beneficial for the nation as it maneuvers in a globalized world?

seems to be a different issue.

[rug]

2. I see your point but he is extrapolating demographic diversity to intellectual diversity.

[Jim__]

3. "The Law School's educational judgment ... is one to which we defer."

I believe that O'Connor's deference on this issue is the correct stance. And, I think it applies to university admissions and to faculty selection.

[rug]

4. It was a fairly fractured decision leaving lots of wiggle room.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-241.ZS.html

In any event, despite all the amici briefs, I think the Supreme Court is going to focus narrowly on the race factor, leaving the religious factor to the speculation to professors.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/11-00345qp.pdf

[cbayer]

5. Now that seems like a Solomonic way to go with this.

Since religion could conceivably change any time, but race can not, they would be wise to take that road, imo.

(Please read with the understanding that my legal knowledge base is pretty limited).

[Jim__]

6. I'm not sure what you mean by a fractured decision.

Do you mean O'Connor's opinion? Or, do you mean O'Connor's opinion taken together with the other written opinions? When I read a court decision, I usually ignore the dissenting opinions. My thought has always been that, since they are on the losing side, they don't really carry any weight. Is that the wrong way to look at it? Do dissenting opinions carry weight, especially when the decision is re-argued?

[rug]

7. This:

O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined in part insofar as it is consistent with the views expressed in Part VII of the opinion of Thomas, J. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Thomas, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Scalia, J., joined as to Parts I—VII. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion.



Just my opinion, but when you see a decision like this, a) they expect the issue to be revisited and they will use their dissenting (or concurring) opinion as the nucleus of a new holding, or b) they are trying to dilute the impact of the decision.

[Jim__]

8. Thanks.