Cohesion and disintegration in Iraq's armies

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http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MID-01-040914.html



Cohesion and disintegration in Iraq's armies
By Brian M Downing
Sep 4, '14

In June, well equipped Iraqi troops trained by the US and other powers collapsed before a smaller and less well equipped force led by men who had little military experience until they plunged into wars in Iraq and Syria. Shadows of doubt have been cast on the reliability of other armies in the region, Saudi Arabia's foremost among them. Training missions can get troops to shoot well and march crisply, especially in front of politicians and cameras, but they cannot ensure cohesion or prevent disintegration. Effective armies are based far more on social systems than on training programs.

There are four armed groups, of very different structure and efficacy, operating in Iraq. The Iraqi national army is organized as a modern standing army; ISIS is a warrior cult reminiscent of monastic fighting orders of the distant past; the Kurds are in an awkward middle position between guerrilla force and conventional army; and the Sunni force is an insurgency with strong support from the populace. The clash of these four militaries is decisively shaping the future of the country and the borders of the region as well.

The Iraqi national army

Iraq has had an army since the country's inception after World War One. It showed considerable tenacity and logistical skill in the long war with Iran (1980-88) and surprised western intelligence organizations with its swift, though ultimately disastrous, move into Kuwait in 1990. The army, from inception to Saddam's ouster, was dominated by Sunni Arabs who constituted about 18% of 2003 Iraq's population. Generals and NCOs, battalion commanders and support unit leaders, were chiefly Sunni. The US disbanded the Sunni army shortly after Baghdad fell and a new Shia-dominated army had to be rapidly put together.

Rapidly building or greatly expanding an army is a difficult undertaking. The US discovered this during World War Two when its army grew from 260,000 in 1940 to 8.3 million five years later. Many talented people rose swiftly and performed ably and the war was successfully prosecuted. However, many people with ordinary or worse talents also rose rapidly. A postwar study conducted by the future general Ernest Dupuy admitted the problem. Countless veterans decried it in their novels, plays, and storytelling of inept and martinetish leaders.