Approval rate above 90 percent for suspected terrorists who try to buy guns

[Scuba]

People on the terrorist watch list shouldn't have easy access to firearms. That said, the last paragraph makes a good point - there should be a transparent process for adding people to the watch list and they should have access to a speedy appeal mechanism.


http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article83821157.html

The data, compiled by the Government Accountability Office, show that between 2004 and 2015, 2,477 individuals on the watch list applied to purchase weapons. Of those, 2,265 were approved – more than 91 percent. That rate was more than 95 percent last year, according to the data, which showed that between January 2015 and December “individuals on the terrorist watch list were involved in firearm-related background checks 244 times.” Only 21 of those were denied. The other 233 were cleared through FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check System to make the purchases.

...

Separately, all 16 Democratic members of the House Judiciary Committee have signed a letter pressing Chairman Bob Goodlatte, R-Virginia, to consider legislation to reinstate a lapsed ban on automatic assault weapons, and to tighten legal loopholes that allowed the assailants in the mass shootings in Orlando and San Bernardino, Ca., to buy semi-automatic weapons.

...

The Democrats also called for action to eliminate a loophole allowing gun owners to privately sell firearms without federal background checks like those required of dealers. They also seek to bar dealers from transferring firearms before a background check has been completed and to prohibit the sale of guns to a variety of individuals, including people on the terror watch list, who’ve been convicted of hate crimes or stalking, and people with a history of domestic violence.

...

But limitations on gun purchases by people on the terrorist watch list are particularly controversial, with many guns rights advocates and civil liberties proponents arguing that there is little known about how someone can be added to the list. Winning removal from the list is a long and arduous process. The American Civil Liberties Union, a major critic of the watch list system, says on its website that “tens of thousands of names” have been placed on government watch lists “without an adequate factual basis.” The ACLU says that in addition to the FBI, at least five other government agencies maintain watch lists.

[Duckhunter935]

1. How many of those approvals committed terrorist acts?

It's called due process and innocent until proven guilty. You know Democratic principals

[Scuba]

2. With what part of the OP - excerpted and original - do you disagree?

Or is your question relevant to the OP in some way that I'm missing?

[Duckhunter935]

3. I don't agree with secret lists that take away

Due process rights

I see you could not answer my question, why?

[Scuba]

4. The article addressed that issue, as did my comments.

Your question is not relevant to the OP or my comments.

[Duckhunter935]

5. Lol

Still can't answer my question

[Scuba]

6. Your question is irrevelent. If one is on the terror list one shouldn't be able to purchase weapon.

If one is not a threat, they shouldn't be on the terror list. The OP addresses this issue, as did I in my comments.




If you're that interested in you question, research it.

[HereSince1628]

7. Was the Pulse attacker on the terrorist watch or some list of no-fly?

Sorry, but I've not kept up on the details and a quick read of the story didn't seem to reveal that.

Typically as these post-attack narratives mature interest turns from the event to interest in risk mitigation of future events.

The path of such narratives often diverge from direct connections to the details of the event and go off in directions to other risks that may or not be closely related

[Scuba]

8. I don't know. Any comment on the OP?

[HereSince1628]

9. That -was- related to your OP. It was an attempt to understand it's connection to Pulse

My personal opinion of the NICs database is that it's both full of holes and often targets people who are low risk to be mass-shooters. I think NICs is a low efficiency tool. Linking more databases to NICs really won't change that.

Linking existing watch-lists, no-fly lists etc falls into the realm of the possible politically 'doables'. Policy makers will look for something 'doable' and that list will include old ideas that didn't pass previous consideration, and any fewer novel ideas.

Allowing exchange of information between the databases and various levels of law enforcement (do you really want campus cops and corporate security running background checks on employees and job applicants to have access to that information?) is problematic. Problematic means problem generating, even if the linkage is something that IT people could do without too much trouble.

Some of the problems are mentioned in the article... arbitrary and perhaps even political use of no-fly and watch lists to make life difficult for political enemies... for example, there was a story that the names of a political Kennedy was on the no-fly list. Maintenance and security of linked databases becomes expensive with some probability that maintence and security will be inadequate. People may go on the list 'in an excess of caution' that really isn't justified and they may never come off because people aren't told they have been placed on the list and the appeals process is a mess. 14th Amendment Equal Protections are just as important for 'others' among us as they are for the rest of 'us'

A problem not much considered is it can create too much of 'a good thing'. The search for prospective mass-shooters is a search for a needle in a hay-stack. The more hay you hide the needle in, the more difficult it becomes to find. Not because a computer can't sort billions of pieces of information, but because the living breathing people who have to ground truth the accuracy of the computer information will be overwhelmed with leads to follow.

In the end the database becomes only useful as a post-hoc tool and we civilians shake our heads at how it always turns out that the FBI or other authority had a perp in their database but didn't/couldn't do anything.

Do we really need more of that and all the other downsides?

[Scuba]

10. No connection to Pulse that I'm aware of.

[HereSince1628]

11. Any comment on the rest of my attempt to reply to your request for greater reply?

[Scuba]

12. If I understand your earlier post, this OP would be of the latter variety.

[HereSince1628]

13. Yes, it is. But what about the balance of benefits/costs using 'lists' to invoke prior restraint?

Are all lists equally good? Do they all use the same criteria and balance the same costs?

Are the costs of a plane load of people and thousands at potential terror targets of high-jackings similar to the costs associated with mass-shootings?

Is cost/benefit analysis even reasonable? Do the costs matter is relative cost and relative benefit an issue or should this be more an absolutist black and white sort of thing?

If anyone is at risk should we incur whatever costs to prevent it? Is cost nothing and security everything?

[Scuba]

14. The issue of the list is addressed in both the OP and my comments.