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Edited on Thu Dec-06-07 05:03 PM by Occam Bandage
0. Nuclear proliferation is dangerous. A nuclear-armed Iran would therefore be a bad thing for the world. Iran is currently a negative force in mideast politics; America is as well. Both are seeking greater regional influence at the expense of their people, each other's people, and the people who live in between. If you disagree with any of that, my case will not make sense to you.
1. The current leadership of Iran wants nuclear weapons. Any country in its position would find the prospect of a nuclear deterrent to be very attractive. They have pursued nuclear weapons, and likely still want them. Little has changed since '03.
2. Iran has voluntarily shut down its nuclear weapons program. It sent no clear signals that it had done so; it did not change its rhetoric. Therefore, suggesting Iran as a nation decided to do so directly due to Western influence (either carrot or stick) is egocentric. If they wanted to get in our ("our" being roughly defined as NATO) good graces, or to to avoid our pressures/threats, they would have clearly announced that they were abandoning their weapons program and reaped the reward, much as Libya did.
3. Therefore, pressures must have been largely internal. I believe this points, if anything, to Ahmadinejad's weakness. There is a deep rift between the radicals and moderates in Iran, and it seems that while the radicals have all the pulpits, they are not running the whole show. I would bet there is considerable dissent within the Iranian government.
4. Iran could restart its nuclear weapons program tomorrow. They still have all the equipment, all the materials, all the personnel, and everything else they need. All they are lacking is internal support for such actions. It is in the interest of humanity to ensure such support is not regained.
5. We should then look at the motivations for support. There are many people in Iran who believe reconciliation with the West is possible. There are many people in Iran who want nothing but to peacefully trade and interact with the West. They believe that a nuke will turn them into a pariah state. There are also many people who believe reconciliation with the West is impossible, that America is bent on fighting them (either culturally, economically, or militarily) and that they must take all measures to resist.
6. Therefore, we would best be served by strengthening the moderates' case. We ought be strengthening diplomatic overtures, scaling down talk of war, and preparing financial incentives. At the same time, we ought also be strengthening the moderates' driving fear--that a nuclear weapon will make Iran a pariah. We need to continue to make it clear that bellicose actions will bring international responses that are not in the interest of the Iranian people; for that reason I believe conditional sanctions are indeed appropriate.
7. On the other hand, this must be balanced against avoiding strengthening the radicals' case. In threatening repercussions, we must avoid threatening war. We must also avoid appearing as if Iran's nuclear program and support of terror are excuses for sanctions instead of causes for sanctions. Arbitrary punishments will look like persecution.
So, that said:
Conclusion 1: Bush's current strategy is absolutely disastrous. By threatening war and pushing for sanctions regardless of circumstance, he ironically strengthens Iranian support and desire for a nuclear weapon, and weakens the Iranian resistance to a nuclear weapon. Each house in Congress ought pass a resolution stating that it does not support the sanctions Bush will be bringing before the UN, and that it will refuse to fund war with Iran under the current situation.
Conclusion 2: Kyl-Lieberman is in some regards a good bill; recognizing Iran's state support of terror is necessary to support the moderates' case that aggressive expansionism is dangerous. However, its language is counterproductively rough. And, most importantly, it is only half the battle. Iranians must also be made to believe that state support of terror is not necessary to secure Iran's survival. This leads us to...
Conclusion 3: Israel/Palestine. In the tepid peace talks that just passed, Bush blew a chance to strike a major blow against an Iranian nuke: he did not strongly push for a secure, independent Palestine. It's time to begin using America's funding of Israel conditionally. By tying American aid to Israel to Israeli compliance with fast-paced benchmarks towards creation of an independent Palestine and a complete return to 1967 borders, America could send a strong message to the Mideast: the world will protect Palestinians as well as Israelis.
Conclusion 4: Iraq. This is messy. Virtually any action we take plays into the radicals' hands. Fight them, and we legitimize their claim that America is fighting a proxy war with Iran (and just might follow the Iranians home if they give up). Withdraw and allow them to take effective control of Iraq, and we legitimize their belief that thuggery will allow them to expand Iranian power. Support the Sunnis as a counterbalance, and we're setting the stage for a bloody civil war, as well as legitimizing their belief that we're nefarious puppeteers of violence. The best bet, I have to think, is Biden's plan to federalize Iraq, accommodating but at the same time limiting the expansion of Iranian power in Iraq.
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