But meanwhile, we get to the world of bombs and instability. And at the center of it, of course, is Pakistan, which appears to be verging towards greater chaos this week -- more terrorist attacks, more bombs. And, of course, no discussion of Pakistan can ever be done without bringing in Afghanistan. I have a fascinating, close-up look at a key battle in Afghanistan, which will shed light on exactly what is happening. And we have a conversation you will not want to miss with the Indian foreign minister.
Let's get started.
(BREAK)
ZAKARIA: We spend a lot of time on this program, and around the media in general, looking at the war in Afghanistan from 30,000 feet -- looking at the big picture, the big questions.
Today, I want to do something different. I want to examine one battle from the war in Afghanistan. It may be the key battle. And I'm going to use it to shed light on America's problems in that country.
Wanat is a town in northeastern Afghanistan by the Pakistan border. The battle there was one of the deadliest skirmishes of the war. Nine U.S. soldiers died in just over two hours.
To get an idea of what was going on there, listen to some of the transmissions between the men pinned down on the ground and the helicopter pilots flying above that day, who didn't get to Wanat until most of the U.S. soldiers were already dead.
(BEGIN AUDIO CLIP)
GROUND: Be advised, we're in a bad situation, that we can't really spots on rounds.
HELICOPTER: I think they're pinned down good, bro. I don't think they want to lift their heads.
I tell you what, man, Dustoff, if you're going in there to do any type of hoist at all, that's going to suck.
GROUND: I need some help with visibility, because I don't have comms with my O.P.
HELICOPTER: Dustoff 3-5, we're taking fire. We just got hit in the lower belly, just to the north side of the aircraft.
GROUND: Dustoff! Chosun (ph) 2-1 Bravo! Hey, the L.Z. is 100 meters to your nine o'clock. You're landing on (UNINTELLIGIBLE). We just took a lot of fire there. Do not land there!
HELICOPTER: Move out, Dustoff. Don't land there.
(END AUDIO CLIP)
ZAKARIA: Tom Ricks joins me now to make sense of all this. He is by common consent the best defense reporter in America, having covered the U.S. military for almost 20 years, first for the "Wall Street Journal," then the "Washington Post." He's written four highly acclaimed books, including "Fiasco" and "The Gamble," both about the Iraq war. He is now senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, which is a think tank based in Washington, D.C.
Tom, let me ask you first, why is this battle important? What are the themes we should be looking at as we peer more closely at it?
THOMAS E. RICKS, AUTHOR AND SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY: It's significant, because it's representative of several things. And it shows you why this war is so difficult and how things can go wrong.
The Afghans have survived by smart -- by observing. They know how Americans fight. They know the intervals they have in which to attack. They know where the American weaknesses are -- communications, heavy weapons.
And things like overhead reconnaissance means you attack ideally in bad weather, like the attack a couple of weeks ago, when it's really hard for the helicopters to get in the mountains. You go after their communications, and then you go after their heavy weapons.
You see this again and again.
These are smart fighters. They fought the Soviet Union, then they fought each other, and now they're fighting us.
ZAKARIA: And so, what should we be looking at? What's going on there?
July 2008, 49 soldiers get orders to establish a base in Wanat. Why are they going to Wanat?
RICKS: At the time, they thought they were doing counterinsurgency. Here we're going up the valley. And they're going way up into this valley. And there's Wanat village up above there. You can see it's way up in the mountains.
Well, this is a corridor that Taliban and Taliban allies have been using to come from Pakistan over into Afghanistan. The U.S. decides, let's go up in there and interfere with their movements.
ZAKARIA: It's a kind of supply route that they're trying to block?
RICKS: Yes. It's a corridor that they're using to come -- and the Americans want to get in there and make it more difficult for then.
ZAKARIA: So then, July 13th, the day of the attack, what happens?
RICKS: They had a lot of foreboding. In fact, one of the -- the commander of the platoon, Lieutenant Brostrom, told his best friend, "I think we're going to get messed up" -- although he didn't use that term -- "messed up badly up there."
And he was right.
Right at dawn, at about 4:20 a.m. there, a volley of perhaps 200 rocket-propelled grenades started coming in on them -- very well done, very sophisticated. The Taliban had crept up close, because they didn't have enough troops to put up patrols up there, because they were so busy building their base.
So, the Taliban fighters had crept up close and aimed their rocket-propelled grenades at exactly the right targets -- the heavy weapons, the anti-tank rocket launcher, the 50-caliber machine gun. They knew what they were doing: take out the heavy weapons first, and then deal with the lighter stuff later.
ZAKARIA: And how long did the battle last?
RICKS: The intense battle lasted about an hour, because -- another point of sophistication -- the Taliban, I think, had observed that it would take about that time for American attack helicopters to get there. So, they knew they had a window of opportunity.
In that hour, nine American soldiers were killed, another 27 were wounded, which made for 75 percent casualties.
ZAKARIA: Now, did they fortify themselves? How much fortification was there?
RICKS: They were working really hard to fortify themselves.
And by the way, in all of the discussion, I have no criticism of the soldiers on the ground. They were in a difficult situation. They're doing the best they can. They were working really hard. But they were really put in a difficult spot.
They didn't have enough water to keep themselves hydrated while digging and filling sand bags in heat that ran over 100 degrees in the high mountains of Afghanistan. So they were desperately trying to secure themselves, aware that the locals were hostile, fearful of the situation.
ZAKARIA: Now, two weeks ago, we had a similar battle in another town a little bit north of Wanat. What happened there?
RICKS: It was very similar, very sophisticated knowledge. And I think the fighters attacking them up there knew that the Americans were beyond the reach of artillery. And that meant, again, you had a window of opportunity until the attack helicopters arrived to start pushing you back.
This was an even tougher fight. It went on for many, many hours, despite the fact that the helicopters were overhead. It was a similar result, that the base wasn't taken, but the base was abandoned shortly thereafter.
Which raises another question that General McChrystal is considering right now. Tell me exactly why we're in Nuristan. I understand why we're in Afghanistan, but why in this part of Afghanistan?
Is this really counterinsurgency you guys are doing up there, or are you simply sticking your fist into a hornet's nest?
ZAKARIA: So, let's delve into that.
The argument would be made, if we were not to be here -- if we were to, say, cede these areas, which are very sparsely populated, there are very few people -- the argument is the Taliban will assert control there. Potentially, al Qaeda or other terrorist groups could set up training camps, and things like that.
What's wrong with that argument?
RICKS: There's nothing wrong with it. That's probably what would happen.
But I think what you're seeing is General McChrystal considering, given the limited number of troops I'm going to have, what's the best use of them?
One use might be, OK, let's pull back from those areas and focus on an ink spot, classic counterinsurgency approach -- Kabul, the Khost bowl, the area southeast of Kabul, and Kandahar. Put your troops, put your resources there, and do classic counterinsurgency there...
ZAKARIA: That is, provide security for the people there, and that is the vast bulk of the population of Afghanistan.
RICKS: Exactly.
And then, in more rural areas, pull your troops back, do a kind of triage, but use counter-terror against them.
ZAKARIA: So, if you saw a terrorist base being set up in Nuristan, go in with attack helicopters, destroy it, but get back out.
RICKS: Yes. I would call this, do the Biden plan for areas like Nuristan, do the Petraeus plan for areas like the major cities and other population areas.
ZAKARIA: What does it say about the Taliban and its military tactics? When you watch what you're describing, should we be wowed by the level of sophistication? Or is this just street smarts?
RICKS: I think we've consistently underestimated Afghans.
I used to live there when I was a teenager. And one thing I learned there is...
ZAKARIA: You lived in Afghanistan when you were...
RICKS: Yes, from 1969 to '71, in Kabul. My father was a professor at Kabul University for two years. I was actually a member of the Afghan ski patrol, junior grade, and skied in the Salang Pass.
A lot of Afghans, though, are illiterate. Illiterate does not mean stupid. In fact, I'm not even sure it means uncultured.
The average Afghan probably knows more poetry by heart than hardly anyone in America. You can run into Afghan tribesmen who know hundreds of poems and thousands of proverbs. And we would consider in their conversation quite literate.
Even when I lived there, it seemed to me that guerrilla warfare was the Afghan national sport.
One of my favorite books on this region is by John Masters. It's called "Bugles and a Tiger." It's a memoir of being a British officer with a Gurkha regiment in Waziristan in the 1930s. At the end of that last war that the British had there, the Afghan cousins showed up rather angrily and confronted him.
"Where are our medals," they said.
He said, "Well, you were the enemy."
And they said, "No, no. You gave medals to the Pashtuns on your side. We want our medals, too. You couldn't have had a good war without us."
This is very much the Afghan attitude. This is a kind of sporting event for them in many ways.
ZAKARIA: Tom, thank you very much. This was fascinating.
Transcript of the whole show:
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0910/18/fzgps.01.html
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