BBV: Georgia Dog-and-pony show: "No questions, please"

[DWright]

Yesterday I attended the second in a series of "dog-and-pony shows" being conducted by the GA SoS's office as a response to Gov. Sonny Purdue blurting out on C-SPAN that there should be an investigation into the Diebold voting machines here. The meeting was held at the The Center for Election Systems at Kennesaw State University, and was hosted by Ray Cobb, the director of the Election Center. The meeting was attended by only ONE member of Cathy Cox' office; Kathy Rogers. There were about 20 other people there. No press, even though we had alerted them. <sigh> Roxanne J., who famously challenged them to let her hack the machines did not attend as she felt her presence might be a distraction. (They still will not give her anything but an empty machine... no software, no modem.)

The first thing out of Mr. Cobb's mouth was that they would NOT be addressing any of the "allegations" that have been discussed in the press. (Yep, you read that right!) He said these claims were "controversial" (really???) and that the Georgia Election Center was remaining "neutral". No, I'm not kidding. He also said that there would be "no debate".

The presentation started with a video which was merely a shameless P.R. fluff piece about Diebold. This was followed by a slide presentation, taking us through an election process. People were asking so many questions that Ms. Rogers asked that we hold all questions until after the presentation. I won't go into every detail (the meeting lasted 3 hours), but here are some observations:

Mr. Cobb claimed, during the slide show, that there was "No Network Connectivity". When it was pointed out that he's ALSO just stated that "preliminary results are modemed to the server in each County" the room exploded. "That IS a network" we rightly pointed out. He sheepishly admitted that this was true, but said that they were "networked just very briefly, long enough to transmit the results". He stated that KSU tested the software to make sure it was EXACTLY the same as what was certified by the ITA (Independent Testing Authority). He would NOT address whether or not the coding was RE-certified after the infamous "patches" were applied to the machines.

On the morning of the election the machines are "unsealed" and "zeroed out". We have been trying to get these "Zero Sum Reports" without success. He claimed that they are kept at the County offices, so we're going to try there now. If they don't exist that is yet another infraction as they are required by law to be part of the permanent record of the election. The machines are "scrubbed" 30 days after an election. CDs are burned containing the entire election data; these are kept for a period of 2 years.

Someone asked if he could buy a Diebold manual. Nope. Not possible. Could he buy a machine himself. No. In light of "security concerns" they were going to be denying most requests for any data about the machines or the election. Cobb claimed that the touch screen machines were ALWAYS locked an in a secure location. When we pointed out that an election official had claimed that machines were being stored in hallways and car trunks Ms. Rogers said "We're looking into that but his claim is dubious."

Almost all technical questions were answered with "I don't know." Since that was the reason most of us were there to begin with there was alot of frustration.

Then we went into the Q & A.

First of all, I have to say that the arrogance and condescension of Kathy Rogers was staggering. She was rude, dismissive, and, more often than not simply refused to answer questions she didn't like. I asked her why the SoS's office was so adamently opposed to a Voter Verified Paper trail she said a) that groups like Common Cause and The League of Women Voters also opposed them. She said she'd NEVER change her mind about a paper trail so it was useless to discuss it. I asked her "In light of the revelations in the Johns Hopkins and SAIC reports didn't they owe it to the citizens of GA to conduct an independent investigation. She said "No". I said Gov Perdue asked for an investigation. She said "No he did not." I said I saw him say in on C-SPAN. She said "We were never ordered to do an investigation by the Governor's office, we have no intention of doing one. We never got a letter from him. That's what these forums are for."

Someone chimed in and said that they were disturbed that there was so little concern about the problems brought to light in both these studies. The SAIC report found HUNDREDS of potential problems. She shrugged. She looked at her watch. She said she didn't have time to be there. Then she said "It's 4:30. This meeting is adjourned." And she walked out of the room.

The only bright spot: A professor from Georgia Tech's School of Public Policy stood up and announced that GaTech would be hosting a Seminar on the issue on October 16th. He said that Dan Wallach (Johns Hopkins study) AND a representative of Diebold would be speaking. He told me that he'd invited Kathy Rogers but she would not commit to attending.

Here's the site he gave us:

http://www.IP3.gatech.edu/

[TacticalPeek]

1. So, its clear we can peaceably assemble.

I guess they will get to the "redress of grievances" part later?


:grr:

[Eloriel]

32. LOL -- Oh, we cqn peacably assemble, all right

But only until 4:30 p.m.

Eloriel

[bryant69]

2. Because that's what discussion is all about.

Talking about things everybody already agrees on. Anything controversial would just slow down the discussion process.

Bryant
Check it out --> http://politicalcomment.blogspot.com

[DEMActivist]

3. A joint decision was made

that they probably have my picture on the door of these meetings with a DO NOT ADMIT this woman warning. We all decided if we had hope of getting any answers, the activists would have to go into the meeting without me.

Of course, the attitudes mirror what happened with me at the first meeting except that they were unprepared for my questions and I caught them off guard. They were a bit better prepared this time by refusing to answer the questions at all.

Also, as I predicted, since Dr. Britian Williams was the one who gave the most "technical" answers to questions, his attendance would be omitted. He was the one who opened most of the doors I walked through the first time. He was also the one who called David Dill, Mr. Jefferson and Kim Alexandar liars. I didn't think they would be willing to give him another opportunity to open that door at this meeting.

Also noticably absent were Michael Barnes and Cliff Tatum. Kathy Rogers' attitude does not surprise me at all. The overwhelming approach to the actual voters is simple - how dare you question our wisdom!

[gristy]

4. Thanks for the summary, DWright!

sigh

Kathy Rogers clearly does not have a technical clue. She is tredding water between a space where she has to either

1) admit that she understands nothing about systems, their security or their proper design, that there actually IS a problem here, and that she will lose her job over this eventually.

OR

2) continue to believe that the growing mass of concerned citizens, newspaper articles, and contrary technical studies comprise a left-wing conspiracy that is out to "destroy" the country.

Basic survival mechanisms force her to choose door #2.

[DWright]

5. Yer welcome, gristy!

Yeah, they had NO CLUE about tech questions, or if they did, they simply avoided answering them. Eloriel (and others) will probably have more to add, that was just a quick overview.

Get this: The Diebold-propaganda video was called "Georgia Counts: Touch the Future of Voting." Clever, huh?

[Eloriel]

33. Great report, Denis

I've been working on mine, trying to decipher my numerous notes.

I'll add more later.

Eloriel

[Junkdrawer]

6. "We have this Diebold video for you to watch"...

[ParanoidPat]

7. Did anyone remember to point out to our elected ones.....

.....that as our REPRESENTATIVES if they don't understand the seriousness of the problem they should either listen, step down or be replaced? :evilgrin:

(That seems to get their attention! :) )

[DWright]

13. yep, I did that

"Did anyone remember to point out to our elected ones.....
.....that as our REPRESENTATIVES if they don't understand the seriousness of the problem they should either listen, step down or be replaced?"

At one point I was so disgusted with her attitude that I said "With all due respect, Ms. Rogers, You work for US and you had BETTER give our concerns serious consideration."

She replied that "Yes, I work for you and 4 million other people, and I don't have time to be here."

[juajen]

48. I'm late here, but here goes

To that answer of working for 4 million other people, ask her "May I ask how many of the other 4 million people's questions or concerns that you have addressed? Or, do you not have time or answers for them either?"

[jackcgt]

8. As a public policy minor at Georgia Tech, I must say...

1) that I am proud of the school and 2) that I will be there with bells on.

Unfortunately I missed the seminar on file swapping. Oh well.

[MGKrebs]

9. Ah, I was hoping to make that meeting,

but got covered up at work. Thanks for the recap.

In a way I feel sorry for Kathy Rogers. I say that because they must know that virtually everyone who attends these meetings are going to be, shall we say, skeptical. How did she get the duty to handle the meetings? Did she volunteer? (Then I don't feel sorry for her.) Or was it assigned to her? Who did she piss off to draw this duty?

I remember in a previous meeting in Decatur, she justified the DRE machines by saying that paper ballots were worse- she had personally witnessed whole giant mailbags containing thousands of ballots go missing. Thanks Cathy. Makes me feel great.

[DEMActivist]

10. Not to worry

There's a "public" meeting every month through the end of the year. Of course, they're all during the afternoon in an attempt to keep those pesky voters away.

As for Kathy Rogers, she was recently appointed by Cathy Cox, but have no fear - she was a member of the 21st Century Vote Commission which is the group of people who chose Diebold to begin with.

Minutes of the 21st Century Vote Commission Meeting
June 28, 2001
1:00 p.m.
Rome, GA
Members Present
Cathy Cox, Secretary of State
Judge Mike Bracewell
Rep. Tom Shanahan
Rep. Buddy DeLoach
Sen. Billy Ray
Ms. Linda Beazley
Ms. Lynn Bailey
Ms. Kathy Rogers
Ms. Linda Latimore
Ms. Gloria Champion
Mr. Robert Woodruff, representing Mr. Larry Singer
Ms. Erica Brooks
Ms. Molly Dye
Mr. Michael Cartwright
Ms. Justine Boyd

[Eloriel]

34. Robt Woodruff, representing Larry Singer!!?!!!

Whoa, isn't that interesting.

The Woodruff family are BIG philanthropists in Atlanta. Really big. Like having things named after them -- Woodruff Arts Center (post place for performances -- etc.

Larry Singer was the guy who cleared out of TOWN (Atlanta) 4 days after the election and moved back to Virginia, but resurfaced recently acting as a "consultant" in some meeting in OH, MD or PA (somewhere up in that area), and walked out when the questions got tough. (Anyone remember the details of that or have a link?)

Eloriel

[DEMActivist]

58. Larry Singer in Ohio

Sorry, no link, but I was told this by a reporter in Ohio....

Larry Singer was on the commission to declare a vendor in Ohio. During one of the meetings, questions of Larry Singer about his experience in Georgia apparently got uncomfortable for him. He stood up, said his schedule prevented him from attending all the meetings so he would have to resign. And he walked out. Right on the spot.

[never cry wolf]

57. Very interesting!!

As in most commissions and panels, there is bound to be differing opinions and debate. Are the minutes and/or transcripts from the meetings and deliberations from the 21st Century Vote Commission available to the public?? This may be an avenue to find allies who were against or at least questioned the eventual decisions or maybe at least shed light on their reasoning and the arguments against. Were the votes for the current system unanimous??

I am on the plan commission in my community and even tho there are rarely any controversial issues or heated debate, there is still debate as we try to ferret out all sides of an issue.

I'll warrant that research into the discussion of this commission will yield something of value that can be used and possibly even an ally that sat on the commission.

[Eloriel]

59. The minutes are -- or were -- on the SoS's website

DA looked at them a bit early on.

Eloriel

[DEMActivist]

69. Yeah, 'were' is the operative word

They were scrubbed early this spring after we started quoting them.

I saved most of them, but there's nothing in there much. The only interesting tidbit is this:

In June 2001, there were 7 vendors, only 2 of whom were certified which were to be used in an election as a test of the system. Diebold/Global was not one of the 7.

[DWright]

14. I might have sympathy for her (a BIG might)

If she'd acted at all like she even cared what we thought. She was openly dismissive and rude. She sat in a corner typing away on her laptop most of the time and acted annoyed if anyone disturbed her. My guess was that she was keeping someone back at the Office clued in as to "what they know". They've GOTTA be getting nervous.

It seems like they want to keep stalling until we give up and go away.

Cluephone for Cathy and Kathy: We ain't going away. To paraphrase Cynthia McKinney: We ain't sitting down and shutting up.

[ramblin_dave]

11. Questions about GA election process

1. How many DRE machines are typically located at each precinct? If there is more than one DRE machine, must each one be connected separately via modem to send in vote totals?

2. When the election is over, are vote totals printed out under observation by poll watchers prior to any connection via modem? Are any such vote total printouts signed off by poll watchers and do they all get copies before leaving the polling place?

3. Are local vote totals printed out at the polling place compared to the totals as received at the central county computer? If so, who does this? If there is a mismatch, which total prevails?

4. Who has custody of and access to the DRE memory cards after the results are logged?

5. Does KSU have a test lab of the actual equipment used in order to evaluate the DRE system end to end? If not, why not? If so, then this lab could be made available, under their supervision, to anyone who wanted to check for vulnerabilities.

[gristy]

12. Those are good questions

The first four relate to the process that a state follows to ensure the integrity of ballots and vote totals. You show a thinking-person's concern w.r.t. where votes could be compromised. Check your GA SOS's web site and see if they publish this process. It ought to be public record. In MN, where we use paper ballots and optical scan, this process is published, though I need to review it more closely.

You can be sure the state will never let you near one of their DRE machines. And if they did (which they won't), they'll load whatever they want onto the ones used in elections, regardless of what they put on anything they let you touch.

Welcome to the new Amerika. Heil bush.

[RedEagle]

16. HAVA complaint process

http://fecweb1.fec.gov/hava/law_ext.txt

This is the site for the HAVA Act.

If Georgia receives money from the government for the machines, then there is a complaint procedure.

Go to title IV, Enforcement.

I realize that with the means mentioned, little might seem to be accomplished. However, there is alway something to be said for a slew of people filing the same complaint. (And sending a copy of the complaint to the press)

Title III should give you some fodder to complain about.

Nothing like making officials defend their positions. This requires a bit more than ignoring the masses like Rodgers appeared to have done.

[DEMActivist]

24. Thanks RedEagle - looks like it's time for another

Open Records Request in Georgia:

SEC. 402. <<NOTE: 42 USC 15512.>> ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE-BASED ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT PROCEDURES TO REMEDY GRIEVANCES.

(a) Establishment of State-Based Administrative Complaint Procedures
To Remedy Grievances.--
(1) Establishment of procedures as condition of receiving funds.--If a State receives any payment under a program under this Act, the State shall be required to establish and maintain State-based administrative complaint procedures which meet the requirements of paragraph (2).

Since Georgia has received $5 million from the federal government under HAVA, I think it's time we ask for these complaint procedures.

[DEMActivist]

15. Answers...

1. How many DRE machines are typically located at each precinct? If there is more than one DRE machine, must each one be connected separately via modem to send in vote totals?

The typical, recommended ratio is 1 touchscreen for every 250 voters.

2. When the election is over, are vote totals printed out under observation by poll watchers prior to any connection via modem? Are any such vote total printouts signed off by poll watchers and do they all get copies before leaving the polling place?

They are supposed to be. However, our open records requests have been repeatedly rebuffed, denied and stonewalled. We have been requesting a number of reports since last March. The Elections Supervisor is supposed to sign the report under oath and then a copy posted on the polling precinct door. Once the accumulation process is complete, the PCMCIA cards are to be sealed in an envelope, wrapped in the sworn reports and then hand carried to the County seat. No, multiple copies are not passed out.


3. Are local vote totals printed out at the polling place compared to the totals as received at the central county computer? If so, who does this? If there is a mismatch, which total prevails?

According to several candidates I spoke to, this is supposed to happen, but no one can get an answer as to whether or not it did. The official response now is - those are only unofficial results.

4. Who has custody of and access to the DRE memory cards after the results are logged?

We now have differing answers to this question. According to Dr. Britian Williams, the PCMCIA cards are collected and kept at The Election Center at Kennesaw State University. However, we recently got reports that the machines (and accompying cards) are being kept at each county location in places like stairwells, trunks of cars and hallways. Cathy Rogers called these stories "dubious" yesterday even though they come from a state elections official.

5. Does KSU have a test lab of the actual equipment used in order to evaluate the DRE system end to end? If not, why not? If so, then this lab could be made available, under their supervision, to anyone who wanted to check for vulnerabilities.

My quick walkthough of the KSU facility did not indicate any such location. However, I have not asked that specific question and could be wrong in this answer. As for checking for vunerabilities, there's one little snag in that possibility - Georgia signed a confidentiality agreement with Diebold that prohibits anyone from touching the software except "authorized" personnel. Now, please don't ask me to define "authorized personnel" because it seems that agreement was specifically exempted from the Georgia Open Records Act by then Governor Barnes and only a select few know what it entails.

on edit:
Just so you can picture the setup, understand that the KSU Election Center is located in a "house" in the housing section of the KSU campus; next to the dorms. It's a single story dwelling with one room converted into the conference room where these "public meetings" are being held. The rest of the rooms are offices.

[DWright]

18. Question for DemActivist

Someone at the meeting brought up the fact that when they went to vote there was a stack of ACTIVATED VOTER CARDS already prepared. Kathy Rogers said "No, no, no, they don't activate any cards until they are handing them to the voters." This set off a Red Flag for me, but since the Techie end of this story is my weak area, I wanted to run that by you.

EDITED TO ADD: Rogers also claims that every precinct had "trained poll workers" but I have an old online story (link now dead) that says only HALF of the precincts even sent anyone to the Training Session.

I guess they were relying on those "experts" from Diebold, huh?

[DEMActivist]

19. ROFL! This seems to be pretty standard

What they are "supposed" to do and what actually happens seems to be 2 very different things. Of course, that is probably because of the training that was conducted:

Minutes of the 21st Century Vote Commission Sub-Committee Meeting
June 28, 2001
4:30 p.m.
Rome, GA

First Training of Local Election Officials Who are participating in the Pilot……………Late August through Early September
(Deadline for this training to begin is September 7, 2001. This training should concentrate on the administrative structure of the election. Training should only be open to city election officials, county election officials, Secretary of State officials and members of the 21st Century Voting Commission.)

Candidate Qualification………………………………………….……September 10-14

First Public Demonstrations…………………………………………..…..September 20

Continuation of Election Official Training…………………..Mid to Late September
(This training should be on ballot design, layout and programming the Election. This training should conclude by September 30, 2001.)

Start of Voter Education Programs………………………………….….Early October
(These programs should run throughout the month of October. They should include public demonstrations of the equipment in various locations. Voter registration drives are encouraged as part of the demonstrations before the Registration Deadline October 9, 2001.)

Familiarizing Surrounding Election Officials With DRE system assigned to Region………………………….Early to Mid-October
(Surrounding election officials should be invited to come and learn more about the DRE system. These officials should first be shown how to vote on the DRE then be shown how a system is programmed to run an election.)

Poll Worker Training……………………………….Third to Fourth Week in October

Refresher Course for Poll Workers…………………………………First of November
(These classes should be held for last minute poll workers and for those poll workers who want to be refreshed on how to operate the machines.)

[DEMActivist]

20. Oh, and BTW...

It was announced at the meeting I went to that KSU would no longer be doing poll worker training - only Elections Supervisors. It would then be the responsibility of the Elections Supervisor to train the individual poll workers locally.

[DWright]

21. Ray Cobb

Who was head of the Election Center before Ray Cobb. It seemed to me that he kept using his short tenure as an excuse for ignoring/not answering questions.

[DEMActivist]

27. The man who did the presentation

I was at was named Barnes...sorry, never got the first name. He was quite comfortable with the presentation and had obviously performed it many times before that day. He attempted to answer most of my questions, but was invariably interrupted by Britian Williams, Michael Barnes, Cliff Tatum, and/or Kathy Rogers. Many answers were conflicting at the exact same time - Williams might say no, while Barnes was saying yes and Rogers was saying no.

[ramblin_dave]

22. Very disturbing

Thanks for the detailed reply. Some follow-up:

1.The typical, recommended ratio is 1 touchscreen for every 250 voters.

I guess that means more than one DRE per polling place. I wanted to know in order to visualize the issues associated with combining the results of more than one DRE. If there is only one, then no issue. But since there probably are multiple DREs, then how the totals are combined is an issue. (I noticed that the official results are reported down to the precinct level. No way to know if the per DRE values even exist.)

2. It is very important that all DRE results be printed out and signed off by precinct officials, with all this observed by poll watchers, prior to any connection to a network. Not only that, the observed and signed-off results must be preserved for public inspection. Every single precinct should have such a report.

3. All the precinct reports must be compared to values transmitted by modem. A report of the per precinct results at the central county computer should be available for public inspection along with the actual signed-off results from each precinct.

The official response now is - those are only unofficial results.

What are they saying is unofficial? The observed precinct tally? That should be the official result and should trump all others unless credible eveidence shows any such total is in error.

4. The chain of custody of the memory cards must be controlled in case of an investigation to resolve an irregularity.

5. KSU should be considered "authorized" in the sense that they have an official relationship with the state. The key here is that their test facility (they must have one) should permit them to allow their own internal testing. If someone claims the system can be compromised then the test facility could be used to prove or disprove that claim. That doesn't mean they have to give outsiders access to code.

[DEMActivist]

26. More answers...

I guess that means more than one DRE per polling place. I wanted to know in order to visualize the issues associated with combining the results of more than one DRE. If there is only one, then no issue. But since there probably are multiple DREs, then how the totals are combined is an issue. (I noticed that the official results are reported down to the precinct level. No way to know if the per DRE values even exist.)

There is, as a part of the software, an "accumulation" process. At the end of an election, the supervisor uses her "magic card" to end the election on each machine. Once the election is ended on the DRE, the PCMCIA card is removed and the supervisor proceeds to the next machine, following the same procedure to the last machine. At that point, the supervisor begins the accumulation process by connecting the modem (this is in the instructions whether they are transferring via modem or not) then inserting each PCMCIA card one by one to accumulate into a single file. There simply aren't any instructions to print a report, but one must conclude that you can't print a report until the accumulation is complete.


2. It is very important that all DRE results be printed out and signed off by precinct officials, with all this observed by poll watchers, prior to any connection to a network. Not only that, the observed and signed-off results must be preserved for public inspection. Every single precinct should have such a report.

That is simply NOT how the Diebold system works. I know from candidates in the 2002 race, some have never seen the precinct reports even after numerous requests for them.

3. All the precinct reports must be compared to values transmitted by modem. A report of the per precinct results at the central county computer should be available for public inspection along with the actual signed-off results from each precinct.

That just doesn't happen.

The official response now is - those are only unofficial results.

What are they saying is unofficial? The observed precinct tally? That should be the official result and should trump all others unless credible eveidence shows any such total is in error.

Every reported result prior to the actual certification of the election is considered an unofficial tally.

4. The chain of custody of the memory cards must be controlled in case of an investigation to resolve an irregularity.

That is not a process the state of Georgia follows, evidently. And, at this point, we have discovered that as soon as the election was certified by the officials, all PCMCIA cards were backed up to a CD and erased. That happened within days of the election in Georgia.

5. KSU should be considered "authorized" in the sense that they have an official relationship with the state. The key here is that their test facility (they must have one) should permit them to allow their own internal testing. If someone claims the system can be compromised then the test facility could be used to prove or disprove that claim. That doesn't mean they have to give outsiders access to code.

KSU's entire budget ($550,000.00/yr.) comes directly from a grant from the Secretary of State's budget. As far as access to outsiders for the code, that's beside the point - outsiders can't even USE the object code we paid for. No one but elections officials are allowed to touch the machines, the software, or the manuals.

[punpirate]

38. I'm curious about the backup of the cards.

Has anyone been able to read one of the back-up CDs to see if it contains the raw count from each unique card, or is it a GEMS count of the cards with card IDs (or the entire GEMS database for that election)? The former would be essentially raw data, while the latter two instances would be inferred data once removed from the source. ???

Cheers.

[DEMActivist]

40. No - no one is allowed to touch anything

connected to these machines in Georgia unless you are an "approved" election official.

The only thing which will pry these files out of their hands is a court order.

[TinfoilHatProgrammer]

17. partial answers

Here's some answers based on the available stolen documentation and source code:

1. No idea how many machines are at each precinct but it's likely more than one. Each machine can transmit its totals individually by modem but the usual practice seems to be to accumulate the results on one machine and upload by modem the total for the precinct from that machine. Some places claim they don't upload the results by modem at all, the individual memory are brought to the election headquarters and loaded directly, but I don't know if Georgia follows that practice.

2. The available documentation is unclear on the process -- in some places it says to print the report prior to upload, in other places it says to print the results afterward. Examination of the source code indicates that a report is normally printed on each machine when the election is ended on that machine, prior to upload, but reports can additionally be printed at any time afterwards. No idea whether poll watchers actually watch the report being printed. According to the source code, the reports appear to contain space designated for signatures by several election officials but it's unclear who or how many people actually sign the reports.

3. No idea whether anyone compares the totals printed at the polling place to the totals received at the central computer. It seems obvious that it's possible for someone to do that, however. No idea what would happen if there were a mismatch, beyond some kind of investigation probably happening.

4. No idea.

5. No idea.


Hope this helps,

JC

[ramblin_dave]

23. There should be answers to these questions

Any ordinary citizen of Georgia should be able to get all these answers promptly and courteously from their county elections office.

But what you said indicates there could be a hodge-podge of methods used to combine DRE results, record these results, transmit these results and preserve the record of results. If so then things are more out of control than I imagined.

[DEMActivist]

25. Hodge-podge...that's being nice

You know, Dr. Britian Williams (the security expert and lead certifier in Georgia) told me that not all the precincts COULD modem in results. He said "some of these precincts don't have phone lines. Hell, some of them don't even have bathrooms."

Their stories change with the questions. Initially, after the 2002 Georgia elections everyone was praising the speed with which the elections were conducted and counted because with the new machines we could modem in the results.

Now, since the question of security has arisen over modem use, those results are suddenly "only unofficial tallys, so even if they did get hacked it wouldn't matter." I kid you not....that's the current mode of operation.

[TinfoilHatProgrammer]

28. I wouldn't call anything out of control

I'm not a citizen of Georgia (although if another hurricane hits here maybe I'll move) and I've never asked any Georgia officials for any information. I agree with you however that a Georgia citizen should be able to get answers to these questions from their county elections office.

I presume that there's a standard procedure in place for dealing with election results at each precinct. The fact that there appears to be some flexibility in the system doesn't suggest to me that anything is "out of control". Moreover, it's reassuring on some level, because any variability in how the results are transmitted to the central server and totalled makes it that much more difficult for an attacker.

For example, does the attacker target the upload from each machine? That's foiled by not uploading from each machine at all: if instead results for each machine are printed and precinct totals accumulated on a dedicated machine for upload -- any attack on the accumulation process or on the uploaded data will be easily detectable by the inconsistency that would appear in the individual machine reports and the backup data on each machine. The same logic applies if the results aren't uploaded at all and the memory cards are manually transported to the election headquarters and counted there... there's no simple vector of attack. What if the attacker instead targets the accumulation process? It's foiled by avoiding the accumulation process altogether and simply uploading individually from each machine, or by transporting the memory cards to election headquarters and counting them there. Does the attacker then simply attempt to intercept the memory cards on the way to election HQ? They're foiled by the internal backups on each voting terminal as well as by the post-election reports. The flexibility in the system has the (probably unintentional) advantage that it makes the system harder to target for attack.

JC

[ramblin_dave]

29. I'm more concerned about certain steps not done

than in having a variety of methods to get the job done. For example the printouts of each DRE should be done before any accumulation or modem connection is made. I thought that was why the Diebold DREs had a printer built in. Once these printouts are done and signed off with poll watchers looking on, then what happens next is less important, and as you say could make the system less vulnerable to attack.

If the individual DRE printouts aren't being done up front and preserved then the process is out of control from the get go.

If no one is checking the accumulated tallys against the individual DRE tallys, then the accumulation is out of control.

If no one is checking the precinct accumulations against the county wide data collection results, then that part is out of control.

I don't care is some use modems and others send in the memory cards by carrier pidgeon, certain steps must be done.

[MGKrebs]

30. Awww man!

Whaddaya want? Printing and comparing and counting all that stuff manually is (in the words of my namesake) WOORRK!

It is easy to think that when these systems were (and are) being "sold" to legislatures, one of the selling points is that it is all done automatically. They will recoup their expenditure by being able to cut a few staff positions (even if they are temporary).

Recount? We don' need no stinkin recount!

[TinfoilHatProgrammer]

31. fair enough

For example the printouts of each DRE should be done before any accumulation or modem connection is made.

Totally agreed. Examination of the source code indicates that a printed report is initiated as soon as the election is closed on each machine, which is before any results are totalled or transmitted.


If no one is checking the accumulated tallys against the individual DRE tallys, then the accumulation is out of control.

Totally agreed. That's not a BBV software issue, however, it's procedural. I'd be curious what Georgia election officials have to say about their practice.


If no one is checking the precinct accumulations against the county wide data collection results, then that part is out of control.

Totally agreed. That's also not a BBV software issue either, however, it's procedural and I'd be equally curious what Georgia election officials say is their practice.


The means are there for officials to check and verify all the individual DRE and precinct results -- it's not Diebold's fault if it turns out nobody actually makes use of them.

JC

[Occulus]

45. constructive rebuttal

If GEMS is involved in either process at any point the database is open to fraud.

GEMS is not secure because the .mdb file it creates is not password protected when in M$ Access.

Is GEMS involved? I don't know enough about the process to answer that. Can ya enlighten me at all?

[Eloriel]

50. GEMS is definitely on the server

I don't think it's on the machines -- is it? I don't know. I'm not the techie in the group.

Eloriel

[Occulus]

51. It was my initial understanding

that GEMS resided on the election supervisor's machine.

What's the security for that machine like if that is the case?

[DEMActivist]

60. Let me see if I can clarify this a little

In Georgia, on election day, at the polling locations (precincts) there are touchscreen voting machines. Those machines have a software package on them named ballotstation.exe (and some other programs - pollbook.exe, etc.). In addition, the ballot images which have been prepared ahead of time are loaded into the EPROM along with the operating system (WindowsCE) and multiple DLLs and executable files. Some of those executables are pieces of the GEMS software (explained in depth below) in order to allow for control processes.

GEMS is the software which controls the county computers. There are 159 computers in Georgia running GEMS, one in each county. GEMS encompasses ballot preparation, reporting functions, vote compiliation, counting and certification functions along with other various and asundry election management functions (i.e., interfacing to the voter registration databases, candidate qualification, etc.) as well as the JResults server software.

Back to the polling place, no single machine is designated as the elections supervisor machine - they are all the same, all equal. The only thing which determines which is used as the accumulator, is the momentary decision of that supervisor at that given moment.

Hopefully, this answers your question.

[Eloriel]

36. Some of your questions are answered

(maybe) in my report, which I'm about to post.

Eloriel

[MoonRiver]

35. My daughter says she will only feel safe from US rightwing fascism

if she moves to Canada. I've been trying to tell her that things may very well turn around with during out next presidential election. And then, I read more about this covert election machine coup, and how little Dems (aside from a few wonderful heros such as Bev) are doing to stop it, and I seriously wonder if she isn't right. My husband and I have had this conversation many times, but lately we've been much more hopeful. Are we wrong, and should everybody who sees this nightmare for what it is, get out while the getting's, if not good, at least possible? :scared:

[Eloriel]

37. My report -- quite long

As Roxanne had accurately predicted, some of the players from the session she attended were not there. Dr. Brit Williams, Cliff Tatum, Michael Barnes and perhaps others I'm not thinking of were absent.

Cobb started out, as Denis mentioned, by setting out the "ground rules" (his words -- anything I put in quotes are a direct quote from my notes). The ground rules were that this "we are in a NEUTRAL position regarding debates in the press and other areas," so no debates here. This is a "factual presentation," so "no debates."

The presentation included a short video, "Georgia Counts: Touch the Future of Voting," and two slide presentations -- one on the election process itself (what steps are taken prior to election day, the day of the election, etc.), and one on the various physical and other security mechanisms and procedures.

The video included a segment by Bob Urosevich of Diebold (formerly of Global Election Management Systems, and brother of Todd Urosevich who is head of ES&S -- the two brothers originally worked together and so their software had a common origin). Urosevich talked about the "security, accuracy, reliability, redundancy and many, many other steps" of the Diebold voting system.

Cobb told us it was supposed to be interactive, so questions were welcome. (That didn't last long.)

THE ELECTION PROCESS SLIDE PRESENTATION
I probably asked too many questions during the slide presentations but there were things I was genuinely curious about. The first was all about how the election process works, and that was most interesting. I'm eager to hook up with my county registrar (I think that's the only election official we have, have to check) and check out some of this info. I'll type some of my notes up separately rather than bore everyone here.

PCMCIA cards
You can program the cards with one of up to 8 different ballot styles. Some precincts will have different ballots required. The code entered by the election worker is for which ballot style to use for that voter, according to a code on the voter roles. They insisted that there is no way that the cards can be coded to identify the voter (and how that person voted).

There were a few questions:

Q - My precinct had a stack of already encoded cards
A - Not supposed to happen. (Others in the group said that was true in their precinct too.)

Q - Are these cards unique Commerciall available?
A - Not unique, yes, commercially available but don't know from whom.

Q - Diebold memos mention that a tech considered the PCMCIA cards the weakest link.
A - (???)

Logic and Accuracy Tests
These are fairly extensive; the test is several pages long. The test measures mechanical aspects, calibration, operational checks, ballots. Must be announced 5 days in advance and open to the public.
Q - Are these test scripts published?
A - Known by the company but not publicly available

I believe I asked about the fact that the machines are in test mode and any programmer could program the machines to work flawlessly in test mode while operating differntly during an actual election.

At the conclusion of L&A, all the machines are zeroed out and there a code that sets the software for the election.

We asked about the Zero Reports and got a little obfuscation (IMO) on that point. These zero reports are germane because we asked to see those 22,000 zero reports in an Open Records Request and weren't able to for some reaaon. They are now saying that those stay in the counties.

There is not a unique password for each machine.

The machines are sealed with red plastic tape which is numbered, delivered to the precincts the night before.


ELECTION DAY
Three people are at the precinct: one breaks the seal, one observes, one records the seal number against the serial number.

They open the unit with the key, turn the power on. The poll Manager has the key. They are not unique to the machines.

Three people runt he zero report again (to make sure no votes from the L&A test remain on the machine), then 3 people sign the zero report if everything's ready.

There are 3 written records of voters --
* Voter Certificate kept in stacks of 25
* Registration list
* Numbered list of voters as they come in
(These totals help to ensure that the machines can't be "ballot stuffed.")

There is no way to correct an already cast ballot, even one that was cast completely blank. There is a procedure for correcting a ballot before it's cast (Cancel). Rogers said that in Walker county there was an election on a tax issue. Some voters didn't realiz that's all that was on the ballot, and so they ended up casting a lot of blank ballots because they didn't want to vote at all on this. She also told about one poll worker or election official who wants to be noted as someone who responsibly votes in EVERY election but doesn't necessarily cast any VOTES during all the elections.

Rogers said that undervotes dropped tremendously, "by 2 - 3%."

The numbers from the 3 different lists of voters are checked "casually" throughout the day against the total ballots cast on the machines. The Final Reconciliation takes place once the election is over when all the PCMCIA cards are taken to one machine in the precinct and "accumulated." The cards are read in one by one and added together. So you can determine an UNOFFICIAL vote count per precinct. These totals must be posted in every precinct. But, they stressed, these are unofficial vote tallies.

The machine hasn't been closed yet at this point. "The official record is the memory card, but if it's destroyed, it can be taken from 2 different places on the machine (inside the machine)."

She would not or could not tell me anything about where these votes are stored other than on the PCMCIA card.

There was a question about printing ballot images. We "can print an image of every ballot cast -- hook it up to a printer...can hook it up to any printer..." but when pressed, she was a little vague on what kinds of printers could be used for that. And, of course, there was no recognition of the fact that if the votes had been tampered with as they were being cast or afterwards, printing images of ballots after the election, when the voter is no longer around to verify (and they're not pegged to individual voters anyway) is not exactly helpful.

Something (not exactly sure what she was talking about here) re the votes or results or whatever, probably the votes, are stored on CDs. The "internal memory is stored in machines for 30 days."

The results are printed and signed by 3 people. The tape is torn off and stored with the memory card. Then the machine is sealed, this time with blue plastic tape.

The memory cards are returned, uploaded one by one into the county server. The server "will not let the precinct close unless every card is accounted for...will not reprt results unless the cards are returned."

I REALLY wanted to ask about those missing Fulton County cards, which she had told me in Decatur a few weeks ago weren't used for the results because they got the results off of the machines' inner memory. But, I didn't have a chance to do that. By this time, they had told us, "Let's get through the presentation, and then we'll take your questions."


SECURITY/INTEGRITY SLIDE PRESENTATION
"There are four principal organizations" protecting your vote -- Diebold, MASED's ITA's ("Georgia uses Wyle and Ciber"), KSU's Election Center and local election jurisdictions.

NASED'S ITA's
* Monitors the "final Build" of the System Code
* Looks for extraneous code
* Submits system along with the source code to KSU Center for Elections Systems

I really wanted to ask a LOT of details about KSU's involvement and how the code is stored in escrow (which Rogers told us it was in Decatur), but had no chance to do so.

KSU:
* Reviews for compliance with Georgia code
* Tests the system for unauthorized/fraudulent code
* Develops a validation program to use to test the system as installed in the local jurisdictions
* Verifies that the system ... (ah, my notes run out on this -- I think the gist of it was that they verify that what is uploaded locally is what they have in escrow, tho the word escrow wasn't used)

SOFTWARE SECURITY
* Audit Logs
* Passwords

PROCEDURAL SECURITY
* Access
* Qualification Testing -- by the ITA re FEC compliance
* Certification testing -- at KSU for compliance to GA Code
* Acceptance Testing -- this is done for "every change in software" -- they "go out physically to test that equipment...developed by KSU" (I really wanted to ask a LOT of questions about this but was unable to
* L&A testing at county level

PHYSICAL SECURITY
* Servers are kept locked behind closed doors
* No extransoue software can be added (they made a big thing about how people in the various localities complain about this because here's this nice computer that could be used -- HOWEVER, curiously, that contradicts what they told me earlier when I asked about what this "server" looks like or is. They told me it was a Dell, but configured for this and made it sound like it was something other than a PC.)


Someone asked a question about modems... Their response was yes, there's a modem card (and I think they said or implied that it's only inserted when it's time to use it), and it comes "with a predefined (phone) number" on it. AND they also have the very same info faxed and modem'd in to make sure that the vote totals that are sent by the server are double-validated against the faxed results and no hanky-panky can take place during this transmission. Again, sounds wonderfully secure and I'll let the techies decide about that, but the problem still remains: if malicious code changed the votes during the election, these steps just offer wonderful security for spurious results.


SECURITY
1. * Verify that the system as delivered from ITA is free of extraneous or fraduulent code. (This is KSU's specially developed program for that or whatever.)
* COnduct HIGH-VOLUME tests to determine the capacity olimits of the system
* Run tests to determine the system's ability to recover from various (my notes ran out again -- kinds of crashes, perhaps)

2. Verify system as installed is the same as what is used.
(I REALLY tried to pin down where the benchmark was, but wasn't able to.) The got this testing program from http://www.dmares.com/maresware/validation_tools.htm if I wrote it down correctly. This is the 1 in 1 billion chance of tampering tool.
BTW, they run this on 159 servers, NOT on 22,000 machines. Also (you guys'll love this), it tests static files only, NOT dll's. They were very satisfied that since dynamic link libraries are, well, dynamic, they're not in need of testing for tampered-with code.

The servers run Windows2000, and the machines run WindowsCE. I was able to ask my question about WindowsCE being COTS or not, and even to explain that it's merely a shell so CANNOT be COTS and MUST, according to all the certification rules, be separately certified as well, but they claimed to know nothing whatsoever about that (I can still see Cobb shrugging his shoulders), so it was obviously totally unimportant to them.

Unfortunately, that was the end of my note-taking. Some of the math or logic or whatever for the Mares ware thingie was one of the last slides and I did have a question about that, but they shooed me away from it wanting to finish the presentation "and then we'll take all your questions," and I responded, as I had re a previous slide or two, "Well, please remember to put that slide back up there..." which, of course, never happened. Afterwards, when I asked about it, Cobb said, "Well, we can look at the handouts," and the guy sitting next to me, Hans from GA Tech said, well, actually, it would be useful to have it up, but that didn't happen either. In fact, after the presentation, Cobb not only turned OFF the slide program, pretty soon the whole computer was off and the screen blank.

Then, while they took questions, Cobb and Rogers paced around like they were really trying to hurry us up. It worked: I felt VERY rushed. Various people had questions, all through the presentation, not just at the end. What was funny was that about 1/2 way through the whole presentation, Rogers assumed we must've all been in this together because she was saying things like, "You people..." such as, toward the end, "You people have YOUR opinions and we have ours and we're not going to change yours and you're not going to change ours." (Yeah, she's entitled to her own opinions, but not her own facts.)

She also told us at one point near the end that basically they (in the SoS's office and the Center) had all made up their minds and if we wanted to pursue any of this further, we needed to contact our legislators.

Also near the end, when she was really trying to wind things down, I said to her, "Well, I was able to ask a few questions of you toward the end of your presentation in Decatur a few weeks ago, then called you on the phone to ask more questions and ask for an appointment with you, and you told me you had NO time for that, that asking questions are what these public forums are about. And now you're telling me that we can't ask our questions here either. I have 7 pages of questions. Are you telling me that my only other opportunity to ask questions is at the next public forum like this?" Cobb said, "Yes, but you'll have to sit through the presentation again." Rogers looked at the clock on the wall and said, "You've got until 4:30." At that moment it was about 4:20 (4:22 or so, from a quick glance at the clock).

There were a LOT of snide remarks made by Rogers during the Q&A portion especially. Even Cobb joined in at one point. I'm not remembering them all, but if any come back to me I'll certainly jot them down and preserve them for posterity.

OH! Someone asked a question during Q&A about the ties with Republicans and Wally O'Dell's statement recently, and Rogers didn't even let that question get completely asked (which was the rule for her rather than the exception). She responded to that quite animatedly: "There's only so low I'll go," (paraphrased:) and I'm NOT getting into discussions about (that -- I don't think she used the word partisanship). And the person asking this question was very nice and sweet, too. She got blasted, as if it were an inappropriate question to begin with. Perhaps that's what they were referring to early on when they said, "this is a factual presentation, not a debate."

They were also asked about the Hopkins and SAIC reports and shrugged those off as well.

Edited to add: I also got the impression during the last half of the 2nd slide presentation that they'd made some changes to their procedures (and slides!) since the first one. When we get a chance, Rox and I will compare notes on that.


Eloriel

[shirlden]

39. Thanks Eloriel, very interesting.

The ballot printing that they mentioned. I remember reading in the GEMS manuel about that and was not sure that I was understanding it correctly. I guess I was. The manuel is on my laptop and I will check that out again in the morning. But I do think that they said each ballot could be printed on a printer attached to the computer and the GEMS unit. If this is true, it raises some questions. The first one would be WHY....


Also in the e-mail memos, I do believe that it was Guy Lancaster (?) who said the the L & A tests only memory and nothing else.

Late here in Ohio......think I'm brain dead....goodnight

:think:

[punpirate]

43. Might have the L&A test confused with the...

... system boot test. IIRC, the issue was that NC (??) required a full operational check according to their laws--essentially an automated L&A test when the ballot station was first turned on. Diebold had simply fooled them by changing the screen write during the memory portion of the power-on self-test that every computer does, from "Memory Test OK" to "System Test OK."

Nice, huh?

Cheers.

[Occulus]

46. You understood correctly

I have hard copy to prove it. Interestingly enough, I've not been able to find a function to display or change the ballot. I'll keep looking, though... I wouldn't be surprised to find it somewhere.

If I do, I'll take some screenshots and post 'em for y'all.

[TinfoilHatProgrammer]

41. that *was* quite long, lol

Good notes. Just a slight clarification of something you wrote: PCMCIA cards are the memory cards that store the results etc, they're not used for voting. Voters are given "smart cards", which are credit-card sized cards. They're not the same thing, so if you read something about PCMCIA cards in the memos or the documentation or elsewhere you should realize that it's referring to something distinct from the voter cards.

Aside from that, interesting information. Thanks for posting it.

JC

[annagull]

42. I wonder if the Carter Center would be interested in this

after all, they have overseen elections in other countries. Maybe with all the evidence out there, they would be interested in it. President Carter hasn't been afraid to swing a few punches, and if there is election stealing going on, he would bring the press in on this, too. Just a thought.

[WaterDog]

44. There was a letter sent to Carter

a few weeks ago. Anyone know what came of it?

[punpirate]

47. Right now, I believe...

... monitoring US election matters is not part of the Carter Center charter. Would be good if someone could get them to change that, but there'd have to be money available to fund that activity.

[GregD]

49. I wrote to him too

I wrote to President Carter on behalf of Verified Voting.org and have not received a reply.

Greg

[gristy]

54. I would agree that the Carter Center should be written about all this

I've corresponded with them in the past. If they get enough hits on this issue, it just might push it up a bit on their priority list.

[DWright]

56. Carter

We've tried to get The Carter Center involved, but we're going to try again. Since he oversees bogus elections overseas, he'd be a good choice to go after the bogus elections here at home.

[althecat]

52. This is fantastic D and El.... thanks... and a source for more As for Qs

Clearly Rodgers is not getting with the spirit of Sonny Perdue's inquiry :)

I noticed the questions above about procedures for vote counting, result printing etc... there is a lot of info about all this in the Diebold staff manual.

E.G.

Page 8-12

8. Election closing at the polls

Ending the election on either AccuVote-OS or AccuVote-TS will automatically prevent any further voting from occurring, and will automatically print the Election Totals report.

Pollworkers, usually representatives of various parties, will sign the oath area at the bottom of the Election Totals report.

One or more copies of the report may be printed on either voting device. Commonly, one copy is posted on the polling place wall, and another copy is filed.

The full manual is available on Jim's site (which has been upgraded!) @
http://www.equalccw.com/ElectionSupportGuide.pdf

[DWright]

55. Thanks, Al

"Clearly Rodgers is not getting with the spirit of Sonny Perdue's inquiry"

Ya think? :-)

GA is Ground Zero to stop these damn machines. Our Election Officials might not care if our votes are counted, but WE DO.

---bump---

[althecat]

61. Ground Zero it is.... and thankfully GA also seems to have the...

... best organised and most passionate set of activists. DA. Eloriel. Dennis... you definitely have been blazing the trail here.

al.

[DEMActivist]

63. Oh, I don't know about that....

RedEagle has a very well organized and dedicated group up in Washington state. They are teaching us how to organize!

We just feel like it's the Georgia officials (Cathy Cox, Kathy Rogers and especially Dr. Britian Williams) who are doing the most damage across the nation. It's as if our (Democratic, no less) Georgia officials have been hired as sales reps for Diebold.

After Friday, I would venture to guess that several folks came away from that meeting wondering who Kathy Rogers DOES work for.

[shirlden]

53. Lots of good stuff here

Keep this kicked for today's Sunday Brunch group.


:kick:

[RedEagle]

62. On up you go

Kick

[rhite5]

64. Worthwhile Report - Another Kick

[mhr]

66. Kicked Again

eom

[Andy_Stephenson]

65. I was not satisfied with the certs I was sent so.....

Dear Ms. Rogers

I am reciept of the "certifications" you sent to me. Thanks for your assistance in this matter. I do have some concerns as the certifications do not include the certifications for the GEMS database.

So please consider this an official request for certifications for the voting machines used in Georgia in the Nov 2002 election. Please in clude certifications for all Hardware, Software, Firmware, database and modems. Look at it this way...if the law says it needs to be certified...I would like the certifications.

I would also like a detailed summary of the storage of the machines etc while not being used. I just read a story where voting machines were stored in hallways trunks of cars and other less than desirable locations. Can you please confirm or deny this, and if in fact it is true what steps are being taken to ensure their integrity?

I realize under the Georgia Open records act you have 3 days to respond to this letter. I have attached my address for mailing as well as my fax number to fax if you so prefer.

Sincerely
God_bush_n_cheney

If anyone has any suggestions or changes they think I should make please don't hesitate to let me know.

[sandnsea]

67. What happened to R. Doug Lewis??

Last I recall, he was the director of The Election Center. Who is this Ray Cobb character?

[DEMActivist]

68. Not the same 'Election Center'

This is the Kennesaw State University Election Center for the state of Georgia only.

Dr. Britian Williams set this up in Georgia after instructions from his buddy R. Doug Lewis. I'm sure we all know what the model is.

[annagull]

70. Just reported on WSB--Diebold sending more patches

Can't find a link, report was very short. Basically said that an independent committee found security flaws and Diebold is sending patches. Whew, that's a relief! :crazy:

[DEMActivist]

71. Just saw it, too

They're making a big deal that Diebold is sending the update for free! Grrrrrrrrrr!

[dusty64]

72. I don't get any of this.

diebold isn't rich enough to bribe EVERY election official in this country so how is it that they all seem to be brainwashed. Have they forgotten they don't work for these manufacturers, that they serve the People and are supposed to follow election law and protect our democracy. What gives? Where are the opposition parties? They all can't be stupid or treasonous so whats the deal. I've racked my brain over and over and I can't figure this shit out. This public "meeting" is such a farce its unbelievable (though unfortunately I DO believe it). Any theories out there how a couple companies have silenced the media and seem to have bought and sold just about EVERY election offical in this nation and most of the politicians, HELP?

[DEMActivist]

73. Don't forget...

Georgia was the first "all electronic" state in the nation.

Diebold made a huge investment in Georgia because the follow on sales could/would be extensive. And they have been.

Look at how acceptable electronic voting has become since Georgia "did so well" with these machines in 2002.

Dr. Britian Williams has become the security consultant to Maryland, Virginia, Ohio and Pennsylvania. He's become the salesman for Diebold in all those states. Ohio alone is a potential $100 million deal - you don't think a few mil thrown at Williams at the beginning was one hell of an investment????

[RedEagle]

75. A Long Indoctrination

This all started big time back around 1989 - 1991 (?) with The Election Center and NASED all coming on the block about the same time.

The Election Center "helped" with the certification process until NASED could get on its feet. It never left.

R. Doug Lewis helped instigate a whole slew of organizations like NASED at all levels of government. The Election Center helps "teach" them and in turn, these people instruct at the local, clerk level.

The Election Center is also heavily involved with NASS-National Association of Seretaries of State.

It's been a while coming but the influence is now everywhere.

And, if you look up the Voting Systems board of NASED, you will find that, past and present, people on that board also happen to be associated with some of the states that we are having the worst problems with- Florida, Georgia, Maryland...and Washington. You don't hear about us that much up here, but our SOS and state elections office will not certify a voter verified paper ballot machine, thereby limiting the choice auditors have. And our SOS is very eager to take the state to Internet voting.

Thanks for the plug up further on the list Demactivist, but you have to know we in Washington state rely heavily on all the research and writing you guys in Georgia have done!

I do urge everyone to get together with others in your state and form a group. Give yourselves a name and always include that when you write, speak, whatever. Get an "Action List" going. But, be very exclusive about who is on it at the strategy level. Our core list up here is private and people cannot be added without a referral from those who are already on the list. Those people, in turn, have people they contact who have people they contact.... you get the idea.

Then get some op eds in newspapers. What's beginning to happen here is that members of our group are now being asked to come and speak at meetings and forums. (Lots of them League of Women Voters, by the way. The local organizations are pretty unhappy with national)

Look for venues where your local and state representatives will be. Just attend and hand out information packets to them, you don't have to take over a meeting with the voting machine agenda. You can usually get a few minutes to talk with them.

Get a bill together and ask your legislators to sponsor it for you.

If necessary, see about complaint procedures for elected officials, ethics, whatever, if you feel they have not done their elected duty or are actually in violation of state laws.

[shirlden]

76. I didn't get it either

until I started reseaching, reading and going Hmmmmmmm a lot.
My take on this is that there is a lot of body buying going on while at the same time some of these little folks are just scared pissless when they realize what and who they are up against.

Chris Floyd did a good job of telling it like it is....
"It's a shell game, with money, companies and corporate brands switching in a blur of buy-outs and bogus fronts. It's a sinkhole, where mobbed-up operators, paid-off public servants, crazed Christian fascists, CIA shadow-jobbers, war-pimping arms dealers--and presidential family members--lie down together in the slime."

more
http://www.counterpunch.org/floyd09262003.html

This may sound like alarmist writing and to an extent it is, but it is also all very true.
If you were some piddly little BOE director or even an SOS worried about his "career", you would put on the kneepads and suck-up.

:argh:

[linazelle]

74. This is appalling

Who are these people? Where am I? What happened to honesty and integrity? How can a company like this not want to confirm to the public that it makes a secure product to protect citizen's votes?

This makes it clear to me how much work I must do not only to support BBV but on other issues like this as well.