If the Chechens had received even a fraction of the support that is alleged, Shamil would be King of Moscow by now. Such claims are highly overstated, a sort of base propaganda usually originating from sources that I, personally, would not wish to endorse ... but often are, anyway. Akhmadov and Zakayev, two of the tamest voices for the ChRI, are given asylum so as to keep a line of communication open. Both ritually curse Basayev for merely waking up in the morning and haven't a damn thing to do with the activities, and the Russian government should be quite aware of this. Their mere existance, and as the official representatives of the legitimate Chechen government, is a slap in the face that hasn't anything to do with "terrorism" ... but that doesn't stop yet another gang of cynical hypocrites--much like our own in nearly every respect (if more advanced along)--from using this propaganda to advance state policy.
The second stage of the invasion and occupation was planned out long before the Daghestan provocation in 1999, and for that matter, the facts of which are not as you say.
In Daghestan, the situation was and is far more complex than this. The makeup of the province is of no less than three dozen distinct micro-nations, most with their own language and dialect, in a land the size of Scotland with a population of around two million. The economic and political order is of a standard feudalist construction, with a handful of ethnic-based mafia bosses ruling over the great masses of generally impoverished people. Resisting this corrupt order was an idea that cut a swath across the whole order, that of Islam set against the feudalist oligarchy. The idea, contrary to several lines of propaganda, was not so much of religion but a way of breaking through and striking against an unjust order and thus used as convenient means of doing so--that is, the matter was one of economics and the class struggle, just as in Latin America and anywhere else in the world at various points in time.
Free and independent enclaves based on Islamic principles had become established by Daghestanis in the Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi villages, among others. While the established authorities were more interested in shoring up their criminal empires, the Islamic enclaves in fact had become among the safest and most orderly and prospering villages in the province, thus endearing to themselves the fear and resentment of the established order. Much of this had taken place completely independently of events in Chechnya, as distinct intra-Dagestani matters, though this would not remain so. It would more accurately be said that Daghestan had 'destablized' its neighbor, rather than the opposite as is often claimed.
The situation in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya (ChRI) at the time was of the natural, and wholly intended, results of deliberate strangulation and isolation. The democratically elected state, generally unrecognized internationally because of undisguised blackmail and threats against any who would do so by the formerly occupying force, struggled to maintain a monopolization of power in the face of their isolated position. Legitimate avenues thus deliberately kept inaccessible by stronger outside forces, illegitimate avenues thrived. Basayev personally drifted somewhere in-between both, though ultimately served the 'good' (and himself, I suppose, though at no point did he materially profit from the variety of situations he had risked his life to place himself in) in occasionally a 'bad' way, and sought a way for the nation to escape this paralysis.
The resistance commander and hero of the 'first' war was, by the way, initially trained by the
Russian GRU for the war in Abkhazia to fight the Georgians, and
not the CIA. I am not aware of any connections Basayev would have with the CIA. After his role leading the pan-Caucasus volunteers (many of whom are still in his army to this day) in Abkhazia had passed, he then fought on the Azeri side following the Armenian invasion and occupation of Karabakh, then took a short trip east to receive formal military training in Afghanistan before the fighting broke out in his homeland. Unlike the other many commanders, Dudayev and Maskhadov in particular, he did not have a formal Soviet military career before the various Caucasus wars spilled out.
After fighting the Russian occupyers in Afghanistan and Tajikistan since the age of 17, Khattab lived in Abkhazia and Daghestan (marrying a Daghestani woman there) before meeting up with Basayev in the course of the first resistance war. Khattab first gained the attention of the Chechen leadership when he had presided over a battle with a Russian occupation convoy high up in the mountains in April of '96, where this convoy was defeated and completely mauled. He was decorated by the commander of the ChRI Armed Forces, Aslan Maskhadov, and became very close to Basayev: Shamil's father had adopted him to officially make them brothers. It is possible that he had a bad effect on Shamil's personality, but then I imagine that having a dozen members of his family massacred by Russian bombs and the deliberate destruction of his entire country also had a
minor, insignifgant role as well.
The Islamic movements in Daghestan had started their political struggle with the state
before neighhors had become physically involved (political connections existed). When it was obvious that the local mafia bosses would call in Yeltsin & Russian military power to eliminate their opposition, and of course kill a great many innocent people in the process, they too appealed for outside help: enter Basayev & Khattab. The latter had seen enough first hand just what happens when Russian bombs and artillery shells would connect with villages (the result, of course, being piles of ruined masonry and the stench of burnt flesh), and of course came to the aid of those who had requested it in order to prevent that from happening. That of course isn't what happened.
The "Che Guevaras in turbans", as one commentator had compared them at the time (though neither actually wore turbans: Khattab was very proud of his hair--with good reason--and generally didn't cover it too thoroughly, and Shamil usually wore a military-style black beret-sort of hat...that aside, Che & Fidel were in fact heroes of a younger Shamil in his days as a student and computer-salesman) easily crossed the border and moved in, linking up with their Daghestani friends. While direct battles on the ground were won by the united Daghestani-Chechen forces and many villages fell under the sway of the newly proclaimed Islamic Republic of Dagestan, Russian air force and artillery units blasted away at rebel-held villages, killing people indescriminately and in some cases destroying entire neighborhoods and villages. Georgian & ChRI territory was also bombed in the course of these operations, "by mistake". Eventually, the aerial/artillery assaults became too much for the rebels to withstand, though the war had ebbed and flowed in 3 stages in the course of a few months before the allied forces pulled out. Some suggest that conditions on the ground were misjudged and this had unfavourably affected the campaign. I would say that the vastly superior destructive capability of the firepower of the one side and limited resources of the other, had more to do with it.
Questions like "WHY THE FUCK?" are open to a variety of answers. The plainest version--of situations on the ground developing as they were, with Shamil responding to the call for help from the Daghestanis--is somewhat the view I take, though not entirely. Shamil had not hidden his thoughts on liberating and uniting the entire North Caucasus region like his epic namesake had attempted previously, and would not pass up such an opportunity thrown in his lap. Talks of it being a secret Russian provocation exist--certain channels were used to provoke him into acting, for example a meeting in France with his old GRU contact at the Riveria house of a Saudi arms dealer (who denies it), are alleged. I tend to shy away from conspiracy theories, though I don't claim to be unbiased (obviously). The situation in ChRI was one of a deadlock and stalemate: Russian-imposed isolation was leaving them with little choice between implosion or explosion, and Basayev sought a way to break out of the strangulating isolation and bring forth a more positive future and advance existing goals. The opportunity presenting itself, then not hesitating to jump at it.
That their version of Che in Bolivia didn't end the way they wanted it to is obvious, and an old/new tragic catastrophe had come again as a result. Many great attempts to reshape the world have failed in this last century alone, so many more before it, and they will continue to do so in the future, but with careful reflection and planning those future attempts may benefit from knowledge of the past.
As usual I have a lot more that I could say (including several distinctly different accounts of even minor facets), but for a variety of reasons have not worked them into this. There are many other interpretations, many other allegations of many other conspiracies, many etc.. I have a day ahead of me, and little sleep behind me: the hour I put into this will have to do as it is. :)
The article above...
http://inn.globalfreepress.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=793...is a real piece of work. The transformation of xenophobic chestpounding and somewhat silly propaganda into opportunistic anti-Bush material is interesting. I remember why I broke very early on with the "ABB" tendency.
Printer-friendly format
Email this thread to a friend
Bookmark this thread
(184 posts)
Send PM |
Profile |
Ignore
