What are we going to do about electronic voting ?

[bearfan454]

I know there is a lot of time before the Presidential election. Bev Harris has done milestones of fantastic work on this. Worst case scenario ? Electronic voting everywhere. What could we do ? Absentee ballots ? I am really worried about the power of Microsoft Access on the GEMS program not being able to be detected with their wireless transmission now. Any ideas ?

[Eloriel]

1. Yes.

One, get busy. Go to http://www.blackboxvoting.org to the Discussion Forum.

Two, for a quick bit of help, we've been given a little entree right here in Georgia, which I wrote up yesterday and it didn't get much action, sadly.

DUers could help a LOT by helping raise the profile on this issue today. DUer Seemslikeadream got the ball rolling with a well-placed call while Gov. Sonny Perdue was on C-Span. He was so taken aback by someone in Illinois knowing about it, that he said on air that he was asking Cathy Cox to do an investigation.
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=104&topic_id=198839

Any help right now, today, on this would be terrific.

Eloriel

[Gordon25]

14. Eloriel

Just wanted you to know I wrote Sonny yesterday and included a link to our Pima County committee report. Congratulated him on "understanding" this to be a non-partisan issue and urging him to see the investigation through. Got a form response back but it contained a promise of a personal response from Sonny yet to come. I'll let you know if he follows through. Anyhow, keep up the good work and don't get discouraged. I heard Jim Hightower on Democracy Now yesterday saying something about how Democrats always start out at a disadvantage. Because we're not true believers, he says, trying to get a bunch of Democrats to work together on something is like trying to load frogs into a wheelbarrow. It's hard to get a full load.

Gordon25

[wtmusic]

2. For a thorough overview

of secure electronic elections see Bruce Schneier's "Applied Cryptography", pp. 125-134. Schneier is arguably the world's leading expert in internet-related security and cryptography.

Schneier lists these 7 requirements for a fair electronic election:

1. Only authorized voters can vote.
2. No one can vote more than once.
3. No one can determine for whom anyone else voted.
4. No one can duplicate anyone else's vote (this turns out to be the hardest requirement).
5. No one can change anyone else's vote without being discovered.
6. Every voter can make sure that his vote has been taken into account in the final tabulation.

Additionally, some voting schemes may have the following requirement:

7. Everyone knows who voted and who didn't.

The systems which come closest are (unfortunately) not simple, require multiple steps by the voter, and are thus IMO impractical for a national election. They use public key cryptography similar to that used to ensure the security of internet e-commerce transactions.

He begins the chapter with this statement: "Computerized voting will never be used for general elections unless there is a protocol that maintains individual privacy and prevents cheating." I'd be interested to know his opinion of the current state of affairs.

[BevHarris]

5. Schneier is missing the most critical part of all

1. The total number of voter-verified votes must be auditable and retained as physical evidence.

The weakness of all cryptography schemes for verifying the vote is that they do not maintain an independent, physical evidence trail that is verified by the voter. While you can verify your own vote, no one can examine the evidence of ALL the voter verified votes at once.

This leads to schemes where the system can pass a spot check (voter checks his own vote) and still stuff the electronic ballot box, or read from two different sets of books, or a multitude of other corruptions.

Cryptography solutions also violate another tenet of basic accounting: Transparency. Everyone needs to be able to SEE the evidence trail. While we may use electronic banking, I can assure you that you can't get a CPA to sign off on an audit using only your electronic banking trail. They need independent, physical documentation. The only proper way to do this is with independently verified (voter verified) physical evidence trail (print ballots from voting machine, store them in ballot box).

Bev

[wtmusic]

9. The weakness of all computerized voting

is that it doesn't maintain a paper trail (unless of course, it's just to print ballots).

Nonetheless, I haven't seen any proof that paper is required for security. It's only been 10 years since the dawn of ecommerce when critics we're crying that there would be no way to conduct business securely online (by 2010 it's estimated that 80% of all transactions will be online). If a similar breakthrough to public-key encryption were to happen for voting it could change everything for the better.

Re: being able to stuff the electronic ballot box, or read from two different sets of books--these have been addressed via cryptography and actually very effectively.

And of course, we're never actually sure with paper ballots either. We saw what happened with the paper trail in Florida in 2000 and it didn't make a damn bit of difference that they were audited.

Though I'm playing devil's advocate I'm on your side Bev--in the meantime, paper is still best.

[BevHarris]

10. Transparency. Answer that and I'll listen.

And no, cryptography has not addressed it, because every cryptography solution so far proposed has not been able to meet both the voter-verified TOTALS test (omitted by Schneier) and the privacy test.

Transparency is even a bigger issue. You need normal everyday voters to be able to see that the system is safe. Our constitution does not say that only computer scientists are allowed to verify the vote.

The third problem is insider fraud -- a cryptography solution prepared by a dishonest company has many issues not addressed by studies that assume insider fraud cannot happen.

And the fourth problem is cost: It costs less to print ballots and store them in ballot boxes than to develop and use the complex cryptographic solutions that would be needed.

bev

[wtmusic]

11. All of your objections to cryptography

are problems with paper systems as well. I don't know what your voter-verified TOTALS test is, but any verification (period, end of story) can be rigged. And the privacy issue is a piece of cake--already present in public-key cryptography ( unless you have roughly 4 trillion years to do a brute force attack on my 512-bit key, in order to see what my vote was). BTW, the Constitution doesn't specify that ANYONE can verify the vote.

In reality how many 'normal everyday voters' can see that a paper system is safe, or even bother to?

The cost is a non-issue as well. Developing the cryptography is expensive but it's a one-time cost. Much more environmentally-friendly to boot.

Again, notwithstanding the above, in the meantime, paper is best!

onedit: insider fraud is an objection that I can't refute. Employing any corporation to have such an integral part in the process is a problem and would have to undergo massive review to work.

[seemslikeadream]

3. Kia Kaha

Stand Tall (Thanks to althecat) and just do something! It may only take 2 minutes but you have no idea where it might lead and what may follow. Democracy requires awarness and particapation. It is a continual struggle and the fight will never be over. "They" will always be there, their mission in life is to oppress you. Just never give up. Speak the truth!

[Eloriel]

15. And THIS gal knows whereof she speaks!

Seemslikeadream was solely responsible, by making a call to C-Span when GA Gov Sonny Purdue was on, and getting him so flustered and surprised that someone from Illinois knew about our voting machines, that he ended up saying he was calling for the Secretary of State to do an investigation.

BIG, BIG wedge for us to use as leverage for this issue. Unbelievably big wedge if we can properly exploit it, which we're trying very hard to do.

So, you NEVER know what impact your actions will have. Just do it! Just take the next step that comes up. And then the next.

Eloriel

[linazelle]

4. I went to BBV site yesterday and gleaned some info which I posted

on other boards where "the enemy" lurks. I actually framed it as a non-partisan issue and focused on the threat to democracy (we've lost the media, will we now lose the sanctity of the vote, too?).

Still, I don't want to refer people not on our side to BBV because they might become polarized and I think it's really not a Dem or Repub issue.

I wish that the issue could be explained more plainly and simply. For instance, I saw that something like 122 elections had errors as a result of e-voting. We had errors in Florida too and in all elections, so how to the error rates compare? What was the impact of these errors on the 122 elections? Maybe I missed something but even the talking points were not to the point and the posts here have been hard for me to follow.

I think this is a critical issue and I have time to follow the developments but can't because it seems too complex (maybe it's old age). For those who have less time, I think the issue is going to be all but lost.

Just my two cents...

[BevHarris]

6. Was that BBV.com or BBV.org? The .org site is apolitical

If you see something political at http://www.blackboxvoting.org let me know. You should not avoid steering people to the .org site because they might become polarized -- it is opinionated on the voting machine issue, but represents Republicans, Democrats, Libertarians, Greens, and Independents.

Bev

[SharonAnn]

7. Here's what I've done in the last two days

Met one-on-one with our Congressional Rep. John J. Duncan of Tennessee at his Constituent Day in Greenback, TN and brought him information about :
1. My concerns about the potential for fraud in electronic voting
2. My concern about the lack of auditability in electronic voting
3. Rep. Holt's Bill and my suggestion that it call the Voter Verified paper "receipt" to be changed to "ballot", since electronic digits in a machine cannot be reasonably thought to be an actual "ballot".
4. The reports and articles from university scientists about their concerns.
5. My experience with hardware/software vendors who will play down these concerns by spouting technical "gobbledy-gook" and not to listen to that but pay attention to how vote counts can be audited or recounted if there is a question about an election.

After this discussion, he said that he would co-sponsor Rep. Rush Holt's bill. He agreed that voting is our most basic right and that every effort must be made to ensure that the counting is correct.

The second thing I did was attend our county's Election Commission meeting last night, and when asked if I had anything to say, explained that I was working with a national group to bring attention to the need for auditability requirements with elctronic voting. Gave them a brief explanation about the types of concerns we technical people have and what we recommend be included or changed in current electronic voting equipment. I stated that I would be glad to provide any information to them if they were interested. i kept the discussion low-key and more of a "for your information" thing. Two of the Democrats are new to the Commission - one is the Chair. I wanted them to see my information as being helpful, not accusatory. I am following up with letter and copies of various articles to each of the commission members. Their initial response seemed to be one of interest and I hope that they will continue to be interested.

[hunter]

8. Don't forget to act locally...

I live in California where voting systems are selected at the county level. If you live in a county that is using, or plans to use, these "black box" voting machines you need to get on the phone with your local officials, or better yet, go visit them in person.

Announce yourself appropriately, dress nicely, behave nicely, and know your subject. If you do it right you may find yourself invited back as an "expert" of sorts.

A few years ago I was doing work opposing internet filtering for adults in Public Libraries. At first I was surprised how easy it was to get "face time" with public officials, especially when I had various library professionals introducing me. A state aseemmblyman even invited me to his offices after I wrote a thoughtful letter to the local newspaper.

I'd like to believe that in most places the BBV issue can be pursued in a similar fashion. Yes, I am very much aware of the various horror stories posted here, Cathy Cox in Georgia, etc., but I think that most public officials will, at the very least, want to keep up some appearance of honest elections.

Good Luck!

[RedEagle]

12. Write the local papers

Letters to the editor is a wonderful venue and I'm told one of the most read parts of many newspapers.

Unknown to many, is the ability to write guest columns. Tool around your newspaper for information or if it's not there, email the eiditor about requirements. They usually have word quotas.

While giving internet addresses for reference should probably go at the bottom, do give people some idea where to begin looking.

The problem that I find, is that this isn't on anyone's radar. As soon as you explain it to most of them, they understand.

And the idea that another corporation is exploiting their vote just like Enron exploited power, and Auther Anderson used shoddy bookkeeping, doesn't sit very well.

Remind them they OWN the vote, they pay for these voting systems. They darn well ought to get what they want, not what some election official wants to make their job easier.

And these touch screen units aren't going to have the lifespan of an optical scan system. Maintenance contracts are not an upfront cost that I don't think anyone is paying enough attention to.

As for Internet voting, once the system is done, then the upgrades begin. Internet programs that stay static are prime sitting ducks for hackers, who don't have that problem. So there is continual testing and upgrade costs there too. And don't think it's going to be cheaper. One site with information on VoteHere compared the costs. Paper was about .25 to .55 CENTS per vote. Internet was $4.00 - $5.00 DOLLARS per vote.

Yeh, right, paper is more expensive- only if you stick your head in the sand and listen to sales people. R. Doug Lewis is the pied piper and all the state and county election officials little lemmings. I did read one piece where Lewis did not back Internet voting. Well, neither did one of our state officials until it became "convenient."

With any luck, the vermin in the trade will do each other in and leave the voter verified paper guys.

[1opinion]

13. It's going to be ugly!