Here's what Black actually wrote on that point: www.minnpost.com/.../seymour_hersh_cheney_left_allies_behind_in_national_security_posts_and_may_still_influence
Terry Gross, the outstanding interviewer of the Fresh Air program, did obtain a statement from an unnamed JSOC spokester who said that Hersh was wrong. The carefully worded statement said that all U.S. military programs go up the chain of command, through the secretary of defense to the president and that the vice president is not part of the military chain of command. JSOC also said that "Congress has oversight over all U.S. military operations, including special operations."
But towards the end of the interview, Hersh revealed something additional. Gross asked him if people with knowledge of events during Bush-Cheney days are still reluctant to talk about them, for fear of retaliation by Cheney. Hersh replied:
"I’ll make it worse. I think he’s put people left. He’s put people back. They call it a stay-behind. It’s sort of an intelligence term of art. When you leave a country and, you know, you’ve been driven out the, you know, you’ve lost the war. You leave people behind. It’s a stay-behind that you can continue to have contacts with, to do sabotage, whatever you want to do. Cheney’s left a stay-behind. He’s got people in a lot of agencies that still tell him what’s going on. Particularly in defense, obviously. Also in the NSA, there’s still people that talk to him. He still knows what’s going on. Can he still control policy up to a point? Probably up to a point, a minor point. But he’s still there. He’s still a presence."
As for disinformation that JSOC is not part of the normal chain of command, that comes from misunderstanding about how various commands are structured so that they are under the direct command of the President, while the JCS and SEC DEF convey orders.
This is Hersh's article last summer, when he was last spreading the notion that Cheney was off the reservation and was going to order a preemptive bomibng of Iran. This was essentially part of a strategy of tension psyop against Iran, in an effort to provoke them to shoot first. Hersh wrote:
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/07/080707fa_fact_hersh
One irony of Admiral Fallonbs departure is that he was, in many areas, in
agreement with President Bush on the threat posed by Iran. They had
a good working relationship, Fallon told me, and, when he ran
CENTCOM, were in regular communication. On March 4th, a week before
his resignation, Fallon testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, saying that he was bencouragedb about the situations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Regarding the role played by Iranbs leaders,
he said, bTheybve been absolutely unhelpful, very damaging, and I
absolutely donbt condone any of their activities. And I have yet
to see anything since Ibve been in this job in the way of a public
action by Iran thatbs been at all helpful in this region.b Fallon
made it clear in our conversations that he considered it inappropriate
to comment publicly about the President, the Vice-President, or
Special Operations. But he said he had heard that people in the
White House had been bstrugglingb with his views on Iran. bWhen I
arrived at CENTCOM, the Iranians were funding every entity inside
Iraq. It was in their interest to get us out, and so they decided
to kill as many Americans as they could. And why not? They didnbt
know whobd come out ahead, but they wanted us out. I decided that
I couldnbt resolve the situation in Iraq without the neighborhood.
To get this problem in Iraq solved, we had to somehow involve Iran
and Syria. I had to work the neighborhood.b Fallon told me that his
focus had been not on the Iranian nuclear issue, or on regime change
there, but on bputting out the fires in Iraq.b There were constant
discussions in Washington and in the field about how to engage Iran
and, on the subject of the bombing option, Fallon said, he believed
that bit would happen only if the Iranians did something stupid.b
Fallonbs early retirement, however, appears to have been provoked
not only by his negative comments about bombing Iran but also by
his strong belief in the chain of command and his insistence on
being informed about Special Operations in his area of responsibility.
One of Fallonbs defenders is retired Marine General John J. (Jack)
Sheehan, whose last assignment was as commander-in-chief of the
U.S. Atlantic Command, where Fallon was a deputy.
Last year, Sheehan rejected a White House offer to become the
Presidentbs bczarb for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. bOne of
the reasons the White House selected Fallon for CENTCOM was that
hebs known to be a strategic thinker and had demonstrated those
skills in the Pacific,b Sheehan told me. (Fallon served as
commander-in-chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific from 2005 to 2007.)
bHe was charged with coming up with an over-all coherent strategy
for Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and, by law, the combatant commander
is responsible for all military operations within his A.O.bbarea
of operations. bThat was not happening,b Sheehan said.
bWhen Fallon tried to make sense of all the overt and covert activity
conducted by the military in his area of responsibility, a small
group in the White House leadership shut him out.b The law cited
by Sheehan is the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, known as
Goldwater-Nichols, which defined the chain of command: from the
President to the Secretary of Defense, through the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on to the various combatant commanders,
who were put in charge of all aspects of military operations,
including joint training and logistics. That authority, the act
stated, was not to be shared with other echelons of command. But
the Bush Administration, as part of its global war on terror,
instituted new policies that undercut regional commanders-in-chief;
for example, it gave Special Operations teams, at military commands
around the world, the highest priority in terms of securing support
and equipment. The degradation of the traditional chain of command
in the past few years has been a point of tension between the White
House and the uniformed military.
bThe coherence of military strategy is being eroded because of undue
civilian influence and direction of nonconventional military
operations,b Sheehan said. bIf you have small groups planning and
conducting military operations outside the knowledge and control
of the combatant commander, by default you canbt have a coherent
military strategy. You end up with a disaster, like the reconstruction
efforts in Iraq.b Admiral Fallon, who is known as Fox, was aware
that he would face special difficulties as the first Navy officer
to lead CENTCOM, which had always been headed by a ground commander,
one of his military colleagues told me. He was also aware that the
Special Operations community would be a concern. bFox said that
therebs a lot of strange stuff going on in Special Ops, and I told
him he had to figure out what they were really doing,b Fallonbs
colleague said. bThe Special Ops guys eventually figured out they
needed Fox, and so they began to talk to him. Fox would have won
his fight with Special Ops but for Cheney.b The Pentagon consultant
said, bFallon went down because, in his own way, he was trying to
prevent a war with Iran, and you have to admire him for that.b In
recent months, according to the Iranian media, there has been a
surge in violence in Iran; it is impossible at this early stage,
however, to credit JSOC or C.I.A. activities, or to assess their
impact on the Iranian leadership. The Iranian press reports are
being carefully monitored by retired Air Force Colonel Sam Gardiner,
who has taught strategy at the National War College and now conducts
war games centered on Iran for the federal government, think tanks,
and universities. The Iranian press bis very open in describing the
killings going on inside the country,b Gardiner said. It is, he
said, ba controlled press, which makes it more important that it
publishes these things. We begin to see inside the government.b He
added, bHardly a day goes by now we donbt see a clash somewhere.
There were three or four incidents over a recent weekend, and the
Iranians are even naming the Revolutionary Guard officers who have
been killed.b Earlier this year, a militant Ahwazi group claimed
to have assassinated a Revolutionary Guard colonel, and the Iranian
government acknowledged that an explosion in a cultural center in
Shiraz, in the southern part of the country, which killed at least
twelve people and injured more than two hundred, had been a terrorist
act and not, as it earlier insisted, an accident. It could not be
learned whether there has been American involvement in any specific
incident in Iran, but, according to Gardiner, the Iranians have
begun publicly blaming the U.S., Great Britain, and, more recently,
the C.I.A. for some incidents. The agency was involved in a coup
in Iran in 1953, and its support for the unpopular regime of Shah
Mohammed Reza Pahlavibwho was overthrown in 1979bwas condemned for
years by the ruling mullahs in Tehran, to great effect. bThis is
the ultimate for the Iraniansbto blame the C.I.A.,b Gardiner said.
bThis is new, and itbs an escalationba ratcheting up of tensions.
It rallies support for the regime and shows the people that there
is a continuing threat from the bGreat Satan.b b In Gardinerbs view,
the violence, rather than weakening Iranbs religious government,
may generate support for it.
Many of the activities may be being carried out by dissidents in
Iran, and not by Americans in the field. One problem with bpassing
moneyb (to use the term of the person familiar with the Finding)
in a covert setting is that it is hard to control where the money
goes and whom it benefits. Nonetheless, the former senior intelligence
official said, bWebve got exposure, because of the transfer of our
weapons and our communications gear. The Iranians will be able to
make the argument that the opposition was inspired by the Americans.
How many times have we tried this without asking the right questions?
Is the risk worth it?b One possible consequence of these operations
would be a violent Iranian crackdown on one of the dissident groups,
which could give the Bush Administration a reason to intervene.