Ali Allawi: The Occupation of Iraq (Independent UK)

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Ali Allawi: The Occupation of Iraq

We won the war, but lost the peace. In this exclusive extract from his definitive history of the conflict in Iraq, Ali Allawi explains how the conquering armies allowed victory to give way to anarchy

Published: 05 March 2007

The invasion of Iraq was launched on 19 March 2003 by American forces led by the Third Infantry Division, with British support, from Kuwait into Iraqi territory. The war was fought fitfully over a three-week period. There was no doubt about the final outcome, even if at certain points there appeared to be some resistance. But this was quickly overcome.

In Basra, the British had effectively surrounded the city by the first week, but did not establish control until the end of March. Meanwhile, the Americans had met unexpected resistance in the city of Nasiriyah, mainly from the Fedayeen Saddam, a militia loyal to Saddam and his family. The march to Baghdad was halted by sandstorms in the central Euphrates area, and also by running skirmishes and ambushes. But the Iraqi army and the vaunted Republican Guard simply melted away. The troops did not surrender en masse as had been expected - they simply went home. Coalition intelligence had expected that entire units would switch sides and form the core of a future loyal military force with which they could cooperate.

Apart from a very few exceptions, however, this did not happen. Reports of the wholesale surrender of Iraqi army units were simply unfounded. By the time the vanguard of the US invading force had reached the outskirts of Baghdad, the armed forces of Iraq had almost disintegrated. The regime tried to use the Arab "volunteers" who had flocked to join the battle against the invaders. Some 4,000 were, reportedly, in Baghdad, awaiting orders from the Iraqi High Command. They were thrown into a hopeless battle in the airport area against the Americans, and were decimated.

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The first weeks after the fall of Baghdad had set the stage for the drama that had only just started. The mostly Shia population of the south had stubbornly refused to make the connection between the overthrow of a hated regime and the invasion and occupation of the country. The Sunni Arabs were alienated, sullen and resentful, and bided their time until an appropriate response. The Kurds were determined to maximise their gains and to set themselves up as the coalition's indispensable allies.

The United States had invaded Iraq with no plan as to how to administer the country, even though the issue of the post-war governance of Iraq had been discussed well before the invasion. The Iraqi opposition was divided on the problem, with some groups advocating the formation of a provisional government that would assume power immediately after the overthrow of the regime. But the reality was that Iraqi exiles had been mainly concerned with the political arrangements and structures through which they would assume or inherit power, not with the actual task of running the country on a day-to-day basis. The detailed requirements for the transfer of control from a centralised, dictatorial and perverse Ba'athist-led Iraq to a form of effective governing body had been left for the US to consider. This, however, it totally failed to address.

The complete piece is at: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2327937.ece