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Edited on Tue Sep-02-03 04:01 AM by Aidoneus
A bit long and very, very unorganized, corrections are much appreciated. Some of this was difficult to piece together due to certain contradictions that come up between the various accounts (some of the more common mistakes in the western press are most misleading and shallow, though the Arab/Iranian & Islamic sources were also a bit muddled on certain facts), and I'm somewhat embarassed to say that one of the better sources for a portion of what I refer to here was a website co-run by a figure that I dislike very, very much. (though the author of the piece also wrote a similar article for a paper I do like however, though it wasn't as detailed, so it's not all bad on that note..)
From what I've found, Muqtada Sadr's father, Sayyid Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, doesn't seem as much the figure of resistance that he's made out to be, at least not until later in his life. Sadr & the Sadrists/Sadriyun now make him out to be one, though in theall-cynic lense that I view the world through I suspect that is so he/they can use his famous family name to get themselves on the dance floor in this semi-vaccuum. Parts of his father's history suggests a bit different story from what I have read of him, though Sadiq al-Sadr's followers seem quite exclusively devoted to him and his line regardless..
Even while the fathers' cousin, the geniunely legendary Grand Ayatallah Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, was a pillar among the Shia political/religious empowerment and resistance to the ruling elite and its oppression of the Shia communities, Sadiq al-Sadr was not known for involvement in this movement in opposing the Baathist ruling elites, despite being arrested on a couple occasions (probably due to his family lineage, the Sadrs being one of the more powerful extended families among Iraqi Shias). Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr is remembered as Shahid al-Sadr among his followers and considered as important a figure in his day as Khomeini or Fadlallah are in Iran and Lebanon respectively, though the cousin Sadiq al-Sadr was apparently not active in that period despite the oppressive policies of the statist ruling elite against the Shia Islamic movements and communities.
In the period after the '91 uprising, the Baathists realized well enough they needed to court at least some section of the Shias to stay afloat--Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr was more or less their proxy to do so, and the Baathists recognized his position as the new Grand Ayatallah of Iraq after the execution of the previous man in the position (Sayyid Abul al-Qassim al-Khoei is the father of Abdul-Masjid al-Khoei, who was cut to death just a few months ago, due either to his blatent collaboration with the murderous US/UK invaders or for appearing with a Shia religious scholar known as a Baathist collaborator, or both?--the dust cloud hasn't cleared on even that months afterward, on a similar note it may be quite some time before it is clearly known who martyred SAIRI's Hakim recently).
Though I doubt the relationship was without conflict, it wasn't until his last couple years in the position before being martyred by the Baathists (the 7th Grand Ayatallah to receive such a fate in the last couple decades) that Sadr's father showed any independent streak or resistance with respect to the statist elite, which naturally gained some of his reverence today. Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr as the recognized Grand Ayatallah of Iraq was somewhat useful to the Baathists for a few years and in return he gained influence among the Shias of parts of Baghdad (who now refer to their community as 'Sadr City' in his name) and the Shiite rural tribals (a tough nut to crack for both the Baghdad ruling establishment and the Najafi Shia Hawza before that) through large scale charity work and other such social welfare services and energetic teaching--the same influence his son is now cashing in on and plays off against his peers and rivals, though he is not alone in claiming his father's legacy.
Of the great mass of political/religious strength created by the movement Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr was responsible for, neither Muqtada or his father are the visible inheritors. After his execution in the early 80s, sections of Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr's al-Daawa movement began to gravitate more towards the umbrella organization SAIRI and the now-martyred Grand Ayatallah Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim--who himself was a member of Sadr's al-Daawa movement before forming the SAIRI as an umbrella organization of many Iraqi Islamic and revolutionary parties (being a merging of many movements and organizations, and a popular figure, that explains a bit how he can overnight draw 300,000 to mourn his martyrdom). It amuses me a bit to see much the same rightwing and centrist/liberal establishment journals & commentators who reviled Hakim a few months ago as a terrorist extremist with little backing, now referring to him as a beloved moderate with tons of supporters.
Muqtada himself is not as high ranking of a religious scholar as those he thumbs his nose at--them scholars and jurists of the rank of Ayatallah, and him the lower position of hojjatolleslam--, though he aspires to be one. On such matters he recognized an exiled Iraqi Ayatallah still staying in Iran named Kazim al-Haeri (which is ironic for Sadr also thumbs his nose at the "exiles" like Baqir al-Hakim), though I have read second-hand from an Iranian page that this is not the case any longer and Ayatallah al-Haeri backs an ex-associate of Sadr's, Sheikh Yaqubi, instead. His draw seems to be from the oppressed class loyal to the legacy of his father, and also the youth, being somewhere between 20 & 30 himself (claims to this vary quite widely) and his behavior/positions/tone reflects that (though youth is not necessarily so much an issue for stature as knowledge of the laws and justice in applying them are--for instance, Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr reached his distinguished position at 22yrs old or so). He runs the Sadrist movement from a Najaf office near the Imam Ali mosque (according to a note in passing in an article I read on the recent blast, his office was damaged by the bomb that martyred Hakim). From this Najafi office he directs the movement in 'Sadr City' and elsewhere, and is able to do so mainly through the fact that he's ignored/tolerated by the occupation forces as yet. Though he has met with the Iranians at a rememberance of Khomeini in June, and there are some images of Khomeini around Sadr City, some of the Sadriyun are said to have an anti-Iranian view and want to both make Najaf the centre of Shiism (at the expense of Iran's Qom) and remove the Iranian influences currently in the Najafi hawza (that's apparently the basis for the stance here against the Persian-born Sistani, self-serving as it may be). Sadr doesn't seem to like the Kuwaiti rulers much either, issuing a fatwa against business with them some time ago.
Despite his obvious opposition to the occupation and the puppet council which the CPA formed as a facade to the neocolonial rule over Iraq, both of which he is well known to speak adamantly against (perhaps too well known, for such singular coverage is oversimplifying and typical of the lazy statist ideologues in western/US press), he has a so-far constant dismissive response to the idea of armed resistance to the US/UK occupation, preferring non-violent means of resisting to it for the time being (probably to solidify their fairly shaky political grounding in the new semi-vaccuum, and realizing it's something of a "how quickly do I want to be martyred" question for such leaders at the current time), and not in my opinion a likely candidate to be among the first major Shia leaders to begin armed resistance. However, if the occupation forces begin to get paranoid at growing tension (as I suspect is a certainty in the environment now after Hakim's martyrdom), he may be targetted as such at some point just because he is a visible semi-opposition figure and if things get bad the US/UK occupation forces will basically just be lashing out blindly and taking out any visible figures they can find (as per Israel's approach to Lebanon, and it brought the invaders only increased resistance and eventual defeat--I don't think any of the naive/optimistic fools running this crusade have learned a thing from history, and are rather bent on repeating every mistake of the Crusades, Beirut, Grozny, Gaza and Britain's failed adventure in Iraq decades ago--though unlike Churchill I really hope we don't break out the poison gas in time).
A former associate of his, Sheikh Yaqubi, recently queitly established his own movement called al-Fadilah after breaking off from Sadr, in part as a rival to Moqtada over the Sadriyun movement and also to resist the American occupation. I say quiety, because aside from an interesting but short reference or two in passing and an Asia Times piece, this figure is difficult to find information on but seems like a potentially notable fellow as time goes on. Sheikh Yaqubi is a student of Sadr's father and apparently the preferred choice of that exiled Ayatallah al-Haeri. But in another article (that Asia Times piece on Yaqubi) I read that his supporters condemn Haeri for his support of Sadr.--A bit of what I meant on how things are difficult to keep up with/sort out!
In response to the original post, I don't notice any mention of Sunnis or Baathists mentioned here.. it seems to be the Sadrists, who are accused (I don't think it was found to be proven or disproven either way) of hassling Sistani at least once before, ended when he had supporters of his among the Shia tribes come to his defense and the threat dissipated. Sadrists are also accused--again I say accused, for it has not been proven or disproven either way--of being behind the hit on Sayyid Abdel-Masjid al-Khoei. Sadr himself commented on this and blamed Sheikh al-Yaqubi, and claims to have expelled him from his movement for it; I haven't read a comment from or about Yaqubi elsewhere with respect to this, though Yaqubi has other explanations for the falling out, along with the couple other contradictory references I can find involving it, and some contradictory references with respect to the Haeri endorsement/falling out/whatever.
The Persian Sistani represents more the Shia establishment, much older than Sadr and more respected generally, also as yet a remarkably passive figure (though he's officially against the invasion, the occupation, and opposes a US-dominated gov't over Iraq). Don't see exactly how he could be called a collaborator (with exception to the fake fatwa the Khoei Foundation forged in his name), except maybe his passiveness in general.. rather than 'collaborating', he's perhaps among others in just waiting to see how things turn out and consolidate their organizations. Moving against the invaders now may not necessarily be as productive as when they can do so from a position of strength.
Since this is long and off the subject enough already, I think as long as the US/UK act as something of a lightning rod for the violent resistance (and provided Sadr doesn't get too openly pissy about the power struggles), the only area I would guess to be really dangerous for civil/ethnic war is in the north, with the Arabs/Turcomens/Turkey & the Kurds(/US?). Sort of 'low-intensity' at the moment, but a Kurdish paper claims the Arab al-Obeid tribe are talking to Turkey about their common dislike of what the Kurds & Americans are doing (WRT the latter, that being arresting their Sheikh, a leader of the 1,000,000-strong extended tribal grouping). If that blows up it probably won't stay just with northern Iraq and 'South Kurdistan', but to the north as well (Turkish-occupied Kurdistan).
As far as the Hakim murder goes, I don't really have an idea.. except I think StandWatie is on to something thinking maybe the Saudis or Kuwaitis, and I think of his as better informed than I on things. I guess by nature they don't exactly dig what Hakim stands for (them being power-loving decadent hypocrites after all, and another "Islamic Revolution", or an IR-lite, nearby would probably be a "bad influence" to their own rule).. :shrug: The argument in favour of the US being directly behind it is mprobable to me, though through the lack of such a strong figure of leadership in the Shias the occupation forces benefit the most, as well as the client states that make up Iraq's neighbors--a splintered and insecure state does quite a bit towards justifying a continued presence of the army and colonial satrap Bremer. A stable self-governing Iraqi system with benefits for Iraqis in mind--(as opposed to Western corporations that will inevitably try to take over many profitable industries, using the army to secure their hold)--would begin to ask the invaders why they're still hanging around, an instable place swallows pride and begs the invader for security. That is in the long term, for short term there is no such benefit and that's why I think of it in that sense as improbable.
BUT--if you look at the CPA's website (and I did earlier to look up a few of their decrees so far), you get the idea that everything is going just fantastic and all according to the plans of our brilliant strategists back in the homeland, Saddam is behind everything bad happening anywhere. God Bless Dear Leader Bush.
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