http://www.morganstanley.com/GEFdata/digests/20051114-mon.html#anchor0snip>
I think a lot about the so-called built-in shock absorbers of a $44 trillion global economy. And whenever I worry about the dark side of global rebalancing, I always remind myself of the countless examples of the world’s inherent resilience. That’s been especially the case in the accident-prone US over the past five and a half years. America has successfully withstood the repeated blows from a bursting of the equity bubble, a devastating terrorist attack, and an unprecedented wave of corporate accounting scandals. Of course, the examples of US resilience go back much further into time -- wars, double-digit inflation, the twin deficits of the 1980s, the hollowing out of US manufacturing, to say nothing of the stresses of social and racial tension. Time and again, a flexible US economy has proved to be extraordinarily resilient in the face of such adversity. There have been bumps in the road along the way -- recessions and bear markets for us macro folks -- but the American model has endured, taking the United States to an unparalleled position of global dominance. The rest of the world has a major stake in these accomplishments. In a US-centric global economy, America’s resilience defines the world’s resilience.
There was broad recognition at this year’s Lyford Cay conference that the US and China were likely to remain the key players on the global stage for some time to come. The US-China symbiosis was singled out for special attention in this regard. America has cut a great deal, went the argument, and so has China -- the goods-for-bonds trade was widely viewed as logical, sustainable, and in both nations’ interests. I challenged the group on this key point, underscoring the costs of this deal. From the US side, those costs are manifested in the form of record levels of household sector indebtedness, an unprecedented saving shortfall, and the mother of all current account deficits. For China, the costs of sustainability include mounting trade frictions with the US, excess credit creation (due to unsterilized currency recycling), and huge potential fiscal costs of a dollar-related depreciation of China’s official reserves. The real problem, of course, is that this co-dependency is deepening: With America’s overall national saving rate likely to fall further over the next year, the US current account deficit is likely to widen further. That means, barring a new source of capital inflows, there will be an ever-greater burden on Chinese capital to fill the void. That ups the ante on the costs of sustainability on both sides of the equation -- for the US as well as for China.
There was an interesting sidebar to this discussion -- the possibility that petro-dollars might play an increasingly important role in funding America’s ever-widening current account deficit. That could be an important twist in the global macro equation, especially since the world’s three largest surplus savers -- Japan, Germany, and China -- are making efforts to boost internal demand. Should those efforts bear fruit, the biggest current account surpluses would be shrinking at precisely the moment when the biggest deficit would be widening -- an outcome that could well put excruciating pressure on the dollar and real US interest rates. With elevated oil prices triggering roughly a $300 billion revenue windfall for the Middle East oil producers, a recycling of those flows back into dollar-denominated assets would certainly ease America’s current-account financing pressures. One of the investors present at Lyford Cay who had a good read on Middle East equity flows noted that there was little interest in the US. Another investor with a good read on the bond business suggested that there was no problem in attracting petro revenues into dollar-denominated fixed income instruments. Many viewed this as yet another example of an elastic world rising to the occasion and dealing with tough issues -- in this case, an energy shock as well as a current account financing problem.
China played a new role at this year’s Lyford Cay conference. As usual, few of the investors expressed any interest in mainland Chinese stocks. But most were confident that the Chinese growth miracle was here to stay. That’s a real switch from the sentiment expressed in years past. Since the late 1990s, my steadfast bullishness on China generally was, in fact, met with great skepticism at this conference. A banking crisis was always feared to be around the corner; the Chinese economy was always thought to be weaker than the official data indicated; and there ongoing concerns over internal stability and potential geopolitical tensions. Suddenly, those concerns have all but vanished into thin air. China is now viewed as a perma-growth story -- unlikely to succumb to any of the problems that were frequently raised in previous years.
This shift in the perception of the China factor underscored a worrisome complacency that was evident throughout most of this year’s conference. The assembled investors understood the essential requirements of today’s two-engine world economy -- that both the US and the Chinese economies had to remain in solid shape to keep the party going. Yet they were more than willing to make that leap of faith. US vulnerabilities were dismissed -- despite an energy-related slowing of personal consumption, signs of stress in housing markets, and the ever-present threat of a current-account adjustment. China’s vulnerabilities were also dismissed -- despite an export- and investment-led growth dynamic that was nearing its limit and a crack in the armor of China’s biggest source of end-market demand, the American consumer. In these respects, the Lyford Cay consensus very much mirrored the sentiment I have picked up in my recent travels around he world. Investors treat economic imbalances like pandemics -- low-probability risks that are worth worrying about but not losing sleep over. One seasoned investor went even further, welcoming the discussion of thin-tailed events as the “healthy skepticism that keeps the US strong.”
more...