Action alert from StudyCaliforniaBallots.org
StudyCaliforniaBallots.org will also send another alert to ask for
people to go to Board of Supervisors Meeting Oct.17, 2006 9:30am to
speak out on this
ACTION ALERT FOR UPCOMING NOVEMBER ELECTION LA COUNTY 2006
Please WRITE or FAX to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors,
and your elected officials and CALL FOR EARLY VOTING to be STOPPED.
"Michael Antonovich"
[email protected] (213) 974-5555 office (213) 974-1010 fax
"Yvonne Burke"
[email protected] (213) 974-2222 office (213) 680-3283 fax
"Don Knabe"
[email protected] 213-974-4444 office 213-626-6941 fax
"Gloria Molina"
[email protected] (213)974-4111(213) 613-1739 fax
"Zev Yaroslavsky"
[email protected] (213) 974-3333 office (213) 625-7360 fax
Dear Supervisors Antonovich, Burke, Knabe, Molina and Yaroslavsky:
I. Please cancel Early Voting On Electronic Machines
I am writing to urge you to cancel early voting (which is set to begin
October 25, 2006) in Los Angeles County. The LA County Registrar has
been offering Early Voting with the Diebold Accuvote-TSx machines
which have a well- documented history of failure in security,
accuracy, and function. (1), (2)
II. LA County Registrar of Voters Continues to advocate for Electronic
voting systems (DREs & GEMS Tabulators) despite overwhelming evidence
of problems
Despite the evidence that these machines are a blight to our elections
process, the LA County Registrar continues to use them and actively
promote their use by the voting public.
As recently as June 21, 2005, in testimony before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration hearing on "Voter Verification
in the Federal Electoral Process," the LA County Registrar testified
that she has expanded the use of DREs ("Direct Record Electronic" aka
electronic voting machines) in LA County "due to extremely positive
voter response." The Registrar further stated that "voters
overwhelmingly express great enthusiasm and preference for voting on
electronic equipment."
During the Early Voting period for the November 2005 election, the
Registrar distributed leaflets at Early Voting locations that stated
that "the DRE equipment tested on March 2, 2004 recorded the votes
cast with 100% accuracy" while omitting existing information that
documents numerous failures and high potential for security breaches
with the very same equipment, the Diebold Accuvote-TS. The situation
is so dire that Voter Action, a citizen nonprofit election justice
group, is pursuing lawsuits in eight states including California,
against the continued use of these machines. (8)
The current Early Voting Touchscreen FAQ sheet for the November 2006
election, again fails to inform voters of the known failure and
security problems with the Diebold Accuvote-TSx model and the Diebold
GEMS tabulator used for Early Voting in Los Angeles County. In
addition to the documented software problems (2), (6), it has been
confirmed that the TSx paper trail printers experience printing
failures as often as 30% of the time (7). The LA County Registrar,
actively advocating for DREs to be used without a paper trail at the
above mentioned June 21, 2005 Senate hearings, herself, compiled a
list of problems with these machines:
"Significant Costs - The initial cost of attaching printers to DREs
adds 25-30% to the already significant DRE purchase price. This does
not take into consideration the ongoing costs to purchase paper for
every election and the cost of storage (22 months is required for
federal elections) of tens of thousands of paper ballot receipts. Talk
about trees dying in vain! 2-13 hours of continuous usage on election
day- undoubtedly this will result in printer/paper jams. Even if such
problems are miniscule, a small percentage of equipment failure will
impact the ability to use the VVPAT (Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail)
for auditing or recount purposes and undermine confidence in the
accuracy of election results...Difficulty for Poll Workers -
Simplicity, not complexity, assures successful elections. Additional
poll worker training requirements invites problems.
The Registrar values convenience and streamlining over an auditable
record of the vote, and perhaps unintentionally makes the case against
DREs altogether while attempting to argue that paper trails serve no
purpose:
"Voter Delays - Adding another step to the voting process will require
additional time to print out the results for each voter even if the
voter does not glance at or review the printout. Anecdotal evidence in
Nevada indicates that very few voters looked at the printout as voter
review occurs conveniently and more easily on the DRE screen. The
voting process needs to be streamlined, not delayed..." (9)
"Receipts are Meaningless - If DRE programming can be manipulated,
that same logic dictates that the programming could be surreptitiously
altered to change election results after the paper ballot receipt is
printed. "(9)
The paper trail is supposed to be the auditable record of the vote and
is of such great importance that SB 370 was passed into law in
California as of August 2005. The fact that "fully electronic systems
do not provide any way that the voter (or election officials) can
truly verify that the ballot cast corresponds to that being recorded,
transmitted, or tabulated "(10) is of dire consequence and is a prime
reason why these machines, with or without a paper trail, should not
be used for our elections.
III. LA County Board of Supervisors should have been provided with
better information so they could make more informed decision as to
whether to approve budget for Early Voting
The LA County Registrar has a responsibility to include the
detrimental information on the FAQ sheet and at CVOC meetings,
national hearings, and all other public business. Provided with this
information, it would be unconscionable for the Board of Supervisors
to approve a budget for Early Voting using DRE voting machines and the
GEMS Tabulator. The fact acknowledged by the registrar, that voters
cannot even be assured that the paper trail printed by a DRE
necessarily reflects their true vote, means that DRE machines are
noncompliant with SB 370. The responsible action with this information
alone would be to return these machines to the vendor for a full
refund, plus compensation for the costs incurred by their use thus
far.
IV. LA County Registrar claims no tabulation problems yet leaves Early
Voting and Absentee results out of 1% Mandatory Manual Audit and does
not sort according to precinct
Making matters much worse, the LA County Registrar claims that "
Equally important is the fact that we have experienced no technical
problems with the tabulation of votes with the DRE equipment.
Electronic voting has proven to be reliable, accurate and
well-accepted by our voters" (9) yet the Registrar never conducts
audits according to the California election which would need to be
done to support this claim. Early Voting ballots are not sorted
according to precinct, nor are they included in the mandatory 1%
manual audit. Because the early voting totals are mixed in with
absentee totals, irregularities could go undetected in a pool of votes
large enough to swing an election. Also, the Registrar never prints
out or posts results of Early Voting at the early voting sites and
never posts them publicly anywhere else. Also, no chain of custody for
the TSx machines or memory cards has been published for the public to
see.
IV. LA County DREs have experienced high rate of paper jams.
Registrar shuts down 1 and only audit ever of a DRE in LA County.
Violates California Election Code.
An attempt to audit results from only one of the Diebold TSx machine
used in the June 2006 Primary Election revealed that the printer,
which is supposed to create an auditable record of the votes, had
jammed 5 times. Considering that this particular machine had a mere 63
ballots cast on it, this high printer failure rate (8%) does not
inspire confidence. The Registrar's action in this case was to stop
the audit of that machine. In violation of California Election Code
15360, the Registrar then, as in previous elections, excluded all the
votes cast on absentee ballots as well as, in violation of California
Election Code 19253(b), all early voting ballots cast on the TSx
machines, from the mandatory 1% manual audit.
V. With low voter turnout in LA County, no need for Early Voting.
Dangerous Diebold GEMS Tabulator used with TSx can change votes in
seconds without leaving a trace.
In addition to the issues presented above, we do not believe our tax
money should go to support a service for which there is no need.
Approximately 1.02% of LA County voters who voted on June 6, 2006
(about 20,000 voters) actually cast their votes at an Early Voting
location. That is the equivalent of about 20 precincts out of the
5000+ precincts in LA County. Not only is this service very costly --
it has been reported that there is possibly as high as a 1000%
increase in the cost of conducting elections with new computerized
voting wares (3)--, but it is unnecessary-- with 27% voter turnout in
the last election (4); and, most significantly, it threatens the
accuracy and legitimacy of our election results. As if that's not bad
enough, the voting results gathered from the Diebold-TSx machines are
transferred to the Diebold GEMS tabulator in which votes may be
changed by unexamined software without a trace (5), (6).
VI. Cancellation of Early Voting would improve accuracy and security
of elections in LA County.
Cancellation of Early Voting would remove the need for the use of the
Diebold GEMS tabulator, and the Diebold Accuvote-TSx equipment, and
thus significantly decrease the cost and potential security problems
for our elections in the largest jurisdiction in the United States.
It is an outrage that voters should have to navigate this mine field
of voting "choices."
PLEASE CANCEL EARLY VOTING NOW!
Footnotes:
(1) "Initial report undersold e-vote snafus", by Ian Hoffman, Oakland
Tribune, 08/03/2005.
(2)
http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/1954/19673.html?1144430968(3)
http://www.votetrustusa.org/ index.php?optionfiltered=com_content&task=view&id=1111&Itemid=113.
(4) Voter turnout in the June Primary was 27.44%. 314,824 absentee
ballots (which includes both mail-in, and early voting) out of a
total of 1,050,076 total votes were cast. Approximately 20,000
voters voted on Early Voting TSx machines.
(5) Devastating Hack
Proven
http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/ 1954/15595.html
(6) Compuware Corporation. Diebold Direct Recording Electronic (DRE)
Technical Security Re-Assessment Report (prepared for the Ohio
Secretary of State, August 2004).
http:// www.sos.state.oh.us/sos//hava/files/DieboldReassessment.pdf
(7)
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=96&Itemid=30(8)
http://www.voteraction.org(9) Testimony of Conny McCormack, June 21, 2005 to the U.S. Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration hearing on Voter Verification
in the Federal Electoral Process
(10) Testimony by Rebecca Mercuri, Ph.D. Presented to the U.S. House
of Representatives Committee on Science Subcommittee on Environment,
Technology, & Standards Tuesday, May 22, 2001, Room 2318, Rayburn
House Office Building
thanks to diva77