Trying to read your reply as fairly as possible, I just spent the afternoon re-reading the 83 page chapter, "The Dual Society in Mandatory Palestine" from Tessler's "A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict". I read it a few years ago but this time a paid more attention.
Thank you for taking the time. Tessler is a good read. I think he omitted a few things here and there, but the work is solid to a large degree. I would also recommend the following books:
The End of the Palestine Mandate by Roger Louis and Robert Stookey
Uri Milstein's Four volume series "History of the War of Independence"
Kimmerling & Migdal's "The Palestinian People"
I now see the question of Palestinian Nationalism as more complex than I did previously. Early on, (1920) it seems there was a strong desire and even an expectation among Palestinians that Palestine should rightfully become part of Greater Syria. They commonly referred to it as Southern Syria. Political and family ties and political clubs were formed to promote that idea which seemed to dominate.
But a desire for Palestinian independence was growing. By the 3rd Arab Congress (1923) such Syrian talk was completely replaced by a focus on Palestinian nationalism. This increased further as Jewish immigration steadily rose and more Arabs sold land to the new arrivals. The idea of a Palestine state took hold completely and was firmly entrenched by 1934.
About this time the Grand Mufti taking advantage of the strong feeling to expand his political power added a strong Muslim focus to the already strong anti-Jew theme of nationalism. Palestinian Arabs (mostly Sunni Muslims) were duly inflamed by this and revolted (the Arab Uprising of 1937-39).
The Uprising consisted of many atrocities mostly Arab against Jews. The Arabs killed mostly Jews. The British killed mostly Arab trying to prevent that. The Haganah and other Jewish self-defense forces expanded their influence and power during this time.The Brits eventually quelled the uprising and by 1939 left the nationalist movement in disarray.
With the Uprising over, as WWII approached, the Brits attempted to appease the Arabs in Palestine and surrounding countries to gain their assistance during the coming conflict. They limited Jewish immigration and caused the deaths of untold Jews who wanted to get out of Germany but were generally unwelcome in other Western nations. During 1932-1939 only 806 Jews made it to England. The US had a more liberal policy but still only 4621 were admitted during that same period. Palestine was the only real chance of survival for most of Europe's Jews.
After the Uprising the Mufti escapes to Lebanon. This leaves a vacuum that is filled by other Arab states who maintain their position of influence over Palestine during WWII (1939-1945) i.e. no real nationalist movement existed in Palestine during that period. Although by 1945 there were 6 nationalist parties in Palestine none were dominant and all were fragmented.
A couple of differences:
- The idea of pan-Syria fell out of the picture for several reasons including the loss of communication and economic ties to Damascus with the recent French conquest. Plus Faisal's own failures and effective sellout of the Palestinians (consider this from the Palestinian viewpoint) at the Balfour agreement left a very sour note.
- The Grand Mufti did not bring a strong Muslim focus, if anything, he was cautious and tried to play both sides. The person who did this was Sheikh Qassam and his Istiqhal party which was modeled after the Moroccan version. Also, it was not Arab vs. Jew and British vs. Arab. The Haganah/Palmach was quite well known for it's forays into Arab villages. Also, there was quite a bit of infighting with the Arabs over which group was to be dominant. The British for the most part played both sides.
- I don't think it was a matter of hatred of Jews for their religion, but more because they represented a colonizing influence. It was one of the great ironies that Jews who were considered outcasts by the ultra-nationalists of Europe would be considered the epitome of Western colonization.
- Most of the Arab differences were cemented during the Arab Revolt of 1936-39. The moderate Nashashibi family and its allies suffered severely at the hands of those loyal to the Grand Mufti. Thus Per Uri Milstein, by 1947, 80% of all Palestinians generally regarded the Grand Mufti as their nominal leader. So when he spoke of and for Palestinian Independence in 1947 at the Arab League, he was representing the Palestinian people.
- The Arab Revolt ended for a variety of reasons including the growing fatigue for violence and the British negotiation of the White Paper. The British were indeed more inclined to negotiate as they did see the start of WWII. As for Jewish immigration, I read somewhere that while the number appeared to be more limiting, the British actually chose a number which still exceeded the Jewish Agency's capacity to actually absorb new immigrants.
Even before the 1939 paper, the number of Jews who were immigrating to Palestine/Israel were severely constrained by the logistics of Palestine, but also by the fact that Palestine was not the preferred destination of many emigrants. I will however, remain ashamed of the anti-Semitic immigration polices of such places as the US and England at this time though which were crimes against humanity even by the standards of the day.
A theme that seems to pervade the history of Palestine during this pre-Partition period according to Tessler - was that nationalism, while always part of Palestinian aspirations, seemed always to take a back seat to inter-Arab politics and power struggles on one hand - and a growing hatred of Jews on the other. For those reasons and others, it seems that a coherent nationalist movement never really materialized - at least one that was willing and able to set aside parochial, clan and religious differences to pursue the common goal of Palestinian independence and eventually, statehood.
So, rather than say that there was no real nationalist movement, I'd now say that there was. It was just poorly organized and focused. It was never the equal of the Jewish need to finally establish a Jewish state - which literally became a "do or die" task for them by WWII thanks to Adolph Hitler.
The same is technically true of Zionism which was heavily fragmented in its implementation. At its core definition, Zionism is more or less a struggle for respect, what differs is the means to that end though often times this means is often conflated to mean Zionism. At the time of Israeli Independence you had quite a few competing notions of how to implement Zionism of which Nationalism was an affair not wholly committed to by World Jewry. Even at the time of the declaration of Independence, the number of Jews who were in favor of this option were still less than 50% of the world population. This included much of the haredi and others in the ultra-orthodox community who slowly changed their opinion over time so that effectively at this time, a strong majority support the notion with only small groups remaining who do not support it. One such group who has remained steadfast in this is the very small, radical fringe Neturei Karta group.
The main difference between the Palestinians and the Jews were that the Jews, particularly the Ashkenazim from the West, were better able to not only interact and lobby for their interests, but also able to express and understand the mechanics of statehood. Had it been dependent upon the Mizrahim who were much less organized than the Palestinians, then it is likely that Israel would not have been founded.
For many years there existed (and I believe still exists to some degree though there have been major public efforts following revelations such as the 1995 Baby adoption scandal and the attitudes that were displayed in those events) cultural and political disparity between the Mizrahim and the Askhenazim.
The Palestinian Arabs were surrounded by other Arab states which at least offered some support and a chance of a fall-back option for them, which I think perhaps gave them less motivation that the Israelis. The Jews were faced with virtual extinction. The Palestinian Arabs saw nationalism more as a question of politics and divided allegiances by that time.
I see this period as dominated by survival instincts rather than moral issues. I think that all changed in November 29, 1947 when the Partition Plan passed the UN. At that time things became deadly serious for both sides and each side would have to live with the moral decisions they made between then and May 15, of 1948 when the Brits pulled out - of how they would respond to those events.
Specifically I think the decision of Israel to reluctantly accept it - and the Arab decision to try to destroy the new state of Israel, first with a Palestinian army augmented by recruits from surrounding Arab states, and then by the armies of the Arab League itself on May 15 - is where the major moral difference lies and where the stage was set for virtually all the conflict that has come after that fateful date.
- Morality? We went through this before. There is no morality in war, it is amoral. Individuals made moral and immoral choices throughout the campaigns, but there is no such thing as a state ethos or conscious and as such it is an error to try and make moral judgment against the people. As for Israel reluctantly accepting it? No, I do not agree with that as the very idea of any statehood was something to not be missed. I also want to point out there were moderates in the Palestinian camp who did advocate for the partition, but these were effectively silenced by the dominance at that time of the Grand Mufti and the rather strong hubris and nationalism which was sweeping the Palestinians at that time.
However, I do think it very sad that some sort of agreement was not reached which allowed for the two nations to be born in peace and not war. I also pity both nations as they both often seen periods where small groups of small men were able to exert sufficient forces at various key and leveragable moments.
Minor quibble, the initial Palestinian Army consisted of four main elements.
- The Arab Liberation Army consisting of 4,000 men from both Palestine and neighboring countries. This group was the one trained in Syria and equipped by the Arab League. They operated in the Galilee/Samaria areas.
- 3,000 men, mostly Palestinian, operated in the Jaffa/Lydda/Ramleh area and were lead by a German trained leader by the name of Hassan Salemah.
- The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt was the source of 1500 men who fought in and around what is now Ashkelon
- 5,000 men, mostly Palestinian, under a relative of the Grand Mufti who fought in/around Jerusalem.
While there were indeed foreign elements and supply, the Haganah and Irgun also received outside volunteers and supplies. By the time the Arab armies entered the picture, the war was pretty much already decided. The only remaining issue was where the armistice lines would be.
Even so, it really doesn't matter. Using the US as an example, the US used quite a number of European volunteers and ultimately European regulars in its fight.
L-
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