Reply #14: Oh, Karynnj -- my primary just took another twist (sigh)

[beachmom]

http://www.cio.com.au/index.php/id;558873322;fp;4;fpid;21

Link not working -- here is direct to the commenter; his link works:

http://www.dailykos.com/comments/2006/6/4/91527/93057/168#c168

When votes are cast and recorded electronically, the way to conduct a recount (and to tally in the first place) is to run a tape off each individual machine and then compare those totals against the number of people who checked in to vote. While that method will reveal discrepancies in the event of some types of voter fraud — multiple voting, for example — there’s no way to ensure that the votes were recorded the way that voters actually cast them. “In a fully electronic system, I can’t confirm my vote, and that’s not a proper democratic election,” says Rebecca Mercuri, a research fellow at Harvard University’s John F Kennedy School of Government who wrote her doctoral dissertation on electronic voting systems. Mercuri is one of the most outspoken critics of e-voting and the vendors that sell the equipment. She and many other computer scientists believe the best way to mitigate the audit problem is to combine electronic machines with good, old-fashioned paper by including a voter-verified paper ballot.

How it would work: With touch-screen systems, voters activate ballots using a PIN or smart card given to them by election workers at the polling place; they activate the screen, select their candidates, verify their choices via a paper printout and then electronically cast their votes. To preserve anonymity and protect against fraud, voters leave the paper behind, either at the machine itself or in something that could resemble an old-fashioned ballot box. The machines capture, tally and transmit the data, but the paper provides a backup.

Pros and cons: Proponents of paper duplicates say they are an essential addition to e-voting for two reasons: They provide voters with a physical confirmation of their vote, and election officials can use them in the event of a recount.

The vendor community doesn’t like it. “We oppose the idea of a voter-verified paper trail,” says Harris Miller, president of the trade group Information Technology Association of America. Introducing paper into the mix, he says, defeats the improved efficiency and reliability e-voting promises. “There was never a golden age when paper ballots were accurately counted,” Miller says. Adding paper to e-voting will only make the process of administering elections more costly and time-consuming without improving accuracy, opponents assert.

Okay, I disagree vehemently with Harris on this. The above link is an IT link, so it's legit.