Reply #50: Two questions about Darwinian evolution

[Stunster]

It strikes me that there is a sense in which Intelligent Design must be a scientific hypothesis, even if it's one for which there is as yet no evidence (a claim which, of course, its proponents dispute).

The reason for saying so is that if Darwinian evolution is

A) a scientific hypothesis

and

B) one that asserts or entails that the evolution of species did not occur by intelligent design,

then the claim of 'no intelligent design' must be falsifiable. But what would falsify it is strong evidence of intelligent design. However, if nothing is allowed even to count as evidence of intelligent design, then the 'no intelligent design' claim is not falsifiable. But then it would not itself be a scientific claim, since one generally accepted mark of scientific claims is that they are falsifiable.

In other words, if Darwinian evolution is a genuine scientific theory, then it must be the case that something could count as evidence against it. And if it includes as a core component of the theory the denial of intelligent design, then it must be the case that something could count as evidence of intelligent design.

Now, it is often charged against the ID proponents that they don't come up with anything that would be evidence for their hypothesis that can't be accounted for by Darwinian mechanisms. But then Darwinians don't come up with anything that would be evidence for their hypothesis that can't be accounted for by the ID hypothesis.

It is not as if evolutionary biology is a completed inquiry. It is an ongoing scientific research program, with some things that are still to be explained. So the question arises, at what point, if any, do we decide that this research program is never going to be satisfactorily completed?

After all, if ID proponents point out that X has yet to be explained by Darwinian mechanisms, meaning that it has not yet been shown that X actually arose by Darwinian mechanisms, is it really sufficient to say, indefinitely, in reply "Well, yes, we haven't yet shown that X arose by Darwinian mechanisms. But we Darwinians think it's possible it did, and you can't prove that it's impossible"?

If the Darwinian can say "it might have occurred by Darwinian mechanisms" forever, then how is this different empirically from saying "it might have been designed that way"? Surely one has to specify, as part of the theory, what would count as evidence against it were it to be discovered?

This charge is usually made against the ID theorists. But it seems to me that the Darwinians are in the same boat---they have to specify, as part of their theory, what would count as evidence of intelligent design, were it to be discovered. Because if they don't specify empirical criteria of falsifiability, then they're really not much better off than the ID theorist. But, ironically, as soon as they do specify such criteria, then that would make ID a scientific hypothesis in the sense that there would be empirical observations which even Darwinians would, ex hypothesi, agree in advance to count as confirmatory of intelligent design, were they to occur.

My question is, therefore, have Darwinians ever collectively individually specified, as part of their own theory, what would count for them as evidence of intelligent design? Because if they haven't, then it seems to me that their own theory cannot be falsified, and hence cannot be scientific in the full sense of the term.

Of course, at the moment, it seems that since there is no agreement as to what would count as evidence for or against it, Intelligent Design cannot be confirmed or falsified and hence, to that extent, it cannot be a scientific theory. But my question is asking in essence, whose fault is that? If Darwinians don't specify what they would consider as falsifying their theory, then that just means, not that there isn't or couldn't be empirical evidence for ID, but merely that Darwinians are never going to count anything as such evidence.

One evidential criterion that has been proposed by ID theorists is the notion of 'irreducible complexity'. So, my second question is this:

Regardless of whether anything has been shown to be irreducibly complex in the relevant sense (and I realize that Darwinians contend that nothing has been so shown), would Darwinians accept that if something were to be shown to be irreducibly complex, this would count as evidence for ID, and hence would confer upon ID the status of being an empirically supported scientific hypothesis? And if not irreducible complexity, what else might count as an evidential criterion for disconfirming the Darwinian theory?