Reply #28: One more of 8,313 examples of conflict with Perm. Military Intel Bureacracy

[EPIC1934]

"(Senator) Mike Mansfield said of Kennedy's response to his critique: 'Presidend Kennedy didn't waste words. He was pretty sparse with his language. But it was not ususual for him to shift position. There is no doubt that he had shifted definitely and unequivocally on Vietnam but he never had the chance to put the plan into effect (footnote 159, chapter 3)

Kennedy was now on the alert to remove any obstacles from the way to a future withdrawal from Vietnam. On January 25, 1963, he phoned Roger Hilsman, the head of State Department Intelligence, at his home to complain about front-page box in the New York Times on a U.S. General visiting Vietnam. In what Hilsman rememberd as "decidedly purple language," (160) Kennedy took him to task. He ordered Hilsman to stop military visits that seemed to increase the US commitment to Vietnam.

Kennedy said, "That is exactly what I dont want to do. Remember Laos," he emphasized. "The United States must keep a low profile in Vietnam so we can negotiate its neutralization like we did in Laos" (161)



After listening to the angry president, Hilsman pointed out that he had not authority as a State Department officer to deny a Pentagon general permission to visit Vietnam.

"Oh," said Kennedy and slammed down the phone. That afternoon the president issued National Security Action Memorandum Number 217, forbidding "high ranking military and civilian personnel" from going to South Vietnam without being cleared by the State Department office where Hilsman worked(162). This action by JFK, reigning in the miliatary's travel to Vietnam, for the sakeof a neutralization pollcy, did not please the Penatgon. JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters, pp. 124-5.