Reply #15: Thanks for posting the links - I did want to read this

[LdyGuique]

First of all, Luntz' analysis in the introduction is thorough and valid. He's not bashing Demos -- he's analyzing election strategies that go back 25 years and he's deadon.

His analysis of voter perceptions about the differences between Bush and Kerry is valid. Regardless of political attacks, Kerry was not strong on a consistent message of why HE would make a better president and what he would do differently.

The components of the Bush victory and Kerry defeat all boil down to a single candidate attribute that the President had in abundance but was AWOL from the Kerry campaign: "says what he means and means what he says." In every state and national survey we conducted in 2004, no desired presidential attribute ever scored higher, and nowhere was Bush stronger and Kerry weaker. In every focus group I moderated, voters would plead for candidates who spoke from the heart and not from some speechwriter's notes.

And nowhere does the image of straight talk matter more than in areas of security: national security, economic security and personal security. John Kerry had had two full years to articulate a concise position on terrorism, the economy, and issues involving values. He couldn't do it. George W. Bush and Dick Cheney did it every single day.

Even during the three Presidential debates, the Massachusetts Senator gave answers that left uncommitted voters in my focus groups both confused and mystified. His critique of the current Administration's failures clearly did political damage, but the electorate could not define exactly what he would do differently. What Kerry did not realize was that referencing "a plan" roughly two dozen times over 90-minutes is different than actua11y having one. In a post-9/11 world, voters simply could not elect a President whose position on the nation's most salient issues were unknown even to himself.

I think putting Dean in charge of the DNC is a step in the right direction and while the following applies mostly for HR elections, it's valid overall.

Strategy: Acknowledge the complexity of your district and the challenges you face should the political climate turn sour. Too often Members in close elections acknowledge their electoral weakness after the election but don't address it until it is too late. If you received less than 57% of the vote, your campaign should begin today: a 20-month effort that includes fundraising, voter contact, message development and grassroots operations. And all of it should be measured on a monthly basis.

Luntz is not a nutjob -- he lays out good analysis and strategy that any political candidacy can benefit from, either by following some of it or by creating an effective strategy against specific strategies suggested.

If we want to win the presidency in 2008 AND have an effective administration, we need to take back the House in 2006 and narrow the gap in the Senate.

http://usconservatives.about.com/library/bl2006senraces.htm">Here's a list of Senators up for re-election in 2006. It's time to stop fretting about who may or may not be a Presidential candidate and to get behind Congressional races in 2006.

I think it's also time to take a more mature approach on any litmus tests about those holding Democratic or Republican seats -- it is the very rare candidate whom any of us could wholeheartedly support as being a mirror image of all of our political beliefs. Politics is the art of compromise and most candidates will move themselves towards the center or moderate viewpoint in order to garner broad support.