Reply #46: Actually by October of 2002, Clark was supporting the Levin amendment.....and it is

[FrenchieCat]

not the same blank check resolution that the Bush-Lieberman resolution represented. By then it was a known that something was gonna pass...the question was what?

The difference between those 2 resolution and the Biden-Lugar one?

The Levin amendment would have forced the Bush regime to COME BACK to congress for a 2nd vote AFTER a vote by the UN security council.

The Biden-Lugar resolution would have authorize to disarm Saddam, but not depose him.

So no, Clark would not have voted for "that" resolution....
for clarification...

http://www.rapidfire-silverbullets.com/2006/12/the_iraq_war_resolution_did_cl.html#more

10/09/02: Don't Let Congress Ratify Bush Preemption Doctrine

UPDATE: Senate
If Sen. Daschle and Senate Democratic leaders cannot come to an agreement on the rules for debate by the end of today, then a cloture vote is likely. Cloture is a method of limiting debate or ending a filibuster in the Senate which takes at least 60 Senators. If a cloture vote carries, then it will deny Senators like Sen. Robert Byrd from filibustering. Thirty hours of floor debate is expected in the Senate, making an actual vote likely on Monday or Tuesday of next week.

The BUSH-LIEBERMAN WAR RESOLUTION is the Senate version of the Bush-Gephardt War Resolution.

The BIDEN-LUGAR AMENDMENT would authorize the use of force only to disarm Saddam Hussein, not depose him.

The LEVIN AMENDMENT, introduced by Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI), would curtail the broad powers provided by the Bush-Lieberman War Resolution by requiring the President to first secure a UN Security Council authorization of the use of force in Iraq.
It would require a second vote in the Senate pending action or inaction by the UN Security Council.

Senators should be urged to vote for the only resolution that would mandate a 2nd vote be taken before the President can launch a war against Iraq. Thus, implore your Senators to vote YES to the Levin Amendment and vote NO to the Bush-Lieberman War Resolution – S.J.Res.46.
Don’t give up! To resist is to win!
Send Free Faxes to Congress from True Majority
http://www.epic-usa.org/Default.aspx?tabid=102 10/09/02

Also note that the two "selected" paragraphs you posted are not the sum of the total of Clark's views on Iraq IN 2002.

SO note this here....

USA Today editorial from September 9, 2002, in which Clark wrote:
"Despite all of the talk of "loose nukes," Saddam doesn't have any, or, apparently, the highly enriched uranium or plutonium to enable him to construct them.

Unless there is new evidence, we appear to have months, if not years, to work out this problem."
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2002-09-09-oplede_x.htm

Clark's September 26, 2002 testimony to the Armed Services Committee, in which he stated:
"The resolution need not at this point authorize the use of force, but simply agree on the intent to authorize the use of force, if other measures fail..."

"...in the near term, time is on our side , and we should endeavor to use the UN if at all possible. This may require a period of time for inspections or even the development of a more intrusive inspection program, if necessary backed by force. This is foremost an effort to gain world-wide legitimacy for US concerns and possible later action, but it may also impede Saddam's weapons programs and further constrain his freedom of action. "

In his Op-Ed dated October 10, 2002, "Let's Wait to Attack." Clark states:
"In the near term, time is on our side. Saddam has no nuclear weapons today, as far as we know, and probably won't gain them in the next few months.

....there is still time for dialogue before we act."

http://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/10/timep.iraq.viewpoints.tm/

Gene Lyons interview on Wes Clark with Buzzflash-

Going all the way back to the summer of 2002, I got a sense of how strong his feelings about Iraq were. Long before it was clear that the administration was really going to sell a war on Iraq, when it was just a kind of a Republican talking point, early in the summer of 2002, Wesley Clark was very strongly opposed to it. He thought it was definitely the wrong move. He conveyed that we'd be opening a Pandora's box that we might never get closed again. And he expressed that feeling to me, in a sort of quasi-public way. It was a Fourth of July party and a lot of journalists were there, and there were people listening to a small group of us talk. There wasn't an audience, there were just several people around. There was no criticism I could make that he didn't sort of see me and raise me in poker terms. Probably because he knew a lot more about it than I did. And his experience is vast, and his concerns were deep.
http://www.buzzflash.com/interviews/03/10/int03221.html


On August 29, 2002, Clark said regarding a proposed invasion of Iraq, "Well, taking it to the United Nations doesn't put America's foreign policy into the hands of the French. What you have to do as the United States is you have to get other nations to commit and come in with you, and so you've got to provide the evidence, and the convincing of the French and the French public, and the leadership elite. Look, there's a war fever out there right now in some quarters of some of the leadership elements in this country, apparently, because I keep hearing this sense of urgency and so forth. Where is that coming from? The vice president said that today he doesn't know when they're going to get nuclear weapons. They've been trying to get nuclear weapons for -- for 20 years.So if there's some smoking gun, if there's some really key piece of information that hasn't been shared publicly, maybe they can share it with the French." CNN, 8/29/02

On August 29, 2002, Clark said, regarding a possible invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, "I think -- but I think that underneath, what you're going to have is you're going to have more boiling in the street. You're going to have deeper anger and you're going to feed the recruitment efforts of Al Qaeda. And this is the key point, I think, that we're at here. The question is what's the greater threat? Three thousand dead in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon underscore the fact that the threat we're facing primarily is Al Qaeda. We have to work the Iraq problem around dealing with Al Qaeda. And the key thing about dealing with Al Qaeda is, we can't win that war alone." CNN, 8/29/02

On August 29, 2002, Clark said, regarding a possible invasion of Iraq, "My perspective would be I'd like to see us slow down the rush to go after Saddam Hussein unless there's some clear convincing evidence that we haven't had shared with the public that he's right on the verge of getting nuclear weapons. CNN, 8/29/02

On August 30, 2002, Clark said, regarding a possible invasion of Iraq, "Going after Iraq right now is at best a diversion, and at worst it risks the possibility of strengthening Al Qaeda and undercutting our coalition at a critical time. So at the strategic level, I think we have to keep our eye on the ball and focus on the number one strategic priority. There are a lot of other concerns as well, but that's the main one." CNN, 8/30/02

On August 30, 2002, Clark said, regarding a possible invasion of Iraq, "It seems that way to me. It seems that this would supercharge the opinion, not necessarily of the elites in the Arab world, who may bow to the inevitability of the United States and its power, but the radical groups in the Middle East, who are looking for reasons and gaining more recruits every time the United States makes a unilateral move by force. They will gain strength from something like this. We can well end up in Iraq with thousands of military forces tied down, and a worse problem in coping with a war on terror here in the United States or Europe, or elsewhere around the world." CNN, 8/30/02

September 16, 2002:
Clark said Congress shouldn't give a "blank check," to Use Force Against Iraq.

On September 16, 2002, Clark said, regarding Iraq and possible Congressional authorization to use force, "Don't give a blank check. Don't just say, you are authorized to use force. Say what the objectives are. Say what the limitations are, say what the constraints and restraints are. What is it that we, the United States of America, hope to accomplish in this operation?" CNN 9/16/02


WOODRUFF: How much difference does it make, the wording of these resolution or resolutions that Congress would pass in terms of what the president is able to do after?

CLARK: I think it does make a difference because I think that Congress, the American people's representatives, can specify what it is they hope that the country will stand for and what it will do.

So I think the -- what people say is, don't give a blank check. Don't just say, you are authorized to use force. Say what the objectives are. Say what the limitations are, say what the constraints and restraints are. What is it that we, the United States of America, hope to accomplish in this operation.

And I think that the support will be stronger and it will be more reliable and more consistent if we are able to put the specifics into the resolution.
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/16/ip.00.html

On September 23, 2002, Clark said, regarding Iraq and possible Congressional authorization for the use of force, "When you're talking about American men and women going and facing the risk we've been talking about this afternoon... you want to be sure that you're using force and expending American blood and lives in treasure as the ultimate last resort. Not because of a sense of impatience with the arcane ways of international institutions." Senate Committee on Armed Forces 9/23/02
http://armedservices.house.gov/openingstatementsandpressreleases/107thcongress/02-09-26clark.html

On October 5, 2002, Clark said, regarding debate on Congressional authorization for war against Iraq, "The way the debate has emerged, it's appeared as though to the American people, at least to many that talk to me, as though the administration jumped to the conclusion that it wanted war first and then the diplomacy has followed." CNN 10/5/02

On January 23, 2003, Clark said, regarding the case the United States had made for war against Iraq to the United Nations, "There are problems with the case that the U.S. is making, because the U.S. hasn't presented publicly the clear, overwhelming sense of urgency to galvanize the world community to immediate military action now."CNN 1/23/03

All CNN quotes located here.... http://www.clark04.com/faq/iraq.html

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There were some of our prominent leaders who chose to listen to the wise words of Wes Clark, and reacted the better for it!

Here's is Ted Kennedy on Larry King pretty recently....

KING: Why did you vote against?

KENNEDY: Well, I'm on the Armed Services Committee and I was inclined to support the administration when we started the hearings in the Armed Services Committee. And, it was enormously interesting to me that those that had been -- that were in the armed forces that had served in combat were universally opposed to going.

I mean we had Wes Clark testify in opposition to going to war at that time. You had General Zinni. You had General (INAUDIBLE). You had General Nash. You had the series of different military officials, a number of whom had been involved in the Gulf I War, others involved in Kosovo and had distinguished records in Vietnam, battle-hardened combat military figures. And, virtually all of them said no, this is not going to work and they virtually identified...

KING: And that's what moved you?

KENNEDY: And that really was -- influenced me to the greatest degree. And the second point that influenced me was in the time that we were having the briefings and these were classified. They've been declassified now. Secretary Rumsfeld came up and said "There are weapons of mass destruction north, south, east and west of Baghdad." This was his testimony in the Armed Services Committee.

And at that time Senator Levin, who is an enormously gifted, talented member of the Armed Services Committee said, "Well, we're now providing this information to the inspectors aren't we?" This is just before the war. "Oh, yes, we're providing that." "But are they finding anything?" "No."
snip
There were probably eight Senators on the Friday before the Thursday we voted on it. It got up to 23. I think if that had gone on another -- we had waited another ten days, I think you may have had a different story.
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0604/20/lkl.01.html

and Sen. Levin, who showed up with Clark at a WesPAC fundraiser a few months ago....here's what he said on the floor of the Senate BEFORE THE IWR VOTE when he submitted his own resolution THAT WASN'T A BLANK CHECK...:

"General Clark, the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, who testified at the same hearing, echoed the views of General Shalikashvili and added "we need to be certain we really are working through the United Nations in an effort to strengthen the institution in this process and not simply checking a block."
http://www.truthout.org/docs_02/10.05B.levin.dont.p.htm

and the late great Sen. Paul Wellstone–
“As General Wes Clark, former Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe has recently noted, a premature go-it-alone invasion of Iraq "would super-charge recruiting for Al Qaida." http://www.wellstone.org/news/news_detail.aspx?itemID=2778&catID=298


Sept. 26, 2002

CLARK: Well, if I could answer and talk about why time is on our side in the near term, first because we have the preponderance of force in this region. There's no question what the outcome of a conflict would be. Saddam Hussein so far as we know does not have nuclear weapons. Even if there was a catastrophic breakdown in the sanctions regime and somehow he got nuclear materials right now, he wouldn't have nuclear weapons in any zable quantity for, at best, a year, maybe two years.

So, we have the time to build up the force, work the diplomacy, achieve the leverage before he can come up with any military alternative that's significant enough ultimately to block us, and so that's why I say time is on our side in the near term. In the long term, no, and we don't know what the long term is. Maybe it's five years. Maybe it's four years. Maybe it's eight years. We don't know.

I would say it would depend on whether we've exhausted all other possibilities and it's difficult. I don't want to draw a line and say, you know, this kind of inspection, if it's 100 inspectors that's enough. I think we've got to have done everything we can do given the time that's available to us before we ask the men and women in uniform, whom you know so well (inaudible).
http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/us/hearingspreparedstatements/hasc-092602.htm#WC


We don't want a bunch of young men in battle dress uniforms out there indefinitely trying to perform humanitarian assistance. That's not our job. We're not very good at it. We're also not any good at police work. Now we're doing a lot of it in place like Kosovo and Bosnia and we have and it's been unfortunate. So we should try to do better in this case.

I think you know with the value of hindsight what you realize is that there are many, you know, ifs, would-haves, and buts in situations like this. The question before the United States of America is whether we think our intelligence system is so faulty and our lack of information so gross that we would feel the need to rush to a military solution before we've taken the time to adequately build up the diplomatic and full military support capabilities that will assure we get a more favorable outcome. And, you know, it's a question of where the weight of the evidence is.

I no longer have access to the information this committee has. You may have information I have not seen, but based on the evidence submitted publicly and my experience over many years of looking at classified information, I would say the balance comes down on time is on our side in the near term. We don't know precisely how long that is and we don't know exactly where we'll draw the line on that risk.
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http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/us/hearingspreparedstatements/hasc-clark-092602.htm

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I especially liked this part, same testimony 9/26/02:

Since then, we've encouraged Saddam Hussein and supported him as he attacked against Iran in an effort to prevent Iranian destabilization of the Gulf. That came back and bit us when Saddam Hussein then moved against Kuwait. We encouraged the Saudis and the Pakistanis to work with the Afghans and build an army of God, the mujahaddin, to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan. Now we have released tens of thousands of these Holy warriors, some of whom have turned against us and formed Al Qaida.

My French friends constantly remind me that these are problems that we had a hand in creating. So when it comes to creating another strategy, which is built around the intrusion into the region by U.S. forces, all the warning signs should be flashing.

There are unintended consequences when force is used. Use it as a last resort. Use it multilaterally if you can. Use it unilaterally only if you must.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=132&topic_id=2035350&mesg_id=2036557

09-02-03
GEN. WESLEY CLARK: U.S. WAR IN IRAQ IS STRATEGIC BLUNDER
Wesley K. Clark was Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (NATO) and ran the U.S.-led war in Kosovo, ... spoke on Sept. 2 with Global Viewpoint editor Nathan Gardels.


I certainly can also locate more 2003 statements...but I think that the 2002 statements are more appropriate to your question.


10/10/02: Retired General Reflects on United States’ Policy Towards Iraq


www.umb.edu/news/2002news/reporter/november/iraq.html

University of Massachusetts at Boston


Retired General Reflects on United States’ Policy Towards Iraq (October 10, 2002)

By Michael McPhee

Wesley K. Clark, retired general of the US Army, was the distinguished guest of the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs on October 10. Over seventy-five people came to hear the former Supreme Allied Commander of Europe discuss his reflections on the US policy towards Iraq.

Edmund Beard, director of the McCormack Institute, introduced Clark and gave an account of the general’s impressive military career, which includes command at every level from company to division. Clark is both a soldier and scholar, graduating first in his 1966 class of the United States Military Academy at West Point and holding a master’s degree in philosophy, politics, and economics from Oxford University, where he studied as a Rhodes Scholar.

Clark, who was the NATO commander in charge of the effort to stop the crisis in Kosovo in 1999, spoke of his experiences in Bosnia, where he learned first-hand about the chaos of unleashed ethnic hatreds. It is exactly this chaos that has led Clark to raise a voice of concern over possible conflict with Iraq. Clark believes that a military war with Iraq could be over in as little as two weeks. He is concerned with the lack of a long-range plan for the chaos that would ensue among the Kurds, Shiites, and those factions loyal to Saddam Hussein, which Clark believes would play out on a much larger scale than what took place in Bosnia.

Clark spoke of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, seeing it as a time when the U.S. lost its adversaries and failed in its foreign policy strategy. At that time there were two groups in Washington debating the role of the military; one group saw the military merely as the fighter and winner of wars; another group, led by Madeleine Albright, saw the military as a useful tool in aiding third world countries.

In comparing the two most recent presidencies, Clark described the Clinton administration as pursuing a foreign policy of engagement and reaching out as opposed to the Bush administration’s preemption policy and striking out.


Clark, when asked where the push to invade Iraq was coming from, rejected the idea that it was the military that wanted to go to war. He blamed civilian advisors to President Bush who were pushing in that direction.

Clark stated his view that terrorism is the problem, not Iraq. He also voiced concern that Americans not blame Islam, and spoke of his belief that US interests are best served in reaching out to those who do not embrace the ideals of radical Islam.