Reply #66: No, it's incredibly silly to only read selected bits like you have...

[Violet_Crumble]

1. I didn't say HRW contradicted itself. I've seen you flailing round a lot going on about double standards and dishonesty, but I've got no idea and probably even less interest in knowing what the hell yr going on about....

2. Actually anyone who claims that police in Gaza were combatants is full of shit. And I'm not at all surprised that after being shown very clearly why B'Tselem don't count them as combatants, yr now ignoring what B'Tselem said and pretending they said something different...

'On 27 December 2008, the first day of the operation, the army bombed the main police
headquarters in Gaza City, killing 42 police cadets who were standing in formation. The same
day, Israel also bombed some 18 police stations in the Gaza Strip. In total, 248 police officers
were killed that day.

Israeli officials stated, in interviews with the media and in official announcements, that
attacks on the police were justified because police officers would in the future take part in
hostilities against Israel, and that every object belonging to Hamas was a legitimate target,
regardless of the actions of the persons attacked.

B’Tselem knows that many police officers in the Gaza Strip are also members of the military
wings of Palestinian armed groups, and might take part in hostilities against Israel. However,
without concrete information on integration of police officers in the combat forces of Hamas,
and taking into account the assumption that persons are deemed civilians unless proven
otherwise, B’Tselem is unable to determine that all the police officers were legitimate targets
and that the Palestinian police in Gaza, as an institution, is part of the combat forces of
Hamas, all of whose members carry out a continuous combat function.

For these reasons, police officers that Israel killed in an attack aimed at police or police
stations were listed in a separate category. Where B’Tselem knows a police officer was
affiliated with an armed group, the fact is noted. If a police officer was killed during combat,
or if he was killed when not taking part in hostilities and not in an attack aimed at police, it is
mentioned that he was also a police officer, if B’Tselem knows this was the case.'

http://btselem.org/Download/20090909_Cast_Lead_Fatalities_Eng.pdf

And here again is the two categories of people who aren't viewed as civilians in conflict...

Based on the findings of the study, the ICRC determined there are two categories of persons
who lose the protection given them as civilians during an armed conflict between a state and
an organized armed group. B’Tselem included both categories under the classification “took
part in the hostilities.”

1. Persons who fulfill a “continuous combat function.” Such persons are legitimate
objects of attack, even if at the moment of attack they are not taking a direct part in
the hostilities. This category includes persons who are involved on an ongoing basis
in the preparation, execution, or command of combat acts or operations. An
individual recruited, trained and equipped by such a group to continuously and
directly participate in hostilities can be considered to assume a continuous combat
function even before he or she carries out a hostile act. On the other hand, persons
who continuously accompany or support an organized armed group but whose
function does not involve direct participation in hostilities maintain their status as
civilians and are not legitimate objects of attack. Thus, recruiters, financiers and
propagandists may contribute to the general war effort, but as long as they do not
directly participate in hostilities, they are not a legitimate object of attack.

2. Persons who do not fulfill a “continuous combat function” but take a direct part in
hostilities (for example, on their way to fir a rocket, during the firing of the rocket,
and on the way back).
The fact that persons wh
o were killed during the operation belonged to an armed Palestinian
group does not constitute, in and of itself, proof that they took part in the hostilities, or that
they lost the protection granted them as civilians. Only persons who carry out a continuous
combat function are deemed to be taking part in hostilities at all times.

And here's what the UN report says about the attack on the policemen:

'33. The Mission examined the attacks against six police facilities, four of them during the first
minutes of the military operations on 27 December 2008, resulting in the death of 99 policemen
and nine members of the public. The overall around 240 policemen killed by Israeli forces
constitute more than one sixth of the Palestinian casualties. The circumstances of the attacks and
the Government of Israel July 2009 report on the military operations clarify that the policemen
were deliberately targeted and killed on the ground that the police as an institution, or a large
part of the policemen individually, are in the Government of Israel’s view part of the Palestinian
military forces in Gaza.

34. To examine whether the attacks against the police were compatible with the principle of
distinction between civilian and military objects and persons, the Mission analysed the
institutional development of the Gaza police since Hamas took complete control of Gaza in July
2007 and merged the Gaza police with the “Executive Force” it had created after its election
victory. The Mission finds that, while a great number of the Gaza policemen were recruited
among Hamas supporters or members of Palestinian armed groups, the Gaza police were a
civilian law-enforcement agency. The Mission also concludes that the policemen killed on 27
December 2008 cannot be said to have been taking a direct part in hostilities and thus did not
lose their civilian immunity from direct attack as civilians on this ground. The Mission accepts
that there may be individual members of the Gaza police that were at the same time members of
Palestinian armed groups and thus combatants. It concludes, however, that the attacks against the
police facilities on the first day of the armed operations failed to strike an acceptable balance
between the direct military advantage anticipated (i.e. the killing of those policemen who may
have been members of Palestinian armed groups) and the loss of civilian life (i.e. the other
policemen killed and members of the public who would inevitably have been present or in the
vicinity), and therefore violated international humanitarian law.