Reply #14: From the same July post mentioned in Post #9...

[Junkdrawer]

Argument: "No need for a paper trail, the machines keep three copies of the vote internally"
Answer: How are we to know that any of these three internal copies are our actual vote without a voter verified paper trail? Internal copies may guard against accidental erasure - they do nothing against intentional cheating.

Argument: "You can't give people receipts - it will encourage vote selling"
Answer: No one walks away with a receipt - the audit ballot is put in a lockbox and only used to audit the election.

Argument: "Counting all the votes by hand only moves us back to the bad old days of paper ballots - and we know that people cheated with paper ballots"
Answer: This one deserves several responses:
1.) Glad to see you agree that cheating has occurred in the past.
2.) Our suggestion was to use spot checks - not to count ALL the ballots by hand.
3.) Prior methods of cheating are labor intensive and require a large number of coconspirators. Computerized cheating would only require a small group of insiders who could then throw elections all over the country – our worst nightmare.

Argument: “Printing paper ballots is completely unworkable. Printers will jam, ink will run out, and malicious voters will tie-up the system with fake spoiled votes.”
Answer: Almost every process that involves monetary transactions in the country (ATM cash withdrawals, retail purchases, bank deposits, etc.) is accompanied by paper audit trails. Don’t our votes deserve as much care? As for malicious slowdowns, unless an organized campaign is launched, I truly doubt this will come to much of a problem.