Reply #11: CIA asset

[pberq]

This is a smokescreen for the fact the OBL is a CIA asset. These excerpts give some evidence, but it is really necessary to read the entire articles.

http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/08_01_98_osama_bin_laden.html

<snip>
In 1979, when the Soviet invasion occurred, virtually none of the heroin entering the US came from the so-called Golden Crescent in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the time it was coming from Mexico and Southeast Asia. By 1982 the region was producing exportable opium base equivalent to 20-30 tons of heroin a year. Of that, at least 4.5 tons reached the U.S. By 1988 those numbers had increased to 70 to 80 tons of heroin of which 15 to 20 tons reached the US.

According to Alfred McCoy, in his outstanding book The Politics of Heroin (Lawrence Hill Books, 1972, 1991), Hekmatyar controlled no less than six heroin refineries in the Khyber District of Pakistan alone. At his side was Osama bin-Laden.

Around the time that Osama bin-Laden moved to Afghanistan in 1980 he was also curiously able to found a series of investment companies under the umbrella SICO which he headquartered in Geneva. Sources formerly in the intelligence community have confirmed to me that, as bin-Laden established branches in the Cayman islands and the Bahamas, he employed law firms and consultants connected to Langley, Virginia and the CIA.

But one thing's for sure, Osama bin-Laden is in a place where CIA can't reach him right now and I bet they want it that way. Like so many other terrorists, from the World Trade Center, to Pan Am 103, he is one of their own creations.

http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/11_02_01_michele.html
<snip>
The existence of an "ISI-Osama-Taliban axis" is a matter of public record. The links between the ISI and agencies of the US government including the CIA are also a matter of public record.

Pakistan's ISI has been used by successive US adminstrations as "a go-between." Pakistan's military-intelligence apparatus, constitutes the core institutional support to both Osama's Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Without this institutional support, there would be no Taliban government in Kabul. In turn, without the unbending support of the US government. there would be no powerful military-intelligence apparatus in Pakistan.

Senior officials in the State Department were fully cognizant of General Mahmoud Ahmad's role. In the wake of September 11, the Bush Administration consciously sought the "cooperation" of the ISI which had been supporting and abetting Osama bin Laden and the Taliban.