Nuclear Reactor Pool Fire/Huge Risks in U.S. According to Unpublicized NRC Study

[kristopher]

22. A consortium of nuclear companies that self insure doesn't really qualify as "commercial insurer"...

...unless you are straining at gnats; a favorite hobby of yours, we know.

From the view of the public, they are not covered and there is no policy they can buy that will cover them - which is what I believe indie9197 was saying.

In an attempt to deploy one of your canned misdirections, YOU were the one that brought up the self insurance scam the nuclear industry is using to avoid paying market rates for the actual amount of insurance they would need to cover the losses from accidents that might result from their technology.

This analysis is extremely conservative as it uses the $100B in damages from earlier studies instead of the $250B and rising figure we see with Fukushima - and remember the high density population areas were spared by a fortunate wind that blew to sea instead of inland.

Although the probability of a large nuclear accident within the United States is considered quite low, that risk is not zero. Further, the damages from even a moderate accident are potentially so enormous that they would likely bankrupt the firm involved. Costs resulting from a large release of radiation from a damaged nuclear reactor or spent-fuel pool at a U.S. facility could exceed $100 billion (Beyea, Lyman, and von Hippel 2004, cited in Lochbaum 2007).
Moreover, risks in the nuclear power indus- try are systemic. An accident in one place has ripple effects throughout the industry, given that many reactors rely on the same technologies, were built by the same contractors, or employ similar defenses (in the case of a terrorist attack). Even when systems and technologies are not overlap- ping, an accident anywhere raises public concern everywhere, and reactor oversight (and associated regulatory and remediation compliance costs) are likely to rise.

One economic response to this problem would be to include the price of risk of the entire nuclear fuel cycle into insurance contracts or other methods of syndicating risk, and let prices rise where they may. If insurance coverage were not available or only available at very high costs, innovative risk- management tools such as risk pooling (as is done under Price-Anderson) or catastrophe bonds could be developed. If even these tools proved to be inadequate or too expensive, markets would be directed toward alternative and less expensive ways to meet the demand for energy services.

Unfortunately, the political response to the problem of high risk in the nuclear industry has followed the opposite path. The statutory caps on the level of private accident insurance that the industry is required to carry under the Price- Anderson Act essentially dampen the impact of risk on the price of nuclear power, and they weaken the political and economic incentives to increase the level of private insurance coverage.

NUCLEAR POWER:Still Not Viable without Subsidies
Doug Koplow pg 77-78
Earth Track, Inc 2011