Thu Oct 11, 2012, 01:44 PM
struggle4progress (88,594 posts)
I'll guess you just didn't read the FOIA release carefully. The investigation in this case concerned
a women who, contrary to order, began to frequent the Wikileaks website and who, contrary to advice, repeatedly attended Assange's trial. She also began to use screen names indicating sympathy with Assange, Wikileaks, and Manning; she further regularly posted pro-Assange Twitter messages; and in addition, she associated with some pro-Assange and/or pro-Manning groups in the UK. She also reportedly exhibited some psychological symptoms during this period. Since she had SIPR NET access and a Top Secret security clearance, there was some concern, and an investigation was launched, into whether she had communicated with the enemy. She was denied further access to restricted information. The investigation apparently produced no evidence that she had leaked anything
The investigation actually began due to a complaint that she did not follow a lawful order (the 11 January 2011 memorandum), and the natural reading of that fact is simply that the military had directed all personnel to avoid contact with Wikileaks in the aftermath of Manning's arrest; that would explain why she was advised not to attend Assange's trial, for example
Thomas A. Ferguson, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, wrote the 11 Feb 2011 memorandum, directing DoD personnel to "follow established procedures for accessing classified information only through authorized means." The beginning page of the actual FOIA release (after the two page FOIA cover letter) states clearly:
... SUBJECT allegedly visited the website Wikileaks in violation of a Memorandum From the Undersecretary of Defense, dated 11 Jan 11, which violated Article 92, Failure to Obey, UCMJ ...This is simply because: accessing the website Wikileaks is not an established procedure for accessing classified information through authorized means. Such access would contradict the lawful general order or regulation embodied in Ferguson's 11 January 2011
Thomas A. Ferguson
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Ferguson's 11 Feb 2011 memorandum is available as pdf from the FAS site:
... It is the responsibility of every DoD employee and contractor to protect classified information and to follow established procedures for accessing classified information only through authorized means ...
From beginning page of the actual FOIA release (after the two page FOIA cover letter):
... SUBJECT allegedly visited the website Wikileaks in violation of a Memorandum From the Undersecretary of Defense, dated 11 Jan 11, which violated Article 92, Failure to Obey, UCMJ ...
Any person subject to this chapter who—
10 USC § 892 - Art. 92. Failure to obey order or regulation
It should be clear, to anyone who reads the entire dozen pages, that the actual concern, and the actual point of the investigation, was whether she posed a security risk and whether unauthorized releases had occurred. Her financial transactions were scrutinized for that reason; she was asked whether she had released any information; persons, who knew her, were asked whether she might release any information; and she discussed with investigators, methods by which information could be released:
... <b6 b7c> believed SUBJECT would not divulge any classification to any unauthorized individuals ... SUBJECT had access to SIPR but <b6 b7c> did not believe SUBJECT looked on SIPR often ... <b6 b7c> believed SUBJECT had the potential to leak classified information ... Lt Col <b6 b7c> explained that in light of SUBJECT's related feeling towards USAF and military service, he intended to suspend SUBJECT's access to SIPR ... <b6 b7c> was unaware if SUBJECT traveled outside the UK ... <b6 b7c> did not think SUBJECT was a National Security risk ... SUBJECT's access to classified information has since been revoked ... SUBJECT explained that at no time was she ever asked to provide or supply any classified FOUO information ... SUBJECT stated that she was not subverted ... SUBJECT pointed out that SIPRnet access was not closely monitored ... SUBJECT reiterated that she had never disclosed any classified or for official use only (FOUO) information and was never approached to provide any military information ...
The matter was finally closed because there was no evidence she had released any information to unauthorized persons
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