“We want to attack the ivory tower from the ivory tower. What's interesting is that these assaults resonate with a punishing paradox. We celebrate transgression, hybridity, migration, and mobility, but when people actually do these things, there is incredible resentment against such movement.”
Michael Eric Dyson ; More Than Academic
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Some of the more acrimonious recent discussions on the Democratic Underground's “General Discussion” have had to do with if President Barack Obama could – or indeed should – face a challenger from the left in the 2012 Democratic Primary season. I think that issues regarding President Obama can be discussed here in a serious manner, without appeals to the bitterness that tend to create hostility and widen the gaps between groups of forum participants. Hence, on Sunday, I posted an essay (“On President Obama & 2012”) which detailed some thoughts on his style of leadership; my goal was to encourage a meaningful discussion. With but three exceptions, those responding to the OP were able to focus on the topic. Not bad, at all.
I am hoping this follow-up will produce a similar response. My goal is not agreement on the issue of a potential primary challenge. Rather, I'm hoping that we can debate some of the issues in a manner that may increase the understanding and appreciation of others' opinions. Let's start by taking a look at three examples of Senators who challenged a sitting Democratic President. Those three are, of course, Eugene McCarthy, Robert Kennedy, and Ted Kennedy.
In looking at these examples, it is important to be aware that “comparing” does not equal “equating.” This caused a bit of confusion for a couple people on the Obama thread. In the study of sociology, including the political sciences, comparisons that include similar circumstance – such as three US Senators who challenged a sitting Democratic President in primaries – are intended to illustrate patterns, not to equate the individuals involved – even if they happen to be brothers.
In late 1967 and early '68, two overlapping issues caused both McCarthy and RFK to consider challenging President Lyndon Johnson. One was his personality; the other, his approach to the Vietnam War. That war drained the American economy to an extent that made it impossible for LBJ to fund his Great Society programs anywhere near the levels he had dreamed of doing. The country was in crisis, with unrest in the cities, and tensions growing between the government and the civil rights and anti-war movements.
LBJ was agreeing to the expansions of military aggression asked for by military leaders. Thus, a growing segment of the Democratic Left was hoping for an insurgent challenge to LBJ in the primary season. More moderate voices within the establishment began to question if it were better for them to fight for peace and lose, than to support the growing war and win.
The Democratic Left would first attempt to talk Senator Robert Kennedy into running. The strained relationship between LBJ and RFK was widely recognized. More, people felt that Senator Kennedy would be the person most likely to be able to defeat Johnson. However, for a variety of reasons – including his fear that such an attempt would split the Democratic Party – Kennedy said no.
Other Democrats who were beginning to come out against the war, such as George McGovern, were also approached. One in particular, Eugene McCarthy, told organizers from the Democratic Left that he felt Kennedy should challenge Johnson. Eventually, when it seemed apparent that RFK would not run in 1968, McCarthy reluctantly agree to enter the contest.
McCarthy was a curious man. Besides serving in military intelligence in the war years, he had pursued his education, and become a public school teacher. Then a university professor. He then served a decade in the House of Representatives, before entering the US Senate in 1959. His most notable action leading up to '68 was likely his introducing Adlia Stevenson for the nomination at the 1969 Democratic Convention, which had instead picked Senator John F. Kennedy. (His line, “Do not reject this man who made us all proud to be Democrats!” was considered one of the best of the convention, but Stevenson had already lost two presidential races.)
In 1964, McCarthy was publicly identified as being on LBJ's short list for VP. This could only have been for political purposes, in my opinion, as Johnson required someone with a much weaker personality. Other than these two things, McCarthy had a rather unremarkable career in the Senate by late '67. He was consider to be highly intelligent, but prone to be moody and highly individualistic. Robert Kennedy viewed him as lazy.
His run against LBJ was not viewed as a particularly serious challenge until New Hampshire. Yet in the period between New Hampshire and Wisconsin, McCarthy became convinced the November election would be between Richard Nixon and himself. When it became apparent that RFK was reconsidering a run, McCarthy sent a message: he only intended to serve one term, and after that, Kennedy could be President.
Three things stand out, in the context of authority/power (as discussed in the Obama OP): first, McCarthy approached his run in a curiously detached manner – as older forum members will remember; second, he believed that US Presidents should enjoy less “power” than, for example, LBJ did; and third, he still maintained a strange sense that even this limited power could be handed off to another select person after four years. His was an example of bureaucratic, systems power, although his almost monk-like, poetic nature made him appear charismatic before closer examination.
Robert Kennedy's 1968 run is one of America's great but tragic mythologies. The idea that he challenged Johnson in order to reclaim the presidency for the Kennedy wing of the party is dispelled when one recognizes that he fully planned to run in 1972 – and not '64 or '68. It was the damage that he saw Johnson doing to this country, and in Vietnam, that convinced him to enter the race. It is true that McCarthy's showing in New Hampshire made clear that Johnson could be beaten. The anti-RFK people believed his entry after that was cheap; the pro-RFK people believed it was because he was convinced McCarthy could not beat Nixon.
A couple of important points: first, before 1966, Robert Kennedy could be called many things, but definitely not charismatic. He was outstanding at “systems” – both in running campaigns, and much more importantly, as Attorney General, running the Department of Justice. A strong case can be made that he was the best Attorney General in modern times. His leadership was entirely bureaucratic in style.
It was only from 1966 to '68 that RFK had his charismatic phase; it was primarily during his primary campaign that his legendary role took place. Yet his pursuit of power was not because he placed his personal ambition first. Rather, it was that he understood, in a way few others have, how power could be used to help those crushed by the system. And that made him dangerous.
After RFK was killed, some people pressured his younger brother, Senator Teddy Kennedy, to run in 1968. Pressure was again applied in '72. When Jimmy Carter was elected in 1976, it became clear that he planned to serve as something of a “Washington outsider.” He did not have particularly close relationships with the still strong “Kennedy wing” of the Democratic Party. Carter's presidential journals show that in his opinion, the biggest area of difference between himself and Teddy Kennedy was in regard to health care reform. President Carter sought to improve health care by taking smaller steps; Kennedy sought larger steps.
One can speculate on what combination of factors caused Ted Kennedy to decide to challenge President Carter in the 1980 Democratic primaries. Certainly, there was a growing public perception that Carter was “weak.” That powerful, non-Democratic interests pulling media strings promoted this perception is beyond debate. Also, Kennedy had to have been considering when, if not 1980, would be the best opportunity for him to run for the presidency.
Ted Kennedy ranks among the greatest US Senators of any generation. His accomplishments speak for themselves. They are also evidence of a man who excelled at exercising bureaucratic power. His run in 1980 shows that he might have been viewing the circumstances more in terms of his own political career's potential, than an accurate reading of the then current political atmosphere.
It is probably fair to say that President Obama's supporters view each of these three Senators' experiences as evidence of but one thing: primary challenges to sitting Democratic Presidents can only hurt the party – and lead to villains like Nixon and Reagan being elected. And there is certainly some truth to that.
Those Democrats and members of the Democratic Left who have been seriously disappointed by President Obama tend to view these same events differently. First, many recognize that a primary challenger is unlikely to beat Barack Obama for the nomination. More, few think a primary challenge would weaken him to the point that Michelle Bachman would crush him next November.
The 1980 events suggest that a politician seeking personal power is not helpful. A worthwhile challenger would be someone who is not seeking power, but who instead seeks to make a powerful statement. Such a candidate could only be convinced to run if the circumstances – including the economy, the wars, the wishes of a segment of the Democratic Party, and also the President's behaviors – demand that such an action be taken.
The pro-Obama people do not believe that we are anywhere near that point. Those hoping for a primary challenger believe that we are either getting very close, or already there.
Would a primary challenge, were one to happen, split the Democratic Party? Or could the lack of such a primary do more to divide the party? I do not think that there is a single correct answer to that …. not at this point, anyhow.
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