Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 339-375.
System Justification Theory
We have shown above that most traditional personality theories
about the functions of conservative ideology, especially theories of
authoritarianism, dogmatism, and anxiety reduction, stress egodefensive
or ego-justifying aspects of conservatism, that is, the
satisfaction of individual needs for security, obedience, and projection
(e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988;
Rokeach, 1960; Wilson, 1973c). Although ego-justifying motives
constitute an important part of the appeal of conservatism, there
are also group-justifying and system-justifying motives that are
satisfied in a particularly efficient manner by right-wing ideologies
(Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Thompson, 2000). Social dominance
theory, for example, stresses the emergence of conservative legitimizing
myths as group-justifying attempts to rationalize the interests
of dominant or high-status group members (Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999). System justification theory focuses on the motivated
tendency for people to do cognitive and ideological work on behalf
of the social system, thereby perpetuating the status quo and
preserving inequality (e.g., Jost, 1995; Jost & Banaji, 1994).
One of the central goals of system justification theory is to
understand how and why people rationalize the existing social
system, especially when their support appears to conflict with
other important motives to maintain or enhance self-esteem and to
maintain or enhance group standing (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost
& Burgess, 2000; Jost & Thompson, 2000). The theory draws
partially on Marxian and feminist theories of dominant ideology
and on sociological theories of legitimization to explain the acceptance
of conservative ideas and practices (Jost, 1995; Jost et al.,
2001). It also draws on ideas from cognitive dissonance theory
(Festinger, 1957) and just world theory (Lerner, 1980) to argue
that people are motivated to perceive existing social arrangements
as fair, legitimate, justifiable, and rational, and perhaps even
natural and inevitable.
~snip~
The strongest form of the system justification hypothesis, which
draws also on the logic of cognitive dissonance theory, is that
under certain circumstances members of disadvantaged groups
would be even more likely than members of advantaged groups to
support the status quo (see Jost et al., 2003). If there is indeed a
motivation to justify the system to reduce ideological dissonance
and defend against threats to the system’s legitimacy, then it may
be that those who suffer the most because of the system are also
those who would have the most to explain, justify, and rationalize.
One way to minimize dissonance would be to redouble one’s
commitment and support for the system, much as hazed initiates
pledge increased loyalty to the fraternity that hazes them (e.g.,
Aronson & Mills, 1959) and, presumably, to the fraternity system
in general.
An additional hypothesis that may be derived from system
justification theory is that people should be motivated to defend
the existing social system against threats to the stability or legitimacy
of the system. If there is a defensive motivation associated
with system justification, then it should be more pronounced under
circumstances that threaten the status quo. This is a possibility that
was suggested by early accounts of authoritarianism (e.g., Adorno
et al., 1950; Fromm, 1941; Reich, 1946/1970; Sanford, 1966), but
situational threats have received much less attention in recent years
in comparison with the measurement of individual differences (but
see Sales, 1972, 1973). Thus, we hypothesized that situations of
crisis or instability in society will, generally speaking, precipitate
conservative, system-justifying shifts to the political right, but only
as long as the crisis situation falls short of toppling the existing
regime and establishing a new status quo for people to justify and
rationalize (p. 350, 351).