What is Sistani's role in the current Iraq situation? Why don't we

[coffeenap]

hear more about him? Any insight out there? Thanks.

[Poppyseedman]

1. Sistani's role is huge.

Basically civil war hangs on his word.

Currently he is being very Gandhi like in his approach to the situation. He said even if the Sunni's assassinate him, do not take revenge.

In the end, if Iraq does jell into a democracy, bush will owe a huge debt of gratitude to him.

[coffeenap]

5. Is the Bush regime aware of the debt they will owe? Do they care?

Does anyone from "here" have a relationship with him?

[Poppyseedman]

11. Sis-tani, is not an idiot, not to imply you thought he was

I am sure he is currently letting the bush administration know what the cost will be for his cooperation in trying to keep the peace.

The man didn't become the leader of millions of religious Shiite people because of his looks.

bush fully knows who holds a couple of Aces in his hand.

[coffeenap]

12. I'm sorry, I meant to imply that BUSH is an idiot and therefore may

not understand what is going on. I am aware of Ay. Sistani's brilliance and power. thanks.:hi:

[muriel_volestrangler]

2. Sistani has spoken about the bombing of the mosque

See Juan Cole's blog: http://www.juancole.com/2006/02/sistani-threatens-to-turn-to-militia.html

[coffeenap]

6. Thanks, I will go there now and read. nt

[Selatius]

3. He was the one who pushed up the timetable for the first election

He didn't like the CPA and Paul Bremer very much, and it was he who forced Bremer to push up the timetable for the first election to set up the council to draft the constitution. His goal is simple:

Eject the US and assert Shi'ite control over Iraq that was denied to them for so many decades.

I don't know what kind of government Sistani wants, but it is clear to me he intends to see to it that the Shi'ites dominate the Sunnis in an Iraqi government. Shi'ites do make up 60 percent of the population, and in a representative form of government, it is reasonable to think they should get the most power as a result.

[coffeenap]

7. What do you think enabled him to convince Bremer? nt.

[Selatius]

8. No Sistani support, no Shi'ite support, really.

He made his point very clear about elections, and if didn't get what he wanted, then he threatened to urge Shi'ites to protest Bremer and the rest of the CPA. Bremer had to placate Sistani's demands or risk a confrontation at a time when the the Sunnis were starting to grow very unhappy with the US. 2004 was a horrible year in the Sunni Triangle for the US, and Bremer was in no position to deal with a mobilized Shi'ite population that is unhappy as well.

[coffeenap]

10. I understand, thank you. nt

[The Magistrate]

4. Ay. Sistani, Ma'am

Remains a conservative strategist. His analysis of the situation seems to be that a convinced small "d" democratic, in as much as he is convinced that the nujmbers of the Shia will suffice, absent a distatorial regime, to ensure them predominant political power in a unified Iraq. His strategy has been to rely onthe U.S. to break Sunni Arab power, and to help U.S. concentration on this objective by holding Shia armed bodies aloof from the open resistance to U.S. occupation of Iraq. Whether he has given a quiet green light to Shia activities against Sunni Arab and foreign elements in the equation is not known; my guess is that he has at least indicated he has no great objection to such activities.

The aim of the forign salafist elements in the insurgency most particularly is to create a full-bore civil war involving the Shia majority against the other elements of Iraqi society. In the resultant chaos, it will be easier to attack U.S. forces, and render the occupation of Iraq wholly untenable. It will also gravely strain the relations between occupation forces and the Shia establishment, which has largely been following Ay. Sistanmi's accommodationist line, because in such a civil war, attacks against occupation forces will be a leading means for upstart militants of all factions to bid for popular support among the Iraqi people, and there will certainly be hostile acts by Shia militias against U.S. and English forces in consequence.

It does not seem likely to me that Ay. Sistani will be able to hold a consensus against such violence within the Shia community much longer. The level of provocation both over time and embodied in recent events is simply intolerable, and this must have great effect on the popular feelings of the mass of Shia adherents. Ay. Sistani risks forfieting his authority if he urges a line that is too unpopular, for his authority, great as it is, is not buttressed by formal hierarchy and law, but rather voluntarily accepted by those who do so, and it can be rejected without fear of consequences. Anyone who chooses to can decide that he or she considers Mr. al'Sadr, or any other figure, more authoritative in this instance, and act accordingly.

[coffeenap]

9. First, please excuse my rudeness--I neglected to use his title, that

wasn't nice. Do you think that the latest round of horrific attacks and reprisals represent the end of his influence? If so, will it provide an "exit strategy" for the US admin? Of course, this question assumes that someone in the admin. actually understands the power structure in Iraq.

Thank you for your thoughtful and detailed reply to my original post.

[The Magistrate]

13. My Money Remains On Ay. Sistani, Ma'am

He seems to be very good at the work, and all in all, a man of some wisdom. Such persons are not to be under-rated. My distaste for fundamentalist clerics as a class runs pretty deep, so praise for such a fellow from me means something. That he conceives his role as that of a quiet power behind the scenes of a government, rather than its open chief, is something commendable in the league in which he operates.

He has several routes available to maintain his power; all of them involve sanctioning some degree of violence by Shia bodies in self defense. In recent statements he has denounced the Iraqi government for not doing enough to prevent such attacks; this government is, already, essentially a Shia body, and this can readily be taken as a call for Shia in the government to take more rigorous action in the spheres they control. Much of the Iraqi police force today, particularly in the Shia regions, consists of men loyal to various Shia militia bodies. Action by Shia in governmental positions, under color of governmental authority, could provide many of the benefits, so to speak, of civil war, without many of the drawbacks, from the point of view of Ay. Sistani and the Shia populace. Most importantly, it would preserve the authority of the government he wishes the Shia to control, and confirm the wisdom of the line he has pressed from the beginning. Success, after all, is the most important source of prestige. There is little doubt in my mind that, if unleashed, the Shia militias could make short work of the foreign salafist elements, though the process would not be a pretty one, but something of extraodinary brutality and cruelty. They have much better intelligence than the U.S. does, and far greater numbers and support among the population. He will attempt, it seems to me, to rally and sanction violence on behalf of his followers, without giving open sanction and clarion calls for it. Such a course would be the best way to maintain all his options open, and preserve the valuable character of a man of peace: people will understand if such a man is finally driven to things he does not wholly approve of owing to hard necessity forced upon him by the misbehavior of lesser men. The U.S. authorities will be hard pressed to quarrel with calls for greater action by their own puppet government, and given no overt cause to break their posture of acquiesence in his authority.

A full-bore civil war would virtually require the exit of U.S. and English forces. These could do nothing to halt such widespread violence, and would be targets for all sides in the violence. The last argument anyone accepts in great measure for the continued occupation is the idea that it is serving as a check upon violence between the Iraqi factions, and when this is stripped from the equation, virtually no one besides the present adnministration wishes this adventure to continue. It would become politically unsupportable first in England, and then here, in short order.

[Disturbed]

14. "exit strategy" for the US admin?

I do not believe there is one. The Neo Fascist Regime of America will draw down to perhaps 100K and keep those troops on the permanent bases and stay out of the fire between Iraqi factions but they will never leave as long as oil is in Iraqi soil.


"The terrorists want to control the oil. Our way of life will be at risk". George W. Bush (Nov. 2005)