Possible Compromise: Hand Counts and Scanned Ballots

[BeFree]

If.... If we can get an Optical Scan system that takes human marked ballots, and is a system that has all the safeguards of an ATM, and all the back doors closed tight, has coding that is universal across the U.S. and uses coding that experts can survey at any time to determine any hacks, and there are enough of them for every precinct in the U.S., then maybe we could trust such a machine?

Then we need audits of those machines. As proposed, audits come after the machines do the deed. What about if we do that in reverse? What if we have audits done ahead of the machine count? That way we have Hand Counted Paper Ballots of a certain percentage in every precinct from sea to shining sea.

Here is the idea:


First audit the paper ballots that are to be optically scanned.

Audit 2% - 10%..... whatever a commission of statisticians come up with.

That way just a few (2% too 10%) of ballots need to be hand counted.

Then run all the the ballots through a scanner and compare the totals.

If there is agreement, fine.

If not, hand count all the ballots.

[JAYJDF]

1. The sad truth really is, if the system couldn't hanle the quantity

of voters that did turn out, how the hell would they react if 50% of the population showed up to vote? Is there any talk about that scenario?

[napi21]

2. How would you identify the ballots for the audit?

THAT has been a big part of the problem! The secret ballot is so revered here in the US, they wouldn't be able t put an identifier on either the paper or the electronic ballot, so there would be no way that I know of to say that you checked 10%, 50% 0r any other % and verify they matched.

The only way I know of is to have the optical scan of the paper ballot for speed in reporting, and the hand count of the paper to verify that it matches the machine total.

[BeFree]

4. Yeah

That's what I'd like to see, a total hand count.

However, if we did have a system that the computer experts would stake their reputations on, and we had an audit with a 99% confidence level, it might be a compromise worth considering.

[napi21]

8. I actually see the total hand count as the compromise.

I do understand that people are used to getting fairly quick results, so to demand elimination of electronics wont work! HOWEVER, total verification of those results the next day or so would give everyone confidence in our voting system. I really can't see any other way of correcting the doubt now.

I don't think there's any way you could ever find enough experts to stake their reputation on ANYTHING! Especially computer experts! I really think you have to have documented PROOF!

[movonne]

3. Why can't all the states go vote by mail like we have here...the

numbers our high on registered voters, voting this way.We have 3 weeks to get it back to get the ballot back...

[BeFree]

6. Even then

The elections people usually scan the ballots. Thing is the machines can't be trusted the way they are set up.

This idea would put an audit officially in place before machines did the work. Most places don't even audit.

All in all, whatever happens this November, we need all DUers to go down and look over the shoulders of all the ballot counters.

[bleever]

5. An idea worthy of discussion.

:thumbsup:

[BeFree]

7. Thanks, bleever.

Yes, it would be a compromise for most of us, but IF we get machines that can be examined inside and out, it just may work.

Yes, let's discuss this.

[Peace Patriot]

9. It's an interesting idea. It might work. But what are we going to do about

November?

No election reform idea, lawsuit, bill, article, book, report, expose, election monitoring effort, or anything else that I see on the horizon is going to prevent another stolen election this fall.

So, what do we do? Here's my idea...and please hear me out before you raise objections about how AB votes are handled. AB voting will not insure an accurate count, but it WILL raise a ruckus and create conditions favorable to reform.

Bust the Machines--Vote Absentee!

Absent Voting is not safe, but it IS a PROTEST against use of the rigged voting machines. If enough people do it (and many are--it's up to 50% in Los Angeles), the machines will be made obsolete, the election officials who purchased them will be made to look like the corrupt fools they are, and we will have the massive citizen rebellion we need to reform the system.

This is an indigenous protest, devised by ordinary American citizens who don't trust the machines, and want a paper ballot, hand-counted. Election officials often just scan AB ballots into the rigged electronic system, so it doesn't make your vote safer, but by AB voting you take a stand against this rigged system, and refuse to cooperate with it as far as you are able to (while yet voting).

It's like the Montgomery bus boycott. Rosa Parks REFUSED to sit at the back of the bus. She REFUSED to participate in the system of segregation. It was then reinforced by a boycott of the segregated buses, and combined with other types of protests to end segregation.

In this case, we MUST participate. We MUST vote. Big turnout is our only hope of overcoming the "thumb on the scales" that these machines are giving to Bushites, warmongers and corporatists. We shouldn't boycott voting. But we SHOULD boycott the machines! Make them gather dust! Don't use them! What good are all these expensive, shiny, new, election theft machines, if nobody will vote on them?

With an AB vote, we can add a meaningful protest of the rigged election system, throw a big monkeywrench into it, and, if it gets big enough, have a huge impact on future elections.

The AB voting protest will also HELP turnout. To people who say it's all rigged and don't vote, we can say, "But this is a PROTEST aimed at UN-rigging the system." Voting will also become less of a passive act, and more of an active protest against election fraud and against the frauds it has put in office. It's easy. Everybody can do it. It's a maximum participation protest!

This protest will not result in accurate counts this time. That is not possible. The corruption and rigged machines are too entrenched. But a big AB voting protest in November WILL lay the groundwork for getting rid of the machines and other needed election reform, and may get us a transparent election in '08.

Imagine if, say, 70% of the American people dumped Absentee Ballots on elections officials this fall--a mountain of paper ballots to deal with--with some delivering letters about why, and others contacting media.

THAT is a huge citizen rebellion! Now we have something. Now we have momentum for change!

Advice: Photocopy your Absentee Ballot after you fill it out. Hand-deliver it if possible (it is in California), or send it registered mail, return receipt requested. Also, if you can, write a letter to election officials stating your opposition to TRADE SECRET, PROPRIETARY programming code in the voting machines and central tabulators (throughout the system), private corporate control of our elections, and insecure, unreliable, hackable voting machines (which they all are), and demand a full hand count of AB and all other paper ballot votes including optiscan ballots, and a ban on paperless voting machines (the touchscreens-DREs--completely unverifiable and unrecountable).

Bumper sticker: "Bust the Machines--Vote Absentee!"

Or: "Join other Americans in busting the machines--VOTE ABSENTEE!"

[JAYJDF]

11. Hell, count me in! I think it's a heck of an idea.

Will pass the word I like it so much. Hopefully, even if this doesn't take off nation wide, it will increase the AB count

[BeFree]

12. I like it!

If someone's only options are AB paper or DRE voting, the paper AB is the only way to vote.

Then, if they go to watch their AB counted, they just might see the officials count their vote.

[Kip Humphrey]

14. How about a photocopy parallel AB election too?

Making sure your precinct is clearly identified on your ballot before submitting to the parallel election.

Ads one more threat of discovery, especially where AB vote tallies are published by precinct as a separate grouping. I bet this would feed into Kathy Dopp's precinct level database quite readily.

Making it clear, I am no fan of AB voting in that: a> the ballots in many jurisdictions will be digitally scanned and tabulated via central tabulators anyway while potentially conveying a false sense of security to the voter, and b> you run an added risk your ballot may not be counted at all (possibly putting you the provisional vote category of "you vote, they decide").

That said, if a massive AB campaign were mounted and a suitable response achieved, the message against machine politics (new meaning to an old phrase, eh?) could be definitive. If a parallel AB election accompanied the campaign, large-scale parallel elections become entirely feasible.

[Redneck Socialist]

10. I'm comfortable with optical scan, if

we had mandatory audits based on a several factors. Do the result differ significantly from the exit polls? If so audit. If the race is close: audit. Automaticly audit random precincts.

I think that would be a workable compromise.

[Bill Bored]

13. Now your are thinking BeFree.

But there are a few problems.

First you still can't trust the machines because they may fail.

Second if the scanners are precinct count, the ballot is counted before it's audited. If they are not precinct count, you end up with undervotes and overvotes. You could just check for that at the precinct and then count centrally, but that's NOT precinct count scanning and if you're going through the trouble of checking for over/under votes at the precinct anyway, might as well count the ballot at the same time and post the precinct results for all to see.

So, we still need the audits and they should be statistically significant and they should be a surprise and if there are any unexplained discrepancies, there must be more of them until the existence of enough corrupt precincts to change the outcome can be ruled out.

On edit, there's another problem: you have to know the machine count before you can decide how much you will need to audit.

[BeFree]

15. Sometimes it happens

First we need a better idea of what audits can and can't do. A commission on audits ought to be able to figure it out.

Say the machines are sitting at the precinct, a voter could run the ballot through to check to see that all races were cast and the machine was working right, but the machine would not add the votes up until the polls close.

So, the audit would then take place. Heck, audit 50% if possible. If possible audit all the races. Then, with the polls closed and auditing complete, run the ballots through the scanner.

[Kip Humphrey]

16. A few problems that continue to get overlooked

1. Existing systems we know are not secure, unreliable, and completely susceptible to fraud. Want to continue using them?

2. What about the central tabulators and precinct aggregaters (the problem is with digital vote processing SYSTEMS not just how you enter the votes into the system)? Do the audit protocols prevent fraud anywhere in the system?

3. Are audits performed after the complete precinct-level machine count has been established and released to the public?

4. Are all precinct totals published (both digitally processed counts and hand counted audits) and published before the vote is certified by the state?

5. Is the ballot chain-of-custody sufficient to ensure the ballots hand-counted in audits are definitively the same as those originally cast?

Hand counted audits must:

be performed at the precinct level and compared publicly to publicly released precinct totals
be preformed only after public release of verified precinct-level machine totals
be entirely random at the precinct level and occur in every precinct.
be sufficiently statistically significant to reveal a vote flip (+x,-x) and straight miscount (undervotes/overvotes) percentages needed to change the outcome of the election being audited.
be performed under strict audit protocols with an audited paper ballot chain-of-custody by multi-partisan representatives in full public view.

Might be easier to hand count in the first place; but, hey, let's do audits instead.

[kster]

17. Ouch! you are 100% correct.......nt

[BeFree]

18. Hand Counted Audits of Paper Ballots -- HCAPB

The current crop of machines should be thrown into Boston Harbor.

Not until we get a machine that real computer experts will testify to it's functionality would machines be used. At present time there is no such machine.

Audits would take place first, then the ballots run through the machine, both processes taking place in front of same witnesses, before any totals are made public.

The ballots would never leave the precinct in which they were cast until both the audit and machine run. Chain of custody being observed by humans and camera, if need be.

Obviously, we need more info about audits. We need audit protocols published and widely understood. The laws establishing audits are NOT widely understood.... WE NEED AUDIT PROTOCOLS - YESTERDAY

[Febble]

19. "WE NEED AUDIT PROTOCOLS - YESTERDAY"

Absolutely. And today, and forever.

And they must be random and the chain of custody must be secure.


:applause:

[BeFree]

20. Huh?

Never heard of 'random audit protocols'.

Oh wait, I get it now, you agree that we need audit protocols, and included in those protocols there must be a protocol that any audit will be randomly undertaken?

And that the chain of custody protocol makes that any such custody as secure and trustworthy as can be?

So, who do we see about having the protocols written so that virtually anyone can read and understand those protocols?

Seems like a job for the Vote.orgs, eh?

[Febble]

21. Yes, you get it

but random selection isn't as easy as it looks. I'd like to see the exact selection protocol spelled out in any legislation.

Yes, it's a job for the vote.orgs, and, as you say, the difficult part will be making it both rigorous and yet understandable.

[BeFree]

22. Why not audit every machine?

How about a 10% audit of every machine? 50%?

[Febble]

26. Well, I don't think you can do a partial audit

of a single machine (not a precinct machine, anyway - maybe you meant a county machine?)

You have to think what you want your audit to be of. You might audit a certain number of machines, or a certain number or precincts (best to think in numbers, not percentages).

The point is that if you are going to audit by handcounting (or recounting) a sample from a larger set (called, in stats, a "population") you have to decide what that set is. It could be county, or it could be state. And what matters is not the percentage but the number in your sample. The smaller the population, the larger the right-sized sample will be, as a percentage of the population.

[BeFree]

28. Audit every machine in every precinct

I want hand counts and no machines until such time as a machine is made that has all the best technology and the experts can't design one any better.

We put one of those machines in every precinct in the U.S.

We hand count a percentage of the votes in each and every precinct. If the precinct is small the percentage is higher, if the precinct is large, the percentage is lower.

We do the hand count of the paper ballots before the machine has a chance to count the ballots. We then have, from the HCPB audit, a number that the machine should match.

We run the ballots through the machine. If the machine does not match the HCPB audit by a certain +/- percent, the rest of the ballots are hand counted because the machine failed.

Every machine in every precinct is audited. That way we have a hand count of paper ballots. But we compromise by allowing a machine to find the totals.

If the audit numbers and machine numbers don't match, ALL the ballots are hand counted.

[Stevepol]

23. Here's an idea: The machines are OK but we count the paper. Like this:

You have the vote, and whatever the machine says, the winners are announced as the winners pro-tem. Meanwhile, the paper ballots are counted and however long it takes, 2 weeks, a month or whatever is fine. If the paper gives a different story from the machine, the paper trumps and the real winner assumes the office the guy has temporarily been re-decorating.

How about that?

In Germany, Steve Freeman says someplace, the exit polls are trusted enough that the results are accepted for the time being and the exit poll winners assume their offices. Very seldom does the hand-count change those results. If the hand count, which usually takes about two weeks, does change the picture, then the exit poll winner is replaced by the real winner.

Actually, one of the Dem candidates for SoS here in KS, Robert Beattie, the author of the book about the BTK killer, has presented the idea I've sketched above as the way to get around the machines while assuring an accurate hand count. I'm hopeful he wins the Dem primary and then can take on Ron Thornburgh, KS' present SoS, who brags about his help in getting the HAVA act written and accepted. The primary is Aug 1. I have my fingers crossed.

[Febble]

24. Well, I don't think you are right

about Germany. The German exit polls weren't accurate in 2005, anyway.

But I think an important point needs making here, in that we (Brits) count our paper ballots really quickly, which means that the ballots are constantly supervised (under TV cameras in fact, from the moment the boxes are emptied. The longer you take to count them, the more opportunity there is for fraud. There are plenty of ways to steal a hand-counted election.

If you want to hand count your presidential election, I think you have to do it right away, as we do. Maybe it's the down-ticket races that need to wait.

Our polls close at 10pm, and our new government is in office by the end of the following day.

[peacetheonlyway]

25. 10% randomized race audit

and I would welcome such a compromise...

meaning each precinct puts in a hat all the race choices and audits based on the race someone picks from a hat.

one single vote out of place, triggers a countywide audit...

3 or more counties out of place triggers statewide audit..

that's the only way to get around what happened in Ohio and NM with the recounts not really happening..

[Febble]

27. 10% of what?

Statistical power (mostly) doesn't depend on the percentage, but on the sample size. What are you sampling, and from what?

And my concern is that if your standards are too stringent ( "one single vote out of place") you will get cheating simply to avoid hassle. Suspiciously tidy recounts. No counting system is that accurate - no voter is that accurate. If you want honest recounts you have to have standards that can be met with honesty. British full hand-recounts rarely come up with the same number twice (though we keep recounting until everyone is happy).

[autorank]

29. Why?

The number of safeguards required are much more labor intensive than simply putting out paper ballots counted in public and retained over time for anyone who wants to count them. Remember Florida's sunshine law...that allowed people to go look at the ballots, count them. It should be like that everywhere.

One point is important to remember: there are not enough computer experts to examine all the machines at the level necessary to make sure there is no fooling around. Who else found what Hursti found? Maybe somebody and I don't mean to start that debate again. Lets say there was one other person. That's the caliber of person you need to satisfy me as a citizen that my vote was handled well.

The key to paper ballots is counting in public, open air, like they do in England. You can never do that with a computer.

When any element of the process is "secret" then you have an election where the poo bahs cannot prove they were elected, I don't how well it's secured...secret is secret.

I knew I'd disagree with you at some point. Why don't you just change your mind so I can feel better:rofl:

[BeFree]

30. Disagree?

You don't disagree, you just think you do. :rofl:

Don't you know we have to have computers to count our vote, that is what two experts say. All the rest of the experts say that the current crop of election computers is stupid. But those two experts will not be denied!
End :sarcasm:

I think it is possible that a computer could be built and softwared to make a computer not be so stupid to use.

Of course, we have not yet seen such a computer, and we may never, since such a thing would mean that elections could no longer be so easily stolen.

And if elections could not be so easily stolen it would mean that the repuklicans would lose control, in fact, all the BIG money corps would lose control and the people would gain the upper hand. You do agree, eh?

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

31. I think paper ballots are doable

I repeat, I am in favor of hand counted paper ballots.

How you get there is the issue.

We had Chuck Herrin testify to our State Legislature,
(he is a North Carolina resident) -it just wasnt enough.

Remember, half of the country has used paperless lever machines for at least
40 years or more, and a large sector has used paperless electronic voting for
up to 20 years.

My state had paperless electronic voting since the 80s in half of the counties.

It takes a huge amount of work to change the mindset of the entire nation.

It won't happen in a few months, and isn't likely to happen in just a few years.

But it is possible.

[BeFree]

36. Thanks

It is possible. And given our current state of affairs, it must be done.

It's like a cancer patient that must quit smoking.

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

38. remember, that took a long while a tons of work

just so you won't be surprised.

The tobacco thing got a heck of a lot more press and
more people were aware of it.

The sponsor of our bill pointed out to me that the voting machine
thing was similar in nature to the tobacco industry
and their hold.

I see it happening incrementally.

We figure that with the paper, we can prove if the machines
are mucking up.

At least enough times to get attention to it.

Without any paper, the machines muck up, and every one says-

"Not enough votes were lost to affect the outcome of the eletion,
all problems were due to poll worker or human error."

I have seen this said over and over in newspapers across our state,
and we have written these reporters as many times, until they learned.

My lawmaker said 10 years.
I say maybe 5 or more.
She is wiser than me though.

[BeFree]

39. True

They all figure it can't happen here.

But that is not what this thread is about.

Where is that op-scan that we can trust? I keep hearing about it, maybe you know where it can be found?

[kster]

41. Get the "make believe media" to tell the people

that the votes are being counted in secret, and paper ballots hand counted will be in place faster than a, cat trying to shit on a hot tin roof.

[autorank]

32. We agree on this...

"And if elections could not be so easily stolen it would mean that the Republicans would lose control, in fact, all the BIG money corps would lose control and the people would gain the upper hand. You do agree, eh?"

Totally.

If you can tell me we have enough experts, real hot shots, not Delta Gammas from Ohio (who were to do ESS maintenance;), then I'll say sure, maybe as long as all the other criteria are met.

But I'd still come down on NO WAY because computerized voting and tabulation (both of which I oppose, is done in secret. Secret anything, when highly workable alternatives are available, are unacceptable in a democracy. I think that's our key point to the general public, secret voting=tyranny.

Is it better to solve some of the problems along the way or go for the total solution now?

Solving problems along the way just delays the real solution, which is very readily available, it's right there. It lulls people into thinking that the problem is addressed. Along the way, between now and the restoration of paper voting, open counting, the vigilance of watching and catching computer problems and mitigation in those areas is a good idea.

[BeFree]

35. Right there

"Solving problems along the way just delays the real solution, which is very readily available, it's right there."

It sure is. Here is the solution:

The machines should be unplugged, returned to the vendors and lawsuits filed to recoup the BILLIONS paid to those vendors, and dropped only when the vendors offer a machine that follows all election laws without question.

Robert Kennedy, for one, is seeing to just that.

[autorank]

37. Right on and so forth!!! :) Lets have a "Cyber Boston Tea Party"

No more bull shit, no more secret voting & counting, stop the smoke screen or "fixes", it's over, we don't believe any of it. ...but hey, that's just one citizen's opinion.

[timewellspent]

33. You don't understand that a voter needs to know his vote is counted

I respectively think that the voter has to know how their vote is being counted. This being said, at the present time, a voter (in an optical count precinct system) puts the ballot into the machine that is counting the ballot. If there is a mistake, the voter needs to know that then, not later when a human is counting the vote.

This is the way it is. You will not get rid of the machine, what we have to do is to make sure the machine is counting correctly. There are public test and openness to each election process. Go to your county and ask questions.

As far as the DRE's are concerned, that is a different ball game.

[BeFree]

34. I don't understand...

...are you saying that the present op-scans make it certain that a voter know how it's vote is being counted?

How does one go about to "make sure the machine is counting correctly"?

Some computer experts looked at op-scans and said they were not sure the machines were counting correctly.... how is a voter to know if not even an expert can know?

[Awsi Dooger]

40. Here's an interesting idea from a new DUer

meldroc posted this today in GD Politics. I thought it was a unique solution, although multiple steps and machinery means it isn't likely to happen.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=132&topic_id=2741003&mesg_id=2741186

"For one, I don't trust electronic voting machines. Being a software engineer, and having followed the Diebold scandal, I know it is far too easy for a technically knowledgeable person to compromise the machines and steal an election.

Computerized voting machines such as touch-screen machines and other machines do have the advantages of speed (as mentioned) and of being accessible to the disabled.

I would be in favor of setting up a system as follows:

Have a touch-screen/accessible electronic machine with a shiny, friendly GUI that is completely non-networked, and comes with a printer. All this machine does is accept the voter's input and print out a paper ballot. The paper ballot would be similar to the optical scan ballots used today in many places (aka a fill-in-the-bubbles scantron ballot, with the bubbles automatically filled in for you.) The voter would then read the ballot, verify that the ballot has the correct votes on it, then put it in the ballot box.

Once the polls close, the ballots are counted. First round of counting is by optical scan machine, to count the ballots quickly and accurately. If an election is close (less than 2 percentage points, or statistically insignificant), or there are any sort of challenges to the count, including a public petition with enough signatures, then the ballots are recounted, by hand (no you can't just run them through the machine again), in a place where the public can watch. Observers from all political parties will be present, and the final count will not be submitted until all observers agree the count is accurate.

Basically hand-counting, but with automation where it makes sense."

[OnTheOtherHand]

42. well, there ought to be some hand auditing

Using DREs to mark op-scan ballots seems OK, although of course there is some theoretical advantage to not letting the voters touch the paper. (Over against that, it's not very friendly to ask people to audit a piece of paper that they can't even hold.) The AutoMark concept is similar: http://www.vogueelection.com/products_automark.html (but the AutoMark doesn't print ballots itself).

If you don't audit some precincts, you don't have much basis for confidence about how close the election is. Even innocent errors could wreak havoc. (On the other hand, to insist on a full hand count for any race within 2% seems excessive -- but those are political judgments, which I generally don't pound the table on.)

It's sort of a nitpick, but most statisticians would agree that there is no such thing as a "statistically insignificant" lead, because voters aren't a sample. Probably the poster is thinking about some other form of error, not sampling error.

[Awsi Dooger]

45. Voter touching the ballot was the main flaw with meldroc's idea

I should have mentioned that in my previous post. Too many things can go wrong.

I wonder if you could have the machine print an op-scan ballot that shows up side-by-side, like a paper trail. At conclusion, the screen lists the candidate name and corresponding number, then the voter verifies them, before hitting a send button to store the ballot.

That probably takes too damn long and you might need supersize op-scan cards, or some method to easily verify them.

[kster]

43. "experts can survey at any time" Leaves the election in to few hands

They can be bought, they can be put in place by the other side, as we see with the goverments certification of these machines in the first place.

We can't accept the "EXPERTS" word on our Democracy, we need to insist on Hand Counting the Paper Ballots in each and every election, all of them, no matter how they get counted in the first place, we need to set up counting rooms so that there is a full hand count of all the paper ballots. That way the counting will never fall into the hands of a few, ever again.

If everyone knows there will be a second count, by the hands of the people automatic, and out in the open for all to see, we have safety in numbers, it would be pretty hard for them to pay off all the people needed to hand count the paper ballots.

NOT A RECOUNT! A second and automatic counting of the paper ballots!

[mod mom]

44. Hand Counted at the PRECINCT LEVEL with full public witness!

[diva77]

46. What is your strategy for bringing this to fruition? Would be helpful to

know!

:hi:

[Febble]

47. Can't imagine that would work.

With tens of thousands of precincts, it would be an invitation for corruption.

In the UK we cast our paper ballots into a ballot box, and at the end of the day, the boxes are sealed in the presence of witnesses. The ballot boxes are numbered. They are then transported to the "count" which is done at "constituency" level (about 30,000-40,000) voters per constituency, and is usually a school gym or town hall, open to the public, and with TV cameras present. The ballot boxes are unsealed in the presence of witnesses, and emptied onto tables. The public is usually kept behind a roped barrier, but bipartisan appointed scrutineers patrol the counting tables. The counting is done by experienced tellers, usually bank tellers.

Election night: Able to move at six times the speed of normal humans, and with extra ghostly arms to help out, the ballot counters of Newton Aycliffe are expected to be among the first to declare a result.

http://politics.guardian.co.uk/election2005/gallery/0,15977,1471463,00.html

[diva77]

48. If people were summoned for ballot counting as they are for jury duty, I

think it could work.

I'm sure there are far more precise posts as to what would be required (please post links if anyone knows of any), but here is what I figure roughly:

A precinct has 1000 voters approximately, and you need 8 (?) people present to conduct hcpb, that means that you'd only need to show up once every 125 elections.

It takes approximately 15 minutes to process 200 ballots by hand per race (this was recently documented in CA), so that means if you have, for example a ballot with

9 state races
2 national races
1 Party central committee
8 judicial races
1 school race
3 county races
2 state measures

That is a total of 26 races. If you assume 1000 voters show up (highly unlikely with the increase in absentee voting--numbers more likely to be under 200) that would mean

75 min. per race X 26 races which equals 32 hours needed to count in the most labor intensive situation possible. So perhaps 4 shifts of people could be summoned for
duty as a better cya plan. That means you would be expected to serve once every 31 elections. Still not bad. No maintenance of machinery required other than food and shelter.


:hurts: