http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/editorial/outlook/2509395Iran's mullahs influencing resistance in Iraq
By REZA LADJEVARDIAN
We are currently witnessing the most serious uprising by the Shiites against the American presence in Iraq since the invasion, led by Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army. This comes less than a month after the conservatives in Iran disqualified most of the reformists running in the parliamentary elections and thereby further consolidated their grip on power. These two events are deeply related and underscore the alarming influence of Iran's conservatives in Iraq.
The present uprising was triggered by the counterproductive and hypocritical decision by U.S. administrator of Iraq L. Paul Bremer to shut down al-Sadr's propaganda newspaper, Al-Hawza. The United States is in Iraq supposedly to promote democracy. We have no business shutting down newspapers we disapprove of, no matter how inflammatory their rhetoric may be.
Nonetheless, al-Sadr was on a collusion course with American forces and conflict was inevitable. The radicalization of the political environment in the run up to the June 30 hand over in Iraq serves the objectives of Iran's conservative mullahs.
After their recent naked power grab in Iran and the Iranian people's apathy toward the plight of the reformists, who consistently failed to deliver on their promises, the conservatives now feel more secure about their powerbase in Iran and are more emboldened to challenge America in Iraq. They now feel the best defense to ensure their position in Iran is a good offense in Iraq.
Al-Sadr has learned very well from his conservative role models in Iran. The vast majority of the Iranians didn't want a theocracy at the time of the revolution, but rather a democratic regime that respected their Islamic values. However, an organized and extremely militant group around Ayatollah Khomeini through force and intimidation outmaneuvered far higher ranking clerics such as Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who wasn't willing to shed blood.
Similar to how the taking of the American hostages resulted in the further radicalization of Iran's Islamic revolution and the marginalization of the more tolerant, democratic Islamic leaders, the present uprising is a power play by radicals such as al-Sadr to undermine and marginalize moderates, such as Ayatollah Ali Sistani.
Al-Sadr is trying to copy Khomeini's formula. By setting himself up as the undisputable leader of the anti-American camp of the Shiites, al-Sadr hopes for a harsh retaliation by the American forces to boost anti-Americanism among the Shiites.
This way, he'll compel Sistani to increasingly become more critical of the American occupation or risk marginalization. Either way, al-Sadr will enhance his own prestige and following. He believes that through intimidation, he can also leverage his organized yet relatively small militant group.
Al-Sadr has consistently advocated for an Iranian-like theocracy, traveled to Iran and received considerable financing and training from Iran's Revolutionary guards. His pre-eminent father, who was assassinated by Saddam Hussein, even argued for velayat-e faqi, in line with Khomeini's rule by jurists.
Al-Sadr is playing a pivotal role in the Iranian mullahs' Iraqi game plan by radicalizing the political environment. But he is not the only piece. The mullahs have hedged their bets by supporting all the key Shiite players in Iraq.
Sistani has had extensive personal and financial ties with Iran's ayatollahs for decades. Although he comes from the quietest school of Shiite Islam and renounces direct governance by the clergy, he favors making the Islamic Sharia law the principal source of Iraq's national law, and rejects the interim constitution. Another top Shiite leader is Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim of the Supreme Council for Islamic Republic, or SCIR. Although he has joined the Governing Council, his organization was founded in Iran and funded by Iran's mullahs. He also lived in Iran for more than two decades trying to over throw Saddam. SCIR's Badr brigade was financed and trained by Iran's Revolutionary guards. Even Ahmad Chalabi, who is the Pentagon's favorite person, has been strongly courting the Iranian mullahs on his numerous visits to Tehran.
The financial and ideological influence of Iran's conservatives on the Iraqi Shiite leadership makes it virtually impossible to get Iraq right without also simultaneously focusing on Iran. The Bush administration needs to urgently develop a strategy to bolster Iran's democratic movement, since exiting Iraq is not an option. Otherwise, Iraq could become a far bigger quagmire with far wider and more negative and enduring repercussions than Vietnam.
Ladjevardian, an Iranian-American, is a Houston-based writer. He can be e-mailed at
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